I would think the use of these programs and methods would only serve to call additional, unwanted attention to yourself.

For more information;

http://www.panta-rhei.eu.org/news/newsportal-0.36/article.php?id=94218&group=alt.privacy#94218
http://www.panta-rhei.eu.org/pantawiki/SecurityAndEncryptionFaq
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hushmail
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zfone

I believe it may also be possible to use DriveCrypt Plus Pack to achieve “plausible deniability”

DCPP is supposed to enable the user to hide an entire operating system inside the free disk space of another operating system. Two passwords are required: One password is for the visible operating system, the other for the invisible one. The first “fake” password grants access to a pre-configured operating system (outer OS), while the other gives grants access to the real working operating system. This functionality is extremely useful if the user fears that someone may force them to provide the DCPP password; in this case, the user simply gives away the first (fake) password so that the snoop will be able to boot into the system, but only see the prepared information that they wishes them to find. The attacker will not be able to see any confidential and personal data and he will also not be able to understand that the machine is storing one more hidden operating system. On the other hand, if the user enters the private password (for the invisible disk), the system will boot a different operating system (the working system) giving the user the access to all the confidential data.

The creation of a hidden operating system is not obligatory and as such, it is not possible for anyone who does not have the hidden OS password to know or find out, if a hidden operating system exists or not.

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1. Perfect forward secrecy: Messages are only encrypted with temporary per-message AES keys, negotiated using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. The compromise of any long-lived cryptographic keys does not compromise any previous conversations, even if an attacker is in possession of ciphertexts.

2. Deniable authentication: Messages in a conversation do not have digital signatures, and after a conversation is complete, anyone is able to forge a message to appear to have come from one of the participants in the conversation, assuring that it is impossible to prove that a specific message came from a specific person.

TrueCrypt provides an “aleatory” defence against RIPA, and, indeed, against any similar legislation. This defence works because TrueCrypt makes encrypted material indistinguishable from pseudo-random data. And before the authorities can insist that you hand over an encryption key, they would first be obliged to prove to the satisfaction of a court that you were in possession of encrypted material. Depending on how TrueCrypt is set up it might be obvious that you have some pseudo-random data in an atypical location on your computer, and you might well be asked how it got there. Now, there are many computer processes that produce pseudo-random data, and you are not obliged by the legislation to account for the origins of every file on your computer that contains such data given the tens of thousands of files on the average PC this would be an impossible task. However, TrueCrypt can also provide you with an excellent and highly plausible reason as to why you possess such a file of pseudo-random data irrespective of where it is found.

The UK government is going to deprive honest an law-abiding citizens of their liberties while criminals can carry on theirs businesses as usual, with just a little software upgrade.

Free software like TrueCrypt can conceal encrypted material in a way that prevent its detection.

In case the Police forces you to reveal your password, TrueCrypt provides and supports two kinds of “plausible deniability”:

1. Hidden volumes. The principle is that a TrueCrypt volume is created within another TrueCrypt volume (within the free space on the volume). Even when the outer volume is mounted, it is impossible to prove whether there is a hidden volume within it or not, because free space on any TrueCrypt volume is always filled with random data when the volume is created* and no part of the (dismounted) hidden volume can be distinguished from random data. Note that TrueCrypt does not modify the file system (information about free space, etc.) within the outer volume in any way.

2. It is impossible to identify a TrueCrypt volume. Until decrypted, a TrueCrypt volume appears to consist of nothing more than random data (it does not contain any kind of “signature”). Therefore, it is impossible to prove that a file, a partition or a device is a TrueCrypt volume or that it has been encrypted.

FreeOTFE also offers similar features.

Off-the-Record (OTR) Messaging, offers true deniability for instant messaging.