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	<title>Comments on: Entertainment Cartels Rule. Everywhere.</title>
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		<title>By: The Great Deceiver</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-782570</link>
		<dc:creator>The Great Deceiver</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 06:17:30 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>So why does this website waste it&#039;s time posting trivel like this ? first of all everybody knows that the US congress and the US goverment is corrupt to the bone and they take kickbacks and bribes from the entertainment cartels.
 
It is NEVER going to change.

.The US goverment supports all kinds of obsolete business models such as silly(civil sevice) tax supported military exchange retail outlets that are badly managed and don&#039;t make a profit and private business contractors that generally rip of the federal goverment.

 The US congress supports billions of dollars worth of useless pork barrel spending.

The federal goverment  has always propped up failing businesses for bad business practices or other wise providing corporate welfare (PROTECTIONISM)for other failing american businesses other than the entertainment cartels.

If i think about the business practices of the movie and recording industry i think of ANTITRUST SUIT...............
GET OVER IT...............THINGS ARE NEVER GOING TO CHANGE.

DON&#039;T BUY THIER PRODUCTS AND WHY DON&#039;T YOU QUIT YOUR CRYING ...........................

Competition law
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  (Redirected from Antitrust)
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&quot;Antitrust&quot; redirects here. For the 2001 film, see Antitrust (film). For laws specific to the U.S., see United States antitrust law.

Competition law, known in the United States as antitrust law, has three main elements:

    * prohibiting agreements or practices that restrict free trading and competition between business entities. This includes in particular the repression of cartels.
    * banning abusive behaviour by a firm dominating a market, or anti-competitive practices that tend to lead to such a dominant position. Practices controlled in this way may include predatory pricing, tying, price gouging, refusal to deal, and many others.
    * supervising the mergers and acquisitions of large corporations, including some joint ventures. Transactions that are considered to threaten the competitive process can be prohibited altogether, or approved subject to &quot;remedies&quot; such as an obligation to divest part of the merged business or to offer licences or access to facilities to enable other businesses to continue competing.

The substance and produce of competition Act vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Protecting the interests of consumers (consumer welfare) and ensuring that entrepreneurs have an opportunity to compete in the market economy are often treated as important objectives. Competition law is closely connected with law on deregulation of access to markets, state aids and subsidies, the privatisation of state owned assets and the establishment of independent sector regulators. In recent decades, competition law has been viewed as a way to provide better public services.[1] Robert Bork has found that competition laws can produce adverse effects when they reduce competition by protecting inefficient competitors and when costs of legal intervention are greater then benefits for the consumers.[2] The history of competition law reaches back to the Roman Empire. The business practices of market traders, guilds and governments have always been subject to scrutiny, and sometimes severe sanctions. Since the twentieth century, competition law has become global. The two largest and most influential systems of competition regulation are United States antitrust law and European Community competition law. National and regional competition authorities across the world have formed international support and enforcement networks.
Contents
[hide]

    * 1 History
          o 1.1 Roman legislation
          o 1.2 Middle ages
          o 1.3 Renaissance developments
          o 1.4 Restraint of trade
    * 2 Today
          o 2.1 United States antitrust
          o 2.2 Development in other countries
          o 2.3 European Union law
          o 2.4 International enforcement
    * 3 Theory
          o 3.1 Classical perspective
          o 3.2 Neo-classical synthesis
          o 3.3 Chicago School
          o 3.4 Policy developments
    * 4 Practice
          o 4.1 Collusion and cartels
          o 4.2 Dominance and monopoly
          o 4.3 Mergers and acquisitions
          o 4.4 Public sector regulation
    * 5 See also
    * 6 Notes
    * 7 References
    * 8 Further reading
    * 9 External links

[edit] History
Competition law
Basic concepts

    * History of competition law
    * Monopolization
          o Coercive monopoly
          o Natural monopoly
    * Barriers to entry
    * Market power
    * SSNIP test
    * Relevant market
    * Merger control

Anti-competitive practices

    * Collusion
          o Formation of cartels
          o Price fixing
          o Bid rigging
    * Product bundling and tying
    * Refusal to deal
          o Group boycott
    * Exclusive dealing
    * Dividing territories
    * Conscious parallelism
    * Predatory pricing
    * Misuse of patents and copyrights

Laws and doctrines

United States

    * Sherman Antitrust Act
    * Clayton Antitrust Act
    * Robinson-Patman Act
    * FTC Act
    * Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
    * Merger guidelines
    * Essential facilities doctrine
    * Noerr-Pennington doctrine
    * Rule of reason

Europe

    * European Community
      competition law
    * Irish Competition Law
    * Competition Act 1998 (UK)

Australia

    * Trade Practices Act 1974

Enforcement authorities and organizations

    * International Competition Network
    * List of competition regulators

edit box

    Main article: History of competition law

Laws governing competition law are found in over two millennia of history. Roman Emperors and Medieval monarchs alike used tariffs to stabilize prices or support local production. The formal study of &quot;competition&quot;, began in earnest during the 18th century with such works as Adam Smith&#039;s The Wealth of Nations. Different terms were used to describe this area of the law, including &quot;restrictive practices&quot;, &quot;the law of monopolies&quot;, &quot;combination acts&quot; and the &quot;restraint of trade&quot;.

[edit] Roman legislation

    See also: Roman law

An early example of competition law is the Lex Julia de Annona, enacted during the Roman Republic around 50 BC.[3] To protect the grain trade, heavy fines were imposed on anyone directly, deliberately and insidiously stopping supply ships.[4] Under Diocletian in 301 AD an edict imposed the death penalty for anyone violating a tariff system, for example by buying up, concealing or contriving the scarcity of everyday goods.[5]

More legislation came under the Constitution of Zeno of 483 AD, which can be traced into Florentine Municipal laws of 1322 and 1325.[6] This provided for confiscation of property and banishment for any trade combinations or joint action of monopolies private or granted by the Emperor. Zeno rescinded all previously granted exclusive rights.[7] Justinian I subsequently introduced legislation to pay officials to manage state monopolies.[8] As Europe slipped into the dark ages, so did the records of law making until the Middle Ages brought greater expansion of trade in the time of lex mercatoria.

[edit] Middle ages

    See also: Lex Mercatoria and Guilds

Edward III during the Black Death enacted the Statute of Labourers to cap wages, and provide double damages against infringers
Edward III during the Black Death enacted the Statute of Labourers to cap wages, and provide double damages against infringers

Legislation in England to control monopolies and restrictive practices were in force well before the Norman Conquest.[9] The Domesday Book recorded that &quot;foresteel&quot; (i.e. forestalling, the practice of buying up goods before they reach market and then inflating the prices) was one of three forfeitures that King Edward the Confessor could carry out through England.[10] But concern for fair prices also led to attempts to directly regulate the market. Under Henry III an act was passed in 1266[11] to fix bread and ale prices in correspondence with corn prices laid down by the assizes. Penalties for breach included amercements, pillory and tumbrel.[12] A fourteenth century statute labelled forestallers as &quot;oppressors of the poor and the community at large and enemies of the whole country.&quot;[13] Under King Edward III the Statute of Labourers of 1349[14] fixed wages of artificers and workmen and decreed that foodstuffs should be sold at reasonable prices. On top of existing penalties, the statute stated that overcharging merchants must pay the injured party double the sum he received, an idea that has been replicated in punitive treble damages under US antitrust law. Also under Edward III, the following statutory provision outlawed trade combinations.[15]

    &quot;...we have ordained and established, that no merchant or other shall make Confederacy, Conspiracy, Coin, Imagination, or Murmur, or Evil Device in any point that may turn to the Impeachment, Disturbance, Defeating or Decay of the said Staples, or of anything that to them pertaineth, or may pertain.&quot;

Examples of legislation in mainland Europe include the constitutiones juris metallici by Wenceslas II of Bohemia between 1283 and 1305, condemning combinations of ore traders increasing prices; the Municipal Statutes of Florence in 1322 and 1325 followed Zeno&#039;s legislation against state monopolies; and under Emperor Charles V in the Holy Roman Empire a law was passed &quot;to prevent losses resulting from monopolies and improper contracts which many merchants and artisans made in the Netherlands.&quot; In 1553 King Henry VIII reintroduced tariffs for foodstuffs, designed to stabilise prices, in the face of fluctuations in supply from overseas. So the legislation read here that whereas,

    &quot;it is very hard and difficult to put certain prices to any such things... [it is necessary because] prices of such victuals be many times enhanced and raised by the Greedy Covetousness and Appetites of the Owners of such Victuals, by occasion of ingrossing and regrating the same, more than upon any reasonable or just ground or cause, to the great damage and impoverishing of the King&#039;s subjects.&quot;[16]

Around this time organisations representing various tradesmen and handicraftspeople, known as guilds had been developing, and enjoyed many concessions and exemptions from the laws against monopolies. The privileges conferred were not abolished until the Municipal Corporations Act 1835.

[edit] Renaissance developments

    See also: Renaissance

Elizabeth I assured monopolies would not be abused in the early era of globalisation
Elizabeth I assured monopolies would not be abused in the early era of globalisation

Europe around the 15th century was changing quickly. The new world had just been opened up, overseas trade and plunder was pouring wealth through the international economy and attitudes among businessmen were shifting. In 1561 a system of Industrial Monopoly Licences, similar to modern patents had been introduced into England. But by the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, the system was reputedly much abused and used merely to preserve privileges, encouraging nothing new in the way of innovation or manufacture.[17] When a protest was made in the House of Commons and a Bill was introduced, the Queen convinced the protesters to challenge the case in the courts. This was the catalyst for the Case of Monopolies or Darcy v. Allin.[18] The plaintiff, an officer of the Queen&#039;s household, had been granted the sole right of making playing cards and claimed damages for the defendant&#039;s infringement of this right. The court found the grant void and that three characteristics of monopoly were (1) price increases (2) quality decrease (3) the tendency to reduce artificers to idleness and beggary. This put a temporary end to complaints about monopoly, until King James I began to grant them again. In 1623 Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies, which for the most part excluded patent rights from its prohibitions, as well as guilds. From King Charles I, through the civil war and to King Charles II, monopolies continued, especially useful for raising revenue.[19] Then in 1684, in East India Company v. Sandys[20] it was decided that exclusive rights to trade only outside the realm were legitimate, on the grounds that only large and powerful concerns could trade in the conditions prevailing overseas. In 1710 to deal with high coal prices caused by a Newcastle Coal Monopoly the New Law was passed.[21] Its provisions stated that &quot;all and every contract or contracts, Covenants and Agreements, whether the same be in writing or not in writing... are hereby declared to be illegal.&quot; When Adam Smith wrote the Wealth of Nations in 1776[22] he was somewhat cynical of the possibility for change.

    &quot;To expect indeed that freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain is as absurd as to expect that Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but what is more unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals irresistibly oppose it. The Member of Parliament who supports any proposal for strengthening this Monopoly is seen to acquire not only the reputation for understanding trade, but great popularity and influence with an order of men whose members and wealth render them of great importance.&quot;

[edit] Restraint of trade

    Main article: Restraint of trade

Judge Coke in the 17th century thought that general restraints on trade were unreasonable
Judge Coke in the 17th century thought that general restraints on trade were unreasonable

The English law of restraint of trade is the direct predecessor to modern competition law.[23] Its current use is small, given modern and economically oriented statutes in most common law countries. Its approach was based on the two concepts of prohibiting agreements that ran counter to public policy, unless the reasonableness of an agreement could be shown. A restraint of trade is simply some kind of agreed provision that is designed to restrain another&#039;s trade. For example, in Nordenfelt v. Maxim, Nordenfelt Gun Co.[24] a Swedish arm inventor promised on sale of his business to an American gun maker that he &quot;would not make guns or ammunition anywhere in the world, and would not compete with Maxim in any way.&quot;

To be consider whether or not there is a restraint of trade in the first place, both parties must have provided valuable consideration for their agreement. In Dyer&#039;s case[25] a dyer had given a bond not to exercise his trade in the same town as the plaintiff for six months but the plaintiff had promised nothing in return. On hearing the plaintiff&#039;s attempt to enforce this restraint, Hull J exclaimed,

    &quot;per Dieu, if the plaintiff were here, he should go to prison until he had paid a fine to the King.&quot;

The common law has evolved to reflect changing business conditions. So in the 1613 case of Rogers v. Parry[26] a court held that a joiner who promised not to trade from his house for 21 years could have this bond enforced against him since the time and place was certain. It was also held that a man cannot bind himself to not use his trade generally by Chief Justice Coke. This was followed in Broad v. Jolyffe[27] and Mitchell v. Reynolds[28] where Lord Macclesfield asked, &quot;What does it signify to a tradesman in London what another does in Newcastle?&quot; In times of such slow communications, commerce around the country it seemed axiomatic that a general restraint served no legitimate purpose for one&#039;s business and ought to be void. But already in 1880 in Roussillon v. Roussillon[29] Lord Justice Fry stated that a restraint unlimited in space need not be void, since the real question was whether it went further than necessary for the promisee&#039;s protection. So in the Nordenfelt[30] case Lord McNaughton ruled that while one could validly promise to &quot;not make guns or ammunition anywhere in the world&quot; it was an unreasonable restraint to &quot;not compete with Maxim in any way.&quot; This approach in England was confirmed by the House of Lords in Mason v. The Provident Supply and Clothing Co.[31]

[edit] Today

Modern competition law begins with the United States legislation of the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914. While other, particularly European, countries also had some form of regulation on monopolies and cartels, the US codification of the common law position on restraint of trade had a widespread effect on subsequent competition law development. Both after World War II and after the fall of the Berlin wall competition law has gone through phases of renewed attention and legislative updates around the world.

[edit] United States antitrust

    Main article: United States antitrust law

Modern competition law is modeled on the United States&#039; Sherman Act, which aimed to &quot;bust the trusts&quot;.
Modern competition law is modeled on the United States&#039; Sherman Act, which aimed to &quot;bust the trusts&quot;.

The American term anti-trust arose not because the US statutes had anything to do with ordinary trust law, but because the large American corporations used trusts to conceal the nature of their business arrangements. Big trusts became synonymous with big monopolies, the perceived threat to democracy and the free market these trusts represented led to the Sherman and Clayton Acts. These laws, in part, codified past American and English common law of restraints of trade. Senator Hoar, an author of the Sherman Act said in a debate, &quot;We have affirmed the old doctrine of the common law in regard to all inter-state and international commercial transactions and have clothed the United States courts with authority to enforce that doctrine by injunction.&quot; Evidence of the common law basis of the Sherman and Clayton acts is found in the Standard Oil case,[32] where Chief Justice White explicitly linked the Sherman Act with the common law and sixteenth century English statutes on engrossing.[33] The Act&#039;s wording also reflects common law. The first two sections read as follows,

    &quot;Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine....

    Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine....&quot;

The Sherman Act did not have the immediate effects its authors intended, though Republican President Theodore Roosevelt&#039;s federal government sued 45 companies, and William Taft used it against 75. The Clayton Act of 1914 was passed to supplement the Sherman Act. Specific categories of abusive conduct were listed, including price discrimination(section 2), exclusive dealings (section 3) and mergers which substantially lessen competition (section 7). Section 6 exempted trade unions from the law&#039;s operation. Both the Sherman and Clayton acts are now codified under Title 15 of the United States Code.

Since the mid-1970s, courts and enforcement officials generally have supported view that antitrust law policy should not follow social and political aims that undermine economic efficiency.[34] The antitrust laws were minimalized in the mid-1980s under influence of Chicago school of economics and blamed for the loss of economic supremacy in the world.[35]

[edit] Development in other countries
	This article or section is missing citations or needs footnotes.
Using inline citations helps guard against copyright violations and factual inaccuracies. (July 2008)

    See also: Competition regulator

The European Commission, established following World War II, was the first Europe wide competition authority
The European Commission, established following World War II, was the first Europe wide competition authority

It was after the First World War that countries began to follow the United States&#039; lead in competition policy. In 1923 Canada introduced the Combines Investigation Act and in 1926 France reinforced its basic competition provisions from the 1810 Code Napoleon. After the Second World War, the Allies, led by the United States, introduced tight regulation of cartels and monopolies in occupied Germany and Japan. In Germany, despite the existence of laws against unfair competition passed in 1909 (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb or UWB) it was widely believed that the predominance of large cartels of German industry had made it easier for the Nazis to assume total economic control, simply by bribing or blackmailing the heads of a small number of industrial magnates. Similarly in Japan, where business was organised along family and nepotistic ties, the zaibatsu were easy for the despotic government to manipulate into the war effort. Following, unconditional surrender tighter controls, replicating American policy were introduced.

Further developments however were considerably overshadowed by the move towards nationalisation and industry wide planning in many countries. Making the economy and industry democratically accountable through direct government action became a priority. Coal industry, railroads, steel, electricity, water, health care and many other sectors were targeted for their special qualities of being natural monopolies. Commonwealth countries were reluctant in enacting statutory competition law provisions. The United Kingdom introduced the (considerably less stringent) Restrictive Practices Act in 1956. Australia introduced its current Trade Practices Act in 1974. Recently however there has been a wave of updates, especially in Europe to harmonise legislation with contemporary competition law thinking.

[edit] European Union law

    Main article: European Community competition law

In 1957 six Western European countries signed the Treaty of the European Community (EC Treaty or Treaty of Rome), which over the last fifty years has grown into a European Union of nearly half a billion citizens. The European Community is the name for the economic and social pillar of EU law, under which competition law falls. Healthy competition is seen as an essential element in the creation of a common market free from restraints on trade.[36] The first provision is Article 81 EC, which deals with cartels and restrictive vertical agreements. Prohibited are:

    &quot;(1) ...all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market...&quot;

Article 81(1) EC then gives examples of &quot;hard core&quot; restrictive practices such as price fixing or market sharing and 81(2) EC confirms that any agreements are automatically void. However, just like the Statute of Monopolies 1623, Article 81(3) EC creates exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a &quot;fair share&quot; of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints (or disproportionate, in ECJ terminology) that risk eliminating competition anywhere. Article 82 EC deals with monopolies, or more precisely firms who have a dominant market share and abuse that position. Unlike U.S. Antitrust, EC law has never been used to punish the existence of dominant firms, but merely imposes a special responsibility to conduct oneself appropriately.[37] Specific categories of abuse listed in Article 82 EC include price discrimination and exclusive dealing, much the same as sections 2 and 3 of the U.S. Clayton Act. Also under Article 82 EC, the European Council was empowered to enact a regulation to control mergers between firms, currently the latest known by the abbreviation of Regulation 139/2004/EC. The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. Again, the similarity to the Clayton Act&#039;s substantial lessening of competition. Finally, Articles 86 and 87 EC regulate the state&#039;s role in the market. Article 86(2) EC states clearly that nothing in the rules can be used to obstruct a member state&#039;s right to deliver public services, but that otherwise public enterprises must play by the same rules on collusion and abuse of dominance as everyone else. Article 87 EC, similar to Article 81 EC, lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition, but then grants exceptions for things like charities, natural disasters or regional development.

[edit] International enforcement

    See also: World Trade Organization and International Competition Network

There is considerable controversy among WTO members, in green, whether competition law should form part of the agreements
There is considerable controversy among WTO members, in green, whether competition law should form part of the agreements

Competition law has already been substantially internationalised along the lines of the US model by nation states themselves, however the involvement of international organisations has been growing. Increasingly active at all international conferences are the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which is prone to making neo-liberal recommendations about the total application of competition law for public and private industries.[38] Chapter 5 of the post war Havana Charter contained an Antitrust code[39] but this was never incorporated into the WTO&#039;s forerunner, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. Office of Fair Trading Director and Professor Richard Whish wrote sceptically that it &quot;seems unlikely at the current stage of its development that the WTO will metamorphose into a global competition authority.&quot;[40] Despite that, at the ongoing Doha round of trade talks for the World Trade Organisation, discussion includes the prospect of competition law enforcement moving up to a global level. While it is incapable of enforcement itself, the newly established International Competition Network[41] (ICN) is a way for national authorities to coordinate their own enforcement activities.

It is unclear whether competition policy is a sensible role for government in developing, particularly low-income countries. In these countries the markets are usually very small and fragmented so that developing scale sufficient to raise competitiveness and engage in international markets is a major challenge. The bigger problem is however poor governance - in societies with widespread corruption, inadequate public finances,[42] and weak judiciary and oversight institutions, competition policy may become another tool for capture by vested interests - becoming in itself a barrier to entry.

[edit] Theory

    Main article: Competition law theory

[edit] Classical perspective

    See also: Classical economics

John Stuart Mill believed the restraint of trade doctrine was justified to preserve liberty and competition
John Stuart Mill believed the restraint of trade doctrine was justified to preserve liberty and competition

The classical perspective on competition was that certain agreements and business practice could be an unreasonable restraint on the individual liberty of tradespeople to carry on their livelihoods. Restraints were judged as permissible or not by courts as new cases appeared and in the light of changing business circumstances. Hence the courts found specific categories of agreement, specific clauses, to fall foul of their doctrine on economic fairness, and they did not contrive an overarching conception of market power. Earlier theorists like Adam Smith rejected any monopoly power on this basis.

    &quot;A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company has the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate.&quot;[43]

In The Wealth of Nations (1776) Adam Smith also pointed out the cartel problem, but did not advocate legal measures to combat them.

    &quot;People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.&quot;[44]

Smith also rejected the very existence of, not just dominant and abusive corporations, but corporations at all.[45] By the latter half of the nineteenth century it had become clear that large firms had become a fact of the market economy. John Stuart Mill&#039;s approach was laid down in his treatise On Liberty (1859).

    &quot;Again, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society... both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil...&quot;[46]

[edit] Neo-classical synthesis

    See also: Neoclassical synthesis

Paul Samuelson, author of the 20th century&#039;s most successful economics text, combined mathematical models and Keynesian macroeconomic intervention. He advocated the general success of the market but backed the American government&#039;s antitrust policies.
Paul Samuelson, author of the 20th century&#039;s most successful economics text, combined mathematical models and Keynesian macroeconomic intervention. He advocated the general success of the market but backed the American government&#039;s antitrust policies.

After Mill, there was a shift in economic theory, which emphasised a more precise and theoretical model of competition. A simple neo-classical model of free markets holds that production and distribution of goods and services in competitive free markets maximizes social welfare. This model assumes that new firms can freely enter markets and compete with existing firms, or to use legal language, there are no barriers to entry. By this term economists mean something very specific, that competitive free markets deliver allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. Allocative efficiency is also known as Pareto efficiency after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto and means that resources in an economy over the long run will go precisely to those who are willing and able to pay for them. Because rational producers will keep producing and selling, and buyers will keep buying up to the last marginal unit of possible output - or alternatively rational producers will be reduce their output to the margin at which buyers will buy the same amount as produced - there is no waste, the greatest number wants of the greatest number of people become satisfied and utility is perfected because resources can no longer be reallocated to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off; society has achieved allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency simply means that society is making as much as it can. Free markets are meant to reward those who work hard, and therefore those who will put society&#039;s resources towards the frontier of its possible production.[47] Dynamic efficiency refers to the idea that business which constantly competes must research, create and innovate to keep its share of consumers. This traces to Austrian-American political scientist Joseph Schumpeter&#039;s notion that a &quot;perennial gale of creative destruction&quot; is ever sweeping through capitalist economies, driving enterprise at the market&#039;s mercy.[48] This led Schumpeter to argue that monopolies did not need to be broken up (as with Standard Oil) because the next gale of economic innovation would do the same.

Contrasting with the allocatively, productively and dynamically efficient market model are monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels. When only one or a few firms exist in the market, and there is no credible threat of the entry of competing firms, prices raise above the competitive level, to either a monopolistic or oligopolistic equilibrium price. Production is also decreased, further decreasing social welfare by creating a deadweight loss. Sources of this market power are said to include the existence of externalities, barriers to entry of the market, and the free rider problem. Markets may fail to be efficient for a variety of reasons, so the exception of competition law&#039;s intervention to the rule of laissez faire is justified if government failure can be avoided. Orthodox economists fully acknowledge that perfect competition is seldom observed in the real world, and so aim for what is called &quot;workable competition&quot;.[49][50] This follows the theory that if one cannot achieve the ideal, then go for the second best option[51] by using the law to tame market operation where it can.

[edit] Chicago School
Robert Bork argues that competition law is fundamentally flawed
Robert Bork argues that competition law is fundamentally flawed

    See also: Chicago School (economics) and Neoclassical economics

A group of economists and lawyers, who are largely associated with the University of Chicago, advocate an approach to competition law guided by the proposition that some actions that were originally considered to be anticompetitive could actually promote competition.[52] The U.S. Supreme Court has used the Chicago School approach in several recent cases.[53] One view of the Chicago School approach to antitrust is found in United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner&#039;s books&#039; Antitrust Law[54] and Economic Analysis of Law[55]

Robert Bork was highly critical of court decisions on United States antitrust law in a series of law review articles and his book The Antitrust Paradox.[56] Bork argued that both the original intention of antitrust laws and economic efficiency was the pursuit only of consumer welfare, the protection of competition rather than competitors.[57] Furthermore, only a few acts should be prohibited, namely cartels that fix prices and divide markets, mergers that create monopolies, and dominant firms pricing predatorily, while allowing such practices as vertical agreements and price discrimination on the grounds that it did not harm consumers.[58] Running through the different critiques of US antitrust policy is the common theme that government interference in the operation of free markets does more harm than good.[59] &quot;The only cure for bad theory&quot;, writes Bork, &quot;is better theory&quot;.[57] The late Harvard Law School Professor Philip Areeda, who favours more aggressive antitrust policy, in at least one Supreme Court case challenged Robert Bork&#039;s preference for non-intervention.[60]

[edit] Policy developments

Anti-cartel enforcement is a key focus of competition law enforcement policy. In the US the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act 2004 raised the maximum imprisonment term for price fixing from three to ten years, and the maximum fine from $10 to $100 million.[61] In 2007 British Airways and Korean Air pleaded guilty to fixing cargo and passenger flight prices.[62]

These actions complement the private enforcement which has always been an important feature of United States antitrust law. The United States Supreme Court summarised why Congress allows punitive damages in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.:[63]
“ 	Every violation of the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-enterprise system envisaged by Congress. This system depends on strong competition for its health and vigor, and strong competition depends, in turn, on compliance with antitrust legislation. In enacting these laws, Congress had many means at its disposal to penalize violators. It could have, for example, required violators to compensate federal, state, and local governments for the estimated damage to their respective economies caused by the violations. But, this remedy was not selected. Instead, Congress chose to permit all persons to sue to recover three times their actual damages every time they were injured in their business or property by an antitrust violation. 	”

In the EU, the Modernisation Regulation 1/2003 means that the European Commission is no longer the only body capable of public enforcement of European Community competition law. This was done in order to facilitate quicker resolution of competition-related inquiries. In 2005 the Commission issued a Green Paper on Damages actions for the breach of the EC antitrust rules,[64] which suggested ways of making private damages claims against cartels easier.[65]

[edit] Practice
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[edit] Collusion and cartels

    Main articles: Collusion and Cartel

Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith was an early enemy of cartels
Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith was an early enemy of cartels

The core of competition policy has, since the 1980s, been the anti-price fixing cartel agenda, despite criticism by libertarians.[66] In The Wealth of Nations (1776) Adam Smith pointed out the cartel problem, but did not advocate legal measures to combat them.[67] Nowadays a far stricter approach is taken. Under EC law cartels are banned by Article 81 EC, whereas under US law the Sherman Act prohibitions of section 1. To compare, the target of competition law under the Sherman Act 1890 is every &quot;contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy&quot;, which essentially targets anybody who has some dealing or contact with someone else. In the mean time, Art. 81 EC makes clear who the targets of competition law are in two stages with the term agreement &quot;undertaking&quot;. This is used to describe almost anyone &quot;engaged in an economic activity&quot;,[68] but excludes both employees, who are by their &quot;very nature the opposite of the independent exercise of an economic or commercial activity&quot;,[69] and public services based on &quot;solidarity&quot; for a &quot;social purpose&quot;.[70] Undertakings must then have formed an agreement, developed a &quot;concerted practice&quot;, or, within an association, taken a decision. Like US antitrust, this just means all the same thing;[71] any kind of dealing or contact, or a &quot;meeting of the minds&quot; between parties. Covered therefore is a whole range from a strong handshaken written or verbal agreement to a supplier sending invoices with directions not to export to its retailer who gives &quot;tacit acquiescence&quot; to the conduct.[72]

Less of a consensus exists in the field of vertical agreements. These are agreements not between firms at the same level of production, but firms at different levels in the supply chain, for instance a supermarket and a bread producer. Recently, the United States Supreme Court has become more skeptical of antitrust cases predicated on agreements between companies that are not directly in competition with one another, such as a clothing manufacturer and a clothing retailer, while maintaining the strict prohibition against agreements that limit competition between companies at the same level of the supply chain, such as agreements between two retailers or between two distributors. Vertical agreements may still be illegal, but the burden of proving them illegal was raised by a number of recent cases from the per se illegal standard to a more demanding rule of reason standard.[73]

[edit] Dominance and monopoly

    Main article: Monopoly law

The economist&#039;s depiction of deadweight loss to efficiency that monopolies cause
The economist&#039;s depiction of deadweight loss to efficiency that monopolies cause

When firms hold large market shares, consumers risk paying higher prices and getting lower quality products than compared to competitive markets. However, the existence of a very high market share does not always mean consumers are paying excessive prices since the threat of new entrants to the market can restrain a high-market-share firm&#039;s price increases. Competition law does not make merely having a monopoly illegal, but rather abusing the power that a monopoly may confer, for instance through exclusionary practices.

First it is necessary to determine whether a firm is dominant, or whether it behaves &quot;to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumer.&quot;[74] Under EU law, very large market shares raise a presumption that a firm is dominant,[75] which may be rebuttable.[76] If a firm has a dominant position, then there is &quot;a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair competition on the common market&quot;.[77] Similarly as with collusive conduct, market shares are determined with reference to the particular market in which the firm and product in question is sold. Then although the lists are seldom closed,[78] certain categories of abusive conduct are usually prohibited under the country&#039;s legislation. For instance, limiting production at a shipping port by refusing to raise expenditure and update technology could be abusive.[79] Tying one product into the sale of another can be considered abuse too, being restrictive of consumer choice and depriving competitors of outlets. This was the alleged case in Microsoft v. Commission[80] leading to an eventual fine of €497 million for including its Windows Media Player with the Microsoft Windows platform. A refusal to supply a facility which is essential for all businesses attempting to compete to use can constitute an abuse. One example was in a case involving a medical company named Commercial Solvents.[81] When it set up its own rival in the tuberculosis drugs market, Commercial Solvents were forced to continue supplying a company named Zoja with the raw materials for the drug. Zoja was the only market competitor, so without the court forcing supply, all competition would have been eliminated.

Forms of abuse relating directly to pricing include price exploitation. It is difficult to prove at what point a dominant firm&#039;s prices become &quot;exploitative&quot; and this category of abuse is rarely found. In one case however, a French funeral service was found to have demanded exploitative prices, and this was justified on the basis that prices of funeral services outside the region could be compared.[82] A more tricky issue is predatory pricing. This is the practice of dropping prices of a product so much that in order one&#039;s smaller competitors cannot cover their costs and fall out of business. The Chicago School (economics) considers predatory pricing to be unlikely.[83] However in France Telecom SA v. Commission[84] a broadband internet company was forced to pay €10.35 million for dropping its prices below its own production costs. It had &quot;no interest in applying such prices except that of eliminating competitors&quot;[85] and was being crossed subsidised to capture the lion&#039;s share of a booming market. One last category of pricing abuse is price discrimination.[86] An example of this could be offering rebates to industrial customers who export your company&#039;s sugar, but not to Irish customers who are selling their goods in the same market as you are in.[87]

    See also: Dominance (economics) and Monopoly

[edit] Mergers and acquisitions

    Main article: Mergers and acquisitions

A merger or acquisition involves, from a competition law perspective, the concentration of economic power in the hands of fewer than before.[88] This usually means that one firm buys out the shares of another. The reasons for oversight of economic concentrations by the state are the same as the reasons to restrict firms who abuse a position of dominance, only that regulation of mergers and acquisitions attempts to deal with the problem before it arises, ex ante prevention of creating dominant firms.[89] In the United States merger regulation began under the Clayton Act, and in the European Union, under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 (known as the &quot;ECMR&quot;[90]). Competition law requires that firms proposing to merge gain authorisation from the relevant government authority, or simply go ahead but face the prospect of demerger should the concentration later be found to lessen competition. The theory behind mergers is that transaction costs can be reduced compared to operating on an open market through bilateral contracts.[91] Concentrations can increase economies of scale and scope. However often firms take advantage of their increase in market power, their increased market share and decreased number of competitors, which can have a knock on effect on the deal that consumers get. Merger control is about predicting what the market might be like, not knowing and making a judgment. Hence the central provision under EU law asks whether a concentration would if it went ahead &quot;significantly impede effective competition... in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening off a dominant position...&quot;[92] and the corresponding provision under US antitrust states similarly,

    &quot;No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital... of the assets of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where... the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.[93]

What amounts to a substantial lessening of, or significant impediment to competition is usually answered through empirical study. The market shares of the merging companies can be assessed and added, although this kind of analysis only gives rise to presumptions, not conclusions.[94] Something called the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used to calculate the &quot;density&quot; of the market, or what concentration exists. Aside from the maths, it is important to consider the product in question and the rate of technical innovation in the market.[95] A further problem of collective dominance, or oligopoly through &quot;economic links&quot;[96] can arise, whereby the new market becomes more conducive to collusion. It is relevant how transparent a market is, because a more concentrated structure could mean firms can coordinate their behaviour more easily, whether firms can deploy deterrants and whether firms are safe from a reaction by their competitors and consumers.[97] The entry of new firms to the market, and any barriers that they might encounter should be considered.[98] If firms are shown to be creating an uncompetitive concentration, in the US they can still argue that they create efficiencies enough to outweigh any detriment, and similar reference to &quot;technical and economic progress&quot; is mentioned in Art. 2 of the ECMR.[99] Another defence might be that a firm which is being taken over is about to fail or go insolvent, and taking it over leaves a no less competitive state than what would happen anyway.[100] Mergers vertically in the market are rarely of concern, although in AOL/Time Warner[101] the European Commission required that a joint venture with a competitor Bertelsmann be ceased beforehand. The EU authorities have also focussed lately on the effect of conglomerate mergers, where companies acquire a large portfolio of related products, though without necessarily dominant shares in any individual market.[102]

[edit] Public sector regulation

    Main articles: Public services, Regulated market, and EC regulation
    See also: American Telephone &amp; Telegraph, Kingsbury Commitment, Hush-a-Phone v. FCC, and Bell System divestiture

Public sector industries, or industries which are by their nature providing a public service, are involved in competition law in many ways similar to private companies. Under EC law, Articles 86 and 87 create exceptions for the assured achievement of public sector service provision. Many industries, such as railways, telecommunications, electricity, gas, water and media have their own independent sector regulators. These government agencies are charged with ensuring that private providers carry out certain public service duties in line of social welfare goals. For instance, an electricity company may not be allowed to disconnect someone&#039;s supply merely because they have not paid their bills up to date, because that could leave a person in the dark and cold just because they are poor. Instead the electricity company would have to give the person a number of warnings and offer assistance until government welfare support kicks in.[103]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So why does this website waste it&#8217;s time posting trivel like this ? first of all everybody knows that the US congress and the US goverment is corrupt to the bone and they take kickbacks and bribes from the entertainment cartels.</p>
<p>It is NEVER going to change.</p>
<p>.The US goverment supports all kinds of obsolete business models such as silly(civil sevice) tax supported military exchange retail outlets that are badly managed and don&#8217;t make a profit and private business contractors that generally rip of the federal goverment.</p>
<p> The US congress supports billions of dollars worth of useless pork barrel spending.</p>
<p>The federal goverment  has always propped up failing businesses for bad business practices or other wise providing corporate welfare (PROTECTIONISM)for other failing american businesses other than the entertainment cartels.</p>
<p>If i think about the business practices of the movie and recording industry i think of ANTITRUST SUIT&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;<br />
GET OVER IT&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;THINGS ARE NEVER GOING TO CHANGE.</p>
<p>DON&#8217;T BUY THIER PRODUCTS AND WHY DON&#8217;T YOU QUIT YOUR CRYING &#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;</p>
<p>Competition law<br />
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia<br />
  (Redirected from Antitrust)<br />
Jump to: navigation, search<br />
&#8220;Antitrust&#8221; redirects here. For the 2001 film, see Antitrust (film). For laws specific to the U.S., see United States antitrust law.</p>
<p>Competition law, known in the United States as antitrust law, has three main elements:</p>
<p>    * prohibiting agreements or practices that restrict free trading and competition between business entities. This includes in particular the repression of cartels.<br />
    * banning abusive behaviour by a firm dominating a market, or anti-competitive practices that tend to lead to such a dominant position. Practices controlled in this way may include predatory pricing, tying, price gouging, refusal to deal, and many others.<br />
    * supervising the mergers and acquisitions of large corporations, including some joint ventures. Transactions that are considered to threaten the competitive process can be prohibited altogether, or approved subject to &#8220;remedies&#8221; such as an obligation to divest part of the merged business or to offer licences or access to facilities to enable other businesses to continue competing.</p>
<p>The substance and produce of competition Act vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Protecting the interests of consumers (consumer welfare) and ensuring that entrepreneurs have an opportunity to compete in the market economy are often treated as important objectives. Competition law is closely connected with law on deregulation of access to markets, state aids and subsidies, the privatisation of state owned assets and the establishment of independent sector regulators. In recent decades, competition law has been viewed as a way to provide better public services.[1] Robert Bork has found that competition laws can produce adverse effects when they reduce competition by protecting inefficient competitors and when costs of legal intervention are greater then benefits for the consumers.[2] The history of competition law reaches back to the Roman Empire. The business practices of market traders, guilds and governments have always been subject to scrutiny, and sometimes severe sanctions. Since the twentieth century, competition law has become global. The two largest and most influential systems of competition regulation are United States antitrust law and European Community competition law. National and regional competition authorities across the world have formed international support and enforcement networks.<br />
Contents<br />
[hide]</p>
<p>    * 1 History<br />
          o 1.1 Roman legislation<br />
          o 1.2 Middle ages<br />
          o 1.3 Renaissance developments<br />
          o 1.4 Restraint of trade<br />
    * 2 Today<br />
          o 2.1 United States antitrust<br />
          o 2.2 Development in other countries<br />
          o 2.3 European Union law<br />
          o 2.4 International enforcement<br />
    * 3 Theory<br />
          o 3.1 Classical perspective<br />
          o 3.2 Neo-classical synthesis<br />
          o 3.3 Chicago School<br />
          o 3.4 Policy developments<br />
    * 4 Practice<br />
          o 4.1 Collusion and cartels<br />
          o 4.2 Dominance and monopoly<br />
          o 4.3 Mergers and acquisitions<br />
          o 4.4 Public sector regulation<br />
    * 5 See also<br />
    * 6 Notes<br />
    * 7 References<br />
    * 8 Further reading<br />
    * 9 External links</p>
<p>[edit] History<br />
Competition law<br />
Basic concepts</p>
<p>    * History of competition law<br />
    * Monopolization<br />
          o Coercive monopoly<br />
          o Natural monopoly<br />
    * Barriers to entry<br />
    * Market power<br />
    * SSNIP test<br />
    * Relevant market<br />
    * Merger control</p>
<p>Anti-competitive practices</p>
<p>    * Collusion<br />
          o Formation of cartels<br />
          o Price fixing<br />
          o Bid rigging<br />
    * Product bundling and tying<br />
    * Refusal to deal<br />
          o Group boycott<br />
    * Exclusive dealing<br />
    * Dividing territories<br />
    * Conscious parallelism<br />
    * Predatory pricing<br />
    * Misuse of patents and copyrights</p>
<p>Laws and doctrines</p>
<p>United States</p>
<p>    * Sherman Antitrust Act<br />
    * Clayton Antitrust Act<br />
    * Robinson-Patman Act<br />
    * FTC Act<br />
    * Hart-Scott-Rodino Act<br />
    * Merger guidelines<br />
    * Essential facilities doctrine<br />
    * Noerr-Pennington doctrine<br />
    * Rule of reason</p>
<p>Europe</p>
<p>    * European Community<br />
      competition law<br />
    * Irish Competition Law<br />
    * Competition Act 1998 (UK)</p>
<p>Australia</p>
<p>    * Trade Practices Act 1974</p>
<p>Enforcement authorities and organizations</p>
<p>    * International Competition Network<br />
    * List of competition regulators</p>
<p>edit box</p>
<p>    Main article: History of competition law</p>
<p>Laws governing competition law are found in over two millennia of history. Roman Emperors and Medieval monarchs alike used tariffs to stabilize prices or support local production. The formal study of &#8220;competition&#8221;, began in earnest during the 18th century with such works as Adam Smith&#8217;s The Wealth of Nations. Different terms were used to describe this area of the law, including &#8220;restrictive practices&#8221;, &#8220;the law of monopolies&#8221;, &#8220;combination acts&#8221; and the &#8220;restraint of trade&#8221;.</p>
<p>[edit] Roman legislation</p>
<p>    See also: Roman law</p>
<p>An early example of competition law is the Lex Julia de Annona, enacted during the Roman Republic around 50 BC.[3] To protect the grain trade, heavy fines were imposed on anyone directly, deliberately and insidiously stopping supply ships.[4] Under Diocletian in 301 AD an edict imposed the death penalty for anyone violating a tariff system, for example by buying up, concealing or contriving the scarcity of everyday goods.[5]</p>
<p>More legislation came under the Constitution of Zeno of 483 AD, which can be traced into Florentine Municipal laws of 1322 and 1325.[6] This provided for confiscation of property and banishment for any trade combinations or joint action of monopolies private or granted by the Emperor. Zeno rescinded all previously granted exclusive rights.[7] Justinian I subsequently introduced legislation to pay officials to manage state monopolies.[8] As Europe slipped into the dark ages, so did the records of law making until the Middle Ages brought greater expansion of trade in the time of lex mercatoria.</p>
<p>[edit] Middle ages</p>
<p>    See also: Lex Mercatoria and Guilds</p>
<p>Edward III during the Black Death enacted the Statute of Labourers to cap wages, and provide double damages against infringers<br />
Edward III during the Black Death enacted the Statute of Labourers to cap wages, and provide double damages against infringers</p>
<p>Legislation in England to control monopolies and restrictive practices were in force well before the Norman Conquest.[9] The Domesday Book recorded that &#8220;foresteel&#8221; (i.e. forestalling, the practice of buying up goods before they reach market and then inflating the prices) was one of three forfeitures that King Edward the Confessor could carry out through England.[10] But concern for fair prices also led to attempts to directly regulate the market. Under Henry III an act was passed in 1266[11] to fix bread and ale prices in correspondence with corn prices laid down by the assizes. Penalties for breach included amercements, pillory and tumbrel.[12] A fourteenth century statute labelled forestallers as &#8220;oppressors of the poor and the community at large and enemies of the whole country.&#8221;[13] Under King Edward III the Statute of Labourers of 1349[14] fixed wages of artificers and workmen and decreed that foodstuffs should be sold at reasonable prices. On top of existing penalties, the statute stated that overcharging merchants must pay the injured party double the sum he received, an idea that has been replicated in punitive treble damages under US antitrust law. Also under Edward III, the following statutory provision outlawed trade combinations.[15]</p>
<p>    &#8220;&#8230;we have ordained and established, that no merchant or other shall make Confederacy, Conspiracy, Coin, Imagination, or Murmur, or Evil Device in any point that may turn to the Impeachment, Disturbance, Defeating or Decay of the said Staples, or of anything that to them pertaineth, or may pertain.&#8221;</p>
<p>Examples of legislation in mainland Europe include the constitutiones juris metallici by Wenceslas II of Bohemia between 1283 and 1305, condemning combinations of ore traders increasing prices; the Municipal Statutes of Florence in 1322 and 1325 followed Zeno&#8217;s legislation against state monopolies; and under Emperor Charles V in the Holy Roman Empire a law was passed &#8220;to prevent losses resulting from monopolies and improper contracts which many merchants and artisans made in the Netherlands.&#8221; In 1553 King Henry VIII reintroduced tariffs for foodstuffs, designed to stabilise prices, in the face of fluctuations in supply from overseas. So the legislation read here that whereas,</p>
<p>    &#8220;it is very hard and difficult to put certain prices to any such things&#8230; [it is necessary because] prices of such victuals be many times enhanced and raised by the Greedy Covetousness and Appetites of the Owners of such Victuals, by occasion of ingrossing and regrating the same, more than upon any reasonable or just ground or cause, to the great damage and impoverishing of the King&#8217;s subjects.&#8221;[16]</p>
<p>Around this time organisations representing various tradesmen and handicraftspeople, known as guilds had been developing, and enjoyed many concessions and exemptions from the laws against monopolies. The privileges conferred were not abolished until the Municipal Corporations Act 1835.</p>
<p>[edit] Renaissance developments</p>
<p>    See also: Renaissance</p>
<p>Elizabeth I assured monopolies would not be abused in the early era of globalisation<br />
Elizabeth I assured monopolies would not be abused in the early era of globalisation</p>
<p>Europe around the 15th century was changing quickly. The new world had just been opened up, overseas trade and plunder was pouring wealth through the international economy and attitudes among businessmen were shifting. In 1561 a system of Industrial Monopoly Licences, similar to modern patents had been introduced into England. But by the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, the system was reputedly much abused and used merely to preserve privileges, encouraging nothing new in the way of innovation or manufacture.[17] When a protest was made in the House of Commons and a Bill was introduced, the Queen convinced the protesters to challenge the case in the courts. This was the catalyst for the Case of Monopolies or Darcy v. Allin.[18] The plaintiff, an officer of the Queen&#8217;s household, had been granted the sole right of making playing cards and claimed damages for the defendant&#8217;s infringement of this right. The court found the grant void and that three characteristics of monopoly were (1) price increases (2) quality decrease (3) the tendency to reduce artificers to idleness and beggary. This put a temporary end to complaints about monopoly, until King James I began to grant them again. In 1623 Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies, which for the most part excluded patent rights from its prohibitions, as well as guilds. From King Charles I, through the civil war and to King Charles II, monopolies continued, especially useful for raising revenue.[19] Then in 1684, in East India Company v. Sandys[20] it was decided that exclusive rights to trade only outside the realm were legitimate, on the grounds that only large and powerful concerns could trade in the conditions prevailing overseas. In 1710 to deal with high coal prices caused by a Newcastle Coal Monopoly the New Law was passed.[21] Its provisions stated that &#8220;all and every contract or contracts, Covenants and Agreements, whether the same be in writing or not in writing&#8230; are hereby declared to be illegal.&#8221; When Adam Smith wrote the Wealth of Nations in 1776[22] he was somewhat cynical of the possibility for change.</p>
<p>    &#8220;To expect indeed that freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain is as absurd as to expect that Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but what is more unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals irresistibly oppose it. The Member of Parliament who supports any proposal for strengthening this Monopoly is seen to acquire not only the reputation for understanding trade, but great popularity and influence with an order of men whose members and wealth render them of great importance.&#8221;</p>
<p>[edit] Restraint of trade</p>
<p>    Main article: Restraint of trade</p>
<p>Judge Coke in the 17th century thought that general restraints on trade were unreasonable<br />
Judge Coke in the 17th century thought that general restraints on trade were unreasonable</p>
<p>The English law of restraint of trade is the direct predecessor to modern competition law.[23] Its current use is small, given modern and economically oriented statutes in most common law countries. Its approach was based on the two concepts of prohibiting agreements that ran counter to public policy, unless the reasonableness of an agreement could be shown. A restraint of trade is simply some kind of agreed provision that is designed to restrain another&#8217;s trade. For example, in Nordenfelt v. Maxim, Nordenfelt Gun Co.[24] a Swedish arm inventor promised on sale of his business to an American gun maker that he &#8220;would not make guns or ammunition anywhere in the world, and would not compete with Maxim in any way.&#8221;</p>
<p>To be consider whether or not there is a restraint of trade in the first place, both parties must have provided valuable consideration for their agreement. In Dyer&#8217;s case[25] a dyer had given a bond not to exercise his trade in the same town as the plaintiff for six months but the plaintiff had promised nothing in return. On hearing the plaintiff&#8217;s attempt to enforce this restraint, Hull J exclaimed,</p>
<p>    &#8220;per Dieu, if the plaintiff were here, he should go to prison until he had paid a fine to the King.&#8221;</p>
<p>The common law has evolved to reflect changing business conditions. So in the 1613 case of Rogers v. Parry[26] a court held that a joiner who promised not to trade from his house for 21 years could have this bond enforced against him since the time and place was certain. It was also held that a man cannot bind himself to not use his trade generally by Chief Justice Coke. This was followed in Broad v. Jolyffe[27] and Mitchell v. Reynolds[28] where Lord Macclesfield asked, &#8220;What does it signify to a tradesman in London what another does in Newcastle?&#8221; In times of such slow communications, commerce around the country it seemed axiomatic that a general restraint served no legitimate purpose for one&#8217;s business and ought to be void. But already in 1880 in Roussillon v. Roussillon[29] Lord Justice Fry stated that a restraint unlimited in space need not be void, since the real question was whether it went further than necessary for the promisee&#8217;s protection. So in the Nordenfelt[30] case Lord McNaughton ruled that while one could validly promise to &#8220;not make guns or ammunition anywhere in the world&#8221; it was an unreasonable restraint to &#8220;not compete with Maxim in any way.&#8221; This approach in England was confirmed by the House of Lords in Mason v. The Provident Supply and Clothing Co.[31]</p>
<p>[edit] Today</p>
<p>Modern competition law begins with the United States legislation of the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914. While other, particularly European, countries also had some form of regulation on monopolies and cartels, the US codification of the common law position on restraint of trade had a widespread effect on subsequent competition law development. Both after World War II and after the fall of the Berlin wall competition law has gone through phases of renewed attention and legislative updates around the world.</p>
<p>[edit] United States antitrust</p>
<p>    Main article: United States antitrust law</p>
<p>Modern competition law is modeled on the United States&#8217; Sherman Act, which aimed to &#8220;bust the trusts&#8221;.<br />
Modern competition law is modeled on the United States&#8217; Sherman Act, which aimed to &#8220;bust the trusts&#8221;.</p>
<p>The American term anti-trust arose not because the US statutes had anything to do with ordinary trust law, but because the large American corporations used trusts to conceal the nature of their business arrangements. Big trusts became synonymous with big monopolies, the perceived threat to democracy and the free market these trusts represented led to the Sherman and Clayton Acts. These laws, in part, codified past American and English common law of restraints of trade. Senator Hoar, an author of the Sherman Act said in a debate, &#8220;We have affirmed the old doctrine of the common law in regard to all inter-state and international commercial transactions and have clothed the United States courts with authority to enforce that doctrine by injunction.&#8221; Evidence of the common law basis of the Sherman and Clayton acts is found in the Standard Oil case,[32] where Chief Justice White explicitly linked the Sherman Act with the common law and sixteenth century English statutes on engrossing.[33] The Act&#8217;s wording also reflects common law. The first two sections read as follows,</p>
<p>    &#8220;Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine&#8230;.</p>
<p>    Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine&#8230;.&#8221;</p>
<p>The Sherman Act did not have the immediate effects its authors intended, though Republican President Theodore Roosevelt&#8217;s federal government sued 45 companies, and William Taft used it against 75. The Clayton Act of 1914 was passed to supplement the Sherman Act. Specific categories of abusive conduct were listed, including price discrimination(section 2), exclusive dealings (section 3) and mergers which substantially lessen competition (section 7). Section 6 exempted trade unions from the law&#8217;s operation. Both the Sherman and Clayton acts are now codified under Title 15 of the United States Code.</p>
<p>Since the mid-1970s, courts and enforcement officials generally have supported view that antitrust law policy should not follow social and political aims that undermine economic efficiency.[34] The antitrust laws were minimalized in the mid-1980s under influence of Chicago school of economics and blamed for the loss of economic supremacy in the world.[35]</p>
<p>[edit] Development in other countries<br />
	This article or section is missing citations or needs footnotes.<br />
Using inline citations helps guard against copyright violations and factual inaccuracies. (July 2008)</p>
<p>    See also: Competition regulator</p>
<p>The European Commission, established following World War II, was the first Europe wide competition authority<br />
The European Commission, established following World War II, was the first Europe wide competition authority</p>
<p>It was after the First World War that countries began to follow the United States&#8217; lead in competition policy. In 1923 Canada introduced the Combines Investigation Act and in 1926 France reinforced its basic competition provisions from the 1810 Code Napoleon. After the Second World War, the Allies, led by the United States, introduced tight regulation of cartels and monopolies in occupied Germany and Japan. In Germany, despite the existence of laws against unfair competition passed in 1909 (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb or UWB) it was widely believed that the predominance of large cartels of German industry had made it easier for the Nazis to assume total economic control, simply by bribing or blackmailing the heads of a small number of industrial magnates. Similarly in Japan, where business was organised along family and nepotistic ties, the zaibatsu were easy for the despotic government to manipulate into the war effort. Following, unconditional surrender tighter controls, replicating American policy were introduced.</p>
<p>Further developments however were considerably overshadowed by the move towards nationalisation and industry wide planning in many countries. Making the economy and industry democratically accountable through direct government action became a priority. Coal industry, railroads, steel, electricity, water, health care and many other sectors were targeted for their special qualities of being natural monopolies. Commonwealth countries were reluctant in enacting statutory competition law provisions. The United Kingdom introduced the (considerably less stringent) Restrictive Practices Act in 1956. Australia introduced its current Trade Practices Act in 1974. Recently however there has been a wave of updates, especially in Europe to harmonise legislation with contemporary competition law thinking.</p>
<p>[edit] European Union law</p>
<p>    Main article: European Community competition law</p>
<p>In 1957 six Western European countries signed the Treaty of the European Community (EC Treaty or Treaty of Rome), which over the last fifty years has grown into a European Union of nearly half a billion citizens. The European Community is the name for the economic and social pillar of EU law, under which competition law falls. Healthy competition is seen as an essential element in the creation of a common market free from restraints on trade.[36] The first provision is Article 81 EC, which deals with cartels and restrictive vertical agreements. Prohibited are:</p>
<p>    &#8220;(1) &#8230;all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market&#8230;&#8221;</p>
<p>Article 81(1) EC then gives examples of &#8220;hard core&#8221; restrictive practices such as price fixing or market sharing and 81(2) EC confirms that any agreements are automatically void. However, just like the Statute of Monopolies 1623, Article 81(3) EC creates exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a &#8220;fair share&#8221; of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints (or disproportionate, in ECJ terminology) that risk eliminating competition anywhere. Article 82 EC deals with monopolies, or more precisely firms who have a dominant market share and abuse that position. Unlike U.S. Antitrust, EC law has never been used to punish the existence of dominant firms, but merely imposes a special responsibility to conduct oneself appropriately.[37] Specific categories of abuse listed in Article 82 EC include price discrimination and exclusive dealing, much the same as sections 2 and 3 of the U.S. Clayton Act. Also under Article 82 EC, the European Council was empowered to enact a regulation to control mergers between firms, currently the latest known by the abbreviation of Regulation 139/2004/EC. The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. Again, the similarity to the Clayton Act&#8217;s substantial lessening of competition. Finally, Articles 86 and 87 EC regulate the state&#8217;s role in the market. Article 86(2) EC states clearly that nothing in the rules can be used to obstruct a member state&#8217;s right to deliver public services, but that otherwise public enterprises must play by the same rules on collusion and abuse of dominance as everyone else. Article 87 EC, similar to Article 81 EC, lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition, but then grants exceptions for things like charities, natural disasters or regional development.</p>
<p>[edit] International enforcement</p>
<p>    See also: World Trade Organization and International Competition Network</p>
<p>There is considerable controversy among WTO members, in green, whether competition law should form part of the agreements<br />
There is considerable controversy among WTO members, in green, whether competition law should form part of the agreements</p>
<p>Competition law has already been substantially internationalised along the lines of the US model by nation states themselves, however the involvement of international organisations has been growing. Increasingly active at all international conferences are the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which is prone to making neo-liberal recommendations about the total application of competition law for public and private industries.[38] Chapter 5 of the post war Havana Charter contained an Antitrust code[39] but this was never incorporated into the WTO&#8217;s forerunner, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. Office of Fair Trading Director and Professor Richard Whish wrote sceptically that it &#8220;seems unlikely at the current stage of its development that the WTO will metamorphose into a global competition authority.&#8221;[40] Despite that, at the ongoing Doha round of trade talks for the World Trade Organisation, discussion includes the prospect of competition law enforcement moving up to a global level. While it is incapable of enforcement itself, the newly established International Competition Network[41] (ICN) is a way for national authorities to coordinate their own enforcement activities.</p>
<p>It is unclear whether competition policy is a sensible role for government in developing, particularly low-income countries. In these countries the markets are usually very small and fragmented so that developing scale sufficient to raise competitiveness and engage in international markets is a major challenge. The bigger problem is however poor governance &#8211; in societies with widespread corruption, inadequate public finances,[42] and weak judiciary and oversight institutions, competition policy may become another tool for capture by vested interests &#8211; becoming in itself a barrier to entry.</p>
<p>[edit] Theory</p>
<p>    Main article: Competition law theory</p>
<p>[edit] Classical perspective</p>
<p>    See also: Classical economics</p>
<p>John Stuart Mill believed the restraint of trade doctrine was justified to preserve liberty and competition<br />
John Stuart Mill believed the restraint of trade doctrine was justified to preserve liberty and competition</p>
<p>The classical perspective on competition was that certain agreements and business practice could be an unreasonable restraint on the individual liberty of tradespeople to carry on their livelihoods. Restraints were judged as permissible or not by courts as new cases appeared and in the light of changing business circumstances. Hence the courts found specific categories of agreement, specific clauses, to fall foul of their doctrine on economic fairness, and they did not contrive an overarching conception of market power. Earlier theorists like Adam Smith rejected any monopoly power on this basis.</p>
<p>    &#8220;A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company has the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate.&#8221;[43]</p>
<p>In The Wealth of Nations (1776) Adam Smith also pointed out the cartel problem, but did not advocate legal measures to combat them.</p>
<p>    &#8220;People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.&#8221;[44]</p>
<p>Smith also rejected the very existence of, not just dominant and abusive corporations, but corporations at all.[45] By the latter half of the nineteenth century it had become clear that large firms had become a fact of the market economy. John Stuart Mill&#8217;s approach was laid down in his treatise On Liberty (1859).</p>
<p>    &#8220;Again, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society&#8230; both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil&#8230;&#8221;[46]</p>
<p>[edit] Neo-classical synthesis</p>
<p>    See also: Neoclassical synthesis</p>
<p>Paul Samuelson, author of the 20th century&#8217;s most successful economics text, combined mathematical models and Keynesian macroeconomic intervention. He advocated the general success of the market but backed the American government&#8217;s antitrust policies.<br />
Paul Samuelson, author of the 20th century&#8217;s most successful economics text, combined mathematical models and Keynesian macroeconomic intervention. He advocated the general success of the market but backed the American government&#8217;s antitrust policies.</p>
<p>After Mill, there was a shift in economic theory, which emphasised a more precise and theoretical model of competition. A simple neo-classical model of free markets holds that production and distribution of goods and services in competitive free markets maximizes social welfare. This model assumes that new firms can freely enter markets and compete with existing firms, or to use legal language, there are no barriers to entry. By this term economists mean something very specific, that competitive free markets deliver allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. Allocative efficiency is also known as Pareto efficiency after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto and means that resources in an economy over the long run will go precisely to those who are willing and able to pay for them. Because rational producers will keep producing and selling, and buyers will keep buying up to the last marginal unit of possible output &#8211; or alternatively rational producers will be reduce their output to the margin at which buyers will buy the same amount as produced &#8211; there is no waste, the greatest number wants of the greatest number of people become satisfied and utility is perfected because resources can no longer be reallocated to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off; society has achieved allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency simply means that society is making as much as it can. Free markets are meant to reward those who work hard, and therefore those who will put society&#8217;s resources towards the frontier of its possible production.[47] Dynamic efficiency refers to the idea that business which constantly competes must research, create and innovate to keep its share of consumers. This traces to Austrian-American political scientist Joseph Schumpeter&#8217;s notion that a &#8220;perennial gale of creative destruction&#8221; is ever sweeping through capitalist economies, driving enterprise at the market&#8217;s mercy.[48] This led Schumpeter to argue that monopolies did not need to be broken up (as with Standard Oil) because the next gale of economic innovation would do the same.</p>
<p>Contrasting with the allocatively, productively and dynamically efficient market model are monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels. When only one or a few firms exist in the market, and there is no credible threat of the entry of competing firms, prices raise above the competitive level, to either a monopolistic or oligopolistic equilibrium price. Production is also decreased, further decreasing social welfare by creating a deadweight loss. Sources of this market power are said to include the existence of externalities, barriers to entry of the market, and the free rider problem. Markets may fail to be efficient for a variety of reasons, so the exception of competition law&#8217;s intervention to the rule of laissez faire is justified if government failure can be avoided. Orthodox economists fully acknowledge that perfect competition is seldom observed in the real world, and so aim for what is called &#8220;workable competition&#8221;.[49][50] This follows the theory that if one cannot achieve the ideal, then go for the second best option[51] by using the law to tame market operation where it can.</p>
<p>[edit] Chicago School<br />
Robert Bork argues that competition law is fundamentally flawed<br />
Robert Bork argues that competition law is fundamentally flawed</p>
<p>    See also: Chicago School (economics) and Neoclassical economics</p>
<p>A group of economists and lawyers, who are largely associated with the University of Chicago, advocate an approach to competition law guided by the proposition that some actions that were originally considered to be anticompetitive could actually promote competition.[52] The U.S. Supreme Court has used the Chicago School approach in several recent cases.[53] One view of the Chicago School approach to antitrust is found in United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner&#8217;s books&#8217; Antitrust Law[54] and Economic Analysis of Law[55]</p>
<p>Robert Bork was highly critical of court decisions on United States antitrust law in a series of law review articles and his book The Antitrust Paradox.[56] Bork argued that both the original intention of antitrust laws and economic efficiency was the pursuit only of consumer welfare, the protection of competition rather than competitors.[57] Furthermore, only a few acts should be prohibited, namely cartels that fix prices and divide markets, mergers that create monopolies, and dominant firms pricing predatorily, while allowing such practices as vertical agreements and price discrimination on the grounds that it did not harm consumers.[58] Running through the different critiques of US antitrust policy is the common theme that government interference in the operation of free markets does more harm than good.[59] &#8220;The only cure for bad theory&#8221;, writes Bork, &#8220;is better theory&#8221;.[57] The late Harvard Law School Professor Philip Areeda, who favours more aggressive antitrust policy, in at least one Supreme Court case challenged Robert Bork&#8217;s preference for non-intervention.[60]</p>
<p>[edit] Policy developments</p>
<p>Anti-cartel enforcement is a key focus of competition law enforcement policy. In the US the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act 2004 raised the maximum imprisonment term for price fixing from three to ten years, and the maximum fine from $10 to $100 million.[61] In 2007 British Airways and Korean Air pleaded guilty to fixing cargo and passenger flight prices.[62]</p>
<p>These actions complement the private enforcement which has always been an important feature of United States antitrust law. The United States Supreme Court summarised why Congress allows punitive damages in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.:[63]<br />
“ 	Every violation of the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-enterprise system envisaged by Congress. This system depends on strong competition for its health and vigor, and strong competition depends, in turn, on compliance with antitrust legislation. In enacting these laws, Congress had many means at its disposal to penalize violators. It could have, for example, required violators to compensate federal, state, and local governments for the estimated damage to their respective economies caused by the violations. But, this remedy was not selected. Instead, Congress chose to permit all persons to sue to recover three times their actual damages every time they were injured in their business or property by an antitrust violation. 	”</p>
<p>In the EU, the Modernisation Regulation 1/2003 means that the European Commission is no longer the only body capable of public enforcement of European Community competition law. This was done in order to facilitate quicker resolution of competition-related inquiries. In 2005 the Commission issued a Green Paper on Damages actions for the breach of the EC antitrust rules,[64] which suggested ways of making private damages claims against cartels easier.[65]</p>
<p>[edit] Practice<br />
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	The examples and perspective in this article or section may not represent a worldwide view of the subject.<br />
Please improve this article or discuss the issue on the talk page.</p>
<p>[edit] Collusion and cartels</p>
<p>    Main articles: Collusion and Cartel</p>
<p>Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith was an early enemy of cartels<br />
Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith was an early enemy of cartels</p>
<p>The core of competition policy has, since the 1980s, been the anti-price fixing cartel agenda, despite criticism by libertarians.[66] In The Wealth of Nations (1776) Adam Smith pointed out the cartel problem, but did not advocate legal measures to combat them.[67] Nowadays a far stricter approach is taken. Under EC law cartels are banned by Article 81 EC, whereas under US law the Sherman Act prohibitions of section 1. To compare, the target of competition law under the Sherman Act 1890 is every &#8220;contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy&#8221;, which essentially targets anybody who has some dealing or contact with someone else. In the mean time, Art. 81 EC makes clear who the targets of competition law are in two stages with the term agreement &#8220;undertaking&#8221;. This is used to describe almost anyone &#8220;engaged in an economic activity&#8221;,[68] but excludes both employees, who are by their &#8220;very nature the opposite of the independent exercise of an economic or commercial activity&#8221;,[69] and public services based on &#8220;solidarity&#8221; for a &#8220;social purpose&#8221;.[70] Undertakings must then have formed an agreement, developed a &#8220;concerted practice&#8221;, or, within an association, taken a decision. Like US antitrust, this just means all the same thing;[71] any kind of dealing or contact, or a &#8220;meeting of the minds&#8221; between parties. Covered therefore is a whole range from a strong handshaken written or verbal agreement to a supplier sending invoices with directions not to export to its retailer who gives &#8220;tacit acquiescence&#8221; to the conduct.[72]</p>
<p>Less of a consensus exists in the field of vertical agreements. These are agreements not between firms at the same level of production, but firms at different levels in the supply chain, for instance a supermarket and a bread producer. Recently, the United States Supreme Court has become more skeptical of antitrust cases predicated on agreements between companies that are not directly in competition with one another, such as a clothing manufacturer and a clothing retailer, while maintaining the strict prohibition against agreements that limit competition between companies at the same level of the supply chain, such as agreements between two retailers or between two distributors. Vertical agreements may still be illegal, but the burden of proving them illegal was raised by a number of recent cases from the per se illegal standard to a more demanding rule of reason standard.[73]</p>
<p>[edit] Dominance and monopoly</p>
<p>    Main article: Monopoly law</p>
<p>The economist&#8217;s depiction of deadweight loss to efficiency that monopolies cause<br />
The economist&#8217;s depiction of deadweight loss to efficiency that monopolies cause</p>
<p>When firms hold large market shares, consumers risk paying higher prices and getting lower quality products than compared to competitive markets. However, the existence of a very high market share does not always mean consumers are paying excessive prices since the threat of new entrants to the market can restrain a high-market-share firm&#8217;s price increases. Competition law does not make merely having a monopoly illegal, but rather abusing the power that a monopoly may confer, for instance through exclusionary practices.</p>
<p>First it is necessary to determine whether a firm is dominant, or whether it behaves &#8220;to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumer.&#8221;[74] Under EU law, very large market shares raise a presumption that a firm is dominant,[75] which may be rebuttable.[76] If a firm has a dominant position, then there is &#8220;a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair competition on the common market&#8221;.[77] Similarly as with collusive conduct, market shares are determined with reference to the particular market in which the firm and product in question is sold. Then although the lists are seldom closed,[78] certain categories of abusive conduct are usually prohibited under the country&#8217;s legislation. For instance, limiting production at a shipping port by refusing to raise expenditure and update technology could be abusive.[79] Tying one product into the sale of another can be considered abuse too, being restrictive of consumer choice and depriving competitors of outlets. This was the alleged case in Microsoft v. Commission[80] leading to an eventual fine of €497 million for including its Windows Media Player with the Microsoft Windows platform. A refusal to supply a facility which is essential for all businesses attempting to compete to use can constitute an abuse. One example was in a case involving a medical company named Commercial Solvents.[81] When it set up its own rival in the tuberculosis drugs market, Commercial Solvents were forced to continue supplying a company named Zoja with the raw materials for the drug. Zoja was the only market competitor, so without the court forcing supply, all competition would have been eliminated.</p>
<p>Forms of abuse relating directly to pricing include price exploitation. It is difficult to prove at what point a dominant firm&#8217;s prices become &#8220;exploitative&#8221; and this category of abuse is rarely found. In one case however, a French funeral service was found to have demanded exploitative prices, and this was justified on the basis that prices of funeral services outside the region could be compared.[82] A more tricky issue is predatory pricing. This is the practice of dropping prices of a product so much that in order one&#8217;s smaller competitors cannot cover their costs and fall out of business. The Chicago School (economics) considers predatory pricing to be unlikely.[83] However in France Telecom SA v. Commission[84] a broadband internet company was forced to pay €10.35 million for dropping its prices below its own production costs. It had &#8220;no interest in applying such prices except that of eliminating competitors&#8221;[85] and was being crossed subsidised to capture the lion&#8217;s share of a booming market. One last category of pricing abuse is price discrimination.[86] An example of this could be offering rebates to industrial customers who export your company&#8217;s sugar, but not to Irish customers who are selling their goods in the same market as you are in.[87]</p>
<p>    See also: Dominance (economics) and Monopoly</p>
<p>[edit] Mergers and acquisitions</p>
<p>    Main article: Mergers and acquisitions</p>
<p>A merger or acquisition involves, from a competition law perspective, the concentration of economic power in the hands of fewer than before.[88] This usually means that one firm buys out the shares of another. The reasons for oversight of economic concentrations by the state are the same as the reasons to restrict firms who abuse a position of dominance, only that regulation of mergers and acquisitions attempts to deal with the problem before it arises, ex ante prevention of creating dominant firms.[89] In the United States merger regulation began under the Clayton Act, and in the European Union, under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 (known as the &#8220;ECMR&#8221;[90]). Competition law requires that firms proposing to merge gain authorisation from the relevant government authority, or simply go ahead but face the prospect of demerger should the concentration later be found to lessen competition. The theory behind mergers is that transaction costs can be reduced compared to operating on an open market through bilateral contracts.[91] Concentrations can increase economies of scale and scope. However often firms take advantage of their increase in market power, their increased market share and decreased number of competitors, which can have a knock on effect on the deal that consumers get. Merger control is about predicting what the market might be like, not knowing and making a judgment. Hence the central provision under EU law asks whether a concentration would if it went ahead &#8220;significantly impede effective competition&#8230; in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening off a dominant position&#8230;&#8221;[92] and the corresponding provision under US antitrust states similarly,</p>
<p>    &#8220;No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital&#8230; of the assets of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where&#8230; the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.[93]</p>
<p>What amounts to a substantial lessening of, or significant impediment to competition is usually answered through empirical study. The market shares of the merging companies can be assessed and added, although this kind of analysis only gives rise to presumptions, not conclusions.[94] Something called the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used to calculate the &#8220;density&#8221; of the market, or what concentration exists. Aside from the maths, it is important to consider the product in question and the rate of technical innovation in the market.[95] A further problem of collective dominance, or oligopoly through &#8220;economic links&#8221;[96] can arise, whereby the new market becomes more conducive to collusion. It is relevant how transparent a market is, because a more concentrated structure could mean firms can coordinate their behaviour more easily, whether firms can deploy deterrants and whether firms are safe from a reaction by their competitors and consumers.[97] The entry of new firms to the market, and any barriers that they might encounter should be considered.[98] If firms are shown to be creating an uncompetitive concentration, in the US they can still argue that they create efficiencies enough to outweigh any detriment, and similar reference to &#8220;technical and economic progress&#8221; is mentioned in Art. 2 of the ECMR.[99] Another defence might be that a firm which is being taken over is about to fail or go insolvent, and taking it over leaves a no less competitive state than what would happen anyway.[100] Mergers vertically in the market are rarely of concern, although in AOL/Time Warner[101] the European Commission required that a joint venture with a competitor Bertelsmann be ceased beforehand. The EU authorities have also focussed lately on the effect of conglomerate mergers, where companies acquire a large portfolio of related products, though without necessarily dominant shares in any individual market.[102]</p>
<p>[edit] Public sector regulation</p>
<p>    Main articles: Public services, Regulated market, and EC regulation<br />
    See also: American Telephone &amp; Telegraph, Kingsbury Commitment, Hush-a-Phone v. FCC, and Bell System divestiture</p>
<p>Public sector industries, or industries which are by their nature providing a public service, are involved in competition law in many ways similar to private companies. Under EC law, Articles 86 and 87 create exceptions for the assured achievement of public sector service provision. Many industries, such as railways, telecommunications, electricity, gas, water and media have their own independent sector regulators. These government agencies are charged with ensuring that private providers carry out certain public service duties in line of social welfare goals. For instance, an electricity company may not be allowed to disconnect someone&#8217;s supply merely because they have not paid their bills up to date, because that could leave a person in the dark and cold just because they are poor. Instead the electricity company would have to give the person a number of warnings and offer assistance until government welfare support kicks in.[103]</p>
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	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: The Great Deceiver</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-782564</link>
		<dc:creator>The Great Deceiver</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 06:15:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-782564</guid>
		<description>So why does this website waste it&#039;s time posting trivel like this ? first of all everybody knows that the US congress and the US goverment is corrupt to the bone and they take kickbacks and bribes from the entertainment cartels.
 
It is NEVER going to change.

.The US goverment supports all kinds of obsolete business models such as silly(civil sevice) tax supported military exchange retail outlets that are badly managed and don&#039;t make a profit and private business contractors that generally rip of the federal goverment.

 The US congress supports billions of dollars worth of useless pork barrel spending.

The federal goverment  has always propped up failing businesses for bad business practices or other wise providing corporate welfare (PROTECTIONISM)for other failing american businesses other than the entertainment cartels.

If i think about the business practices of the movie and recording industry i think of ANTITRUST SUIT...............
GET OVER IT...............THINGS ARE NEVER GOING TO CHANGE.

DON&#039;T BUYT THIER PRODUCTS AND WHY DON&#039;T YOU QUIT YOUR CRYING ...........................

Competition law
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&quot;Antitrust&quot; redirects here. For the 2001 film, see Antitrust (film). For laws specific to the U.S., see United States antitrust law.

Competition law, known in the United States as antitrust law, has three main elements:

    * prohibiting agreements or practices that restrict free trading and competition between business entities. This includes in particular the repression of cartels.
    * banning abusive behaviour by a firm dominating a market, or anti-competitive practices that tend to lead to such a dominant position. Practices controlled in this way may include predatory pricing, tying, price gouging, refusal to deal, and many others.
    * supervising the mergers and acquisitions of large corporations, including some joint ventures. Transactions that are considered to threaten the competitive process can be prohibited altogether, or approved subject to &quot;remedies&quot; such as an obligation to divest part of the merged business or to offer licences or access to facilities to enable other businesses to continue competing.

The substance and produce of competition Act vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Protecting the interests of consumers (consumer welfare) and ensuring that entrepreneurs have an opportunity to compete in the market economy are often treated as important objectives. Competition law is closely connected with law on deregulation of access to markets, state aids and subsidies, the privatisation of state owned assets and the establishment of independent sector regulators. In recent decades, competition law has been viewed as a way to provide better public services.[1] Robert Bork has found that competition laws can produce adverse effects when they reduce competition by protecting inefficient competitors and when costs of legal intervention are greater then benefits for the consumers.[2] The history of competition law reaches back to the Roman Empire. The business practices of market traders, guilds and governments have always been subject to scrutiny, and sometimes severe sanctions. Since the twentieth century, competition law has become global. The two largest and most influential systems of competition regulation are United States antitrust law and European Community competition law. National and regional competition authorities across the world have formed international support and enforcement networks.
Contents
[hide]

    * 1 History
          o 1.1 Roman legislation
          o 1.2 Middle ages
          o 1.3 Renaissance developments
          o 1.4 Restraint of trade
    * 2 Today
          o 2.1 United States antitrust
          o 2.2 Development in other countries
          o 2.3 European Union law
          o 2.4 International enforcement
    * 3 Theory
          o 3.1 Classical perspective
          o 3.2 Neo-classical synthesis
          o 3.3 Chicago School
          o 3.4 Policy developments
    * 4 Practice
          o 4.1 Collusion and cartels
          o 4.2 Dominance and monopoly
          o 4.3 Mergers and acquisitions
          o 4.4 Public sector regulation
    * 5 See also
    * 6 Notes
    * 7 References
    * 8 Further reading
    * 9 External links

[edit] History
Competition law
Basic concepts

    * History of competition law
    * Monopolization
          o Coercive monopoly
          o Natural monopoly
    * Barriers to entry
    * Market power
    * SSNIP test
    * Relevant market
    * Merger control

Anti-competitive practices

    * Collusion
          o Formation of cartels
          o Price fixing
          o Bid rigging
    * Product bundling and tying
    * Refusal to deal
          o Group boycott
    * Exclusive dealing
    * Dividing territories
    * Conscious parallelism
    * Predatory pricing
    * Misuse of patents and copyrights

Laws and doctrines

United States

    * Sherman Antitrust Act
    * Clayton Antitrust Act
    * Robinson-Patman Act
    * FTC Act
    * Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
    * Merger guidelines
    * Essential facilities doctrine
    * Noerr-Pennington doctrine
    * Rule of reason

Europe

    * European Community
      competition law
    * Irish Competition Law
    * Competition Act 1998 (UK)

Australia

    * Trade Practices Act 1974

Enforcement authorities and organizations

    * International Competition Network
    * List of competition regulators

edit box

    Main article: History of competition law

Laws governing competition law are found in over two millennia of history. Roman Emperors and Medieval monarchs alike used tariffs to stabilize prices or support local production. The formal study of &quot;competition&quot;, began in earnest during the 18th century with such works as Adam Smith&#039;s The Wealth of Nations. Different terms were used to describe this area of the law, including &quot;restrictive practices&quot;, &quot;the law of monopolies&quot;, &quot;combination acts&quot; and the &quot;restraint of trade&quot;.

[edit] Roman legislation

    See also: Roman law

An early example of competition law is the Lex Julia de Annona, enacted during the Roman Republic around 50 BC.[3] To protect the grain trade, heavy fines were imposed on anyone directly, deliberately and insidiously stopping supply ships.[4] Under Diocletian in 301 AD an edict imposed the death penalty for anyone violating a tariff system, for example by buying up, concealing or contriving the scarcity of everyday goods.[5]

More legislation came under the Constitution of Zeno of 483 AD, which can be traced into Florentine Municipal laws of 1322 and 1325.[6] This provided for confiscation of property and banishment for any trade combinations or joint action of monopolies private or granted by the Emperor. Zeno rescinded all previously granted exclusive rights.[7] Justinian I subsequently introduced legislation to pay officials to manage state monopolies.[8] As Europe slipped into the dark ages, so did the records of law making until the Middle Ages brought greater expansion of trade in the time of lex mercatoria.

[edit] Middle ages

    See also: Lex Mercatoria and Guilds

Edward III during the Black Death enacted the Statute of Labourers to cap wages, and provide double damages against infringers
Edward III during the Black Death enacted the Statute of Labourers to cap wages, and provide double damages against infringers

Legislation in England to control monopolies and restrictive practices were in force well before the Norman Conquest.[9] The Domesday Book recorded that &quot;foresteel&quot; (i.e. forestalling, the practice of buying up goods before they reach market and then inflating the prices) was one of three forfeitures that King Edward the Confessor could carry out through England.[10] But concern for fair prices also led to attempts to directly regulate the market. Under Henry III an act was passed in 1266[11] to fix bread and ale prices in correspondence with corn prices laid down by the assizes. Penalties for breach included amercements, pillory and tumbrel.[12] A fourteenth century statute labelled forestallers as &quot;oppressors of the poor and the community at large and enemies of the whole country.&quot;[13] Under King Edward III the Statute of Labourers of 1349[14] fixed wages of artificers and workmen and decreed that foodstuffs should be sold at reasonable prices. On top of existing penalties, the statute stated that overcharging merchants must pay the injured party double the sum he received, an idea that has been replicated in punitive treble damages under US antitrust law. Also under Edward III, the following statutory provision outlawed trade combinations.[15]

    &quot;...we have ordained and established, that no merchant or other shall make Confederacy, Conspiracy, Coin, Imagination, or Murmur, or Evil Device in any point that may turn to the Impeachment, Disturbance, Defeating or Decay of the said Staples, or of anything that to them pertaineth, or may pertain.&quot;

Examples of legislation in mainland Europe include the constitutiones juris metallici by Wenceslas II of Bohemia between 1283 and 1305, condemning combinations of ore traders increasing prices; the Municipal Statutes of Florence in 1322 and 1325 followed Zeno&#039;s legislation against state monopolies; and under Emperor Charles V in the Holy Roman Empire a law was passed &quot;to prevent losses resulting from monopolies and improper contracts which many merchants and artisans made in the Netherlands.&quot; In 1553 King Henry VIII reintroduced tariffs for foodstuffs, designed to stabilise prices, in the face of fluctuations in supply from overseas. So the legislation read here that whereas,

    &quot;it is very hard and difficult to put certain prices to any such things... [it is necessary because] prices of such victuals be many times enhanced and raised by the Greedy Covetousness and Appetites of the Owners of such Victuals, by occasion of ingrossing and regrating the same, more than upon any reasonable or just ground or cause, to the great damage and impoverishing of the King&#039;s subjects.&quot;[16]

Around this time organisations representing various tradesmen and handicraftspeople, known as guilds had been developing, and enjoyed many concessions and exemptions from the laws against monopolies. The privileges conferred were not abolished until the Municipal Corporations Act 1835.

[edit] Renaissance developments

    See also: Renaissance

Elizabeth I assured monopolies would not be abused in the early era of globalisation
Elizabeth I assured monopolies would not be abused in the early era of globalisation

Europe around the 15th century was changing quickly. The new world had just been opened up, overseas trade and plunder was pouring wealth through the international economy and attitudes among businessmen were shifting. In 1561 a system of Industrial Monopoly Licences, similar to modern patents had been introduced into England. But by the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, the system was reputedly much abused and used merely to preserve privileges, encouraging nothing new in the way of innovation or manufacture.[17] When a protest was made in the House of Commons and a Bill was introduced, the Queen convinced the protesters to challenge the case in the courts. This was the catalyst for the Case of Monopolies or Darcy v. Allin.[18] The plaintiff, an officer of the Queen&#039;s household, had been granted the sole right of making playing cards and claimed damages for the defendant&#039;s infringement of this right. The court found the grant void and that three characteristics of monopoly were (1) price increases (2) quality decrease (3) the tendency to reduce artificers to idleness and beggary. This put a temporary end to complaints about monopoly, until King James I began to grant them again. In 1623 Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies, which for the most part excluded patent rights from its prohibitions, as well as guilds. From King Charles I, through the civil war and to King Charles II, monopolies continued, especially useful for raising revenue.[19] Then in 1684, in East India Company v. Sandys[20] it was decided that exclusive rights to trade only outside the realm were legitimate, on the grounds that only large and powerful concerns could trade in the conditions prevailing overseas. In 1710 to deal with high coal prices caused by a Newcastle Coal Monopoly the New Law was passed.[21] Its provisions stated that &quot;all and every contract or contracts, Covenants and Agreements, whether the same be in writing or not in writing... are hereby declared to be illegal.&quot; When Adam Smith wrote the Wealth of Nations in 1776[22] he was somewhat cynical of the possibility for change.

    &quot;To expect indeed that freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain is as absurd as to expect that Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but what is more unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals irresistibly oppose it. The Member of Parliament who supports any proposal for strengthening this Monopoly is seen to acquire not only the reputation for understanding trade, but great popularity and influence with an order of men whose members and wealth render them of great importance.&quot;

[edit] Restraint of trade

    Main article: Restraint of trade

Judge Coke in the 17th century thought that general restraints on trade were unreasonable
Judge Coke in the 17th century thought that general restraints on trade were unreasonable

The English law of restraint of trade is the direct predecessor to modern competition law.[23] Its current use is small, given modern and economically oriented statutes in most common law countries. Its approach was based on the two concepts of prohibiting agreements that ran counter to public policy, unless the reasonableness of an agreement could be shown. A restraint of trade is simply some kind of agreed provision that is designed to restrain another&#039;s trade. For example, in Nordenfelt v. Maxim, Nordenfelt Gun Co.[24] a Swedish arm inventor promised on sale of his business to an American gun maker that he &quot;would not make guns or ammunition anywhere in the world, and would not compete with Maxim in any way.&quot;

To be consider whether or not there is a restraint of trade in the first place, both parties must have provided valuable consideration for their agreement. In Dyer&#039;s case[25] a dyer had given a bond not to exercise his trade in the same town as the plaintiff for six months but the plaintiff had promised nothing in return. On hearing the plaintiff&#039;s attempt to enforce this restraint, Hull J exclaimed,

    &quot;per Dieu, if the plaintiff were here, he should go to prison until he had paid a fine to the King.&quot;

The common law has evolved to reflect changing business conditions. So in the 1613 case of Rogers v. Parry[26] a court held that a joiner who promised not to trade from his house for 21 years could have this bond enforced against him since the time and place was certain. It was also held that a man cannot bind himself to not use his trade generally by Chief Justice Coke. This was followed in Broad v. Jolyffe[27] and Mitchell v. Reynolds[28] where Lord Macclesfield asked, &quot;What does it signify to a tradesman in London what another does in Newcastle?&quot; In times of such slow communications, commerce around the country it seemed axiomatic that a general restraint served no legitimate purpose for one&#039;s business and ought to be void. But already in 1880 in Roussillon v. Roussillon[29] Lord Justice Fry stated that a restraint unlimited in space need not be void, since the real question was whether it went further than necessary for the promisee&#039;s protection. So in the Nordenfelt[30] case Lord McNaughton ruled that while one could validly promise to &quot;not make guns or ammunition anywhere in the world&quot; it was an unreasonable restraint to &quot;not compete with Maxim in any way.&quot; This approach in England was confirmed by the House of Lords in Mason v. The Provident Supply and Clothing Co.[31]

[edit] Today

Modern competition law begins with the United States legislation of the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914. While other, particularly European, countries also had some form of regulation on monopolies and cartels, the US codification of the common law position on restraint of trade had a widespread effect on subsequent competition law development. Both after World War II and after the fall of the Berlin wall competition law has gone through phases of renewed attention and legislative updates around the world.

[edit] United States antitrust

    Main article: United States antitrust law

Modern competition law is modeled on the United States&#039; Sherman Act, which aimed to &quot;bust the trusts&quot;.
Modern competition law is modeled on the United States&#039; Sherman Act, which aimed to &quot;bust the trusts&quot;.

The American term anti-trust arose not because the US statutes had anything to do with ordinary trust law, but because the large American corporations used trusts to conceal the nature of their business arrangements. Big trusts became synonymous with big monopolies, the perceived threat to democracy and the free market these trusts represented led to the Sherman and Clayton Acts. These laws, in part, codified past American and English common law of restraints of trade. Senator Hoar, an author of the Sherman Act said in a debate, &quot;We have affirmed the old doctrine of the common law in regard to all inter-state and international commercial transactions and have clothed the United States courts with authority to enforce that doctrine by injunction.&quot; Evidence of the common law basis of the Sherman and Clayton acts is found in the Standard Oil case,[32] where Chief Justice White explicitly linked the Sherman Act with the common law and sixteenth century English statutes on engrossing.[33] The Act&#039;s wording also reflects common law. The first two sections read as follows,

    &quot;Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine....

    Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine....&quot;

The Sherman Act did not have the immediate effects its authors intended, though Republican President Theodore Roosevelt&#039;s federal government sued 45 companies, and William Taft used it against 75. The Clayton Act of 1914 was passed to supplement the Sherman Act. Specific categories of abusive conduct were listed, including price discrimination(section 2), exclusive dealings (section 3) and mergers which substantially lessen competition (section 7). Section 6 exempted trade unions from the law&#039;s operation. Both the Sherman and Clayton acts are now codified under Title 15 of the United States Code.

Since the mid-1970s, courts and enforcement officials generally have supported view that antitrust law policy should not follow social and political aims that undermine economic efficiency.[34] The antitrust laws were minimalized in the mid-1980s under influence of Chicago school of economics and blamed for the loss of economic supremacy in the world.[35]

[edit] Development in other countries
	This article or section is missing citations or needs footnotes.
Using inline citations helps guard against copyright violations and factual inaccuracies. (July 2008)

    See also: Competition regulator

The European Commission, established following World War II, was the first Europe wide competition authority
The European Commission, established following World War II, was the first Europe wide competition authority

It was after the First World War that countries began to follow the United States&#039; lead in competition policy. In 1923 Canada introduced the Combines Investigation Act and in 1926 France reinforced its basic competition provisions from the 1810 Code Napoleon. After the Second World War, the Allies, led by the United States, introduced tight regulation of cartels and monopolies in occupied Germany and Japan. In Germany, despite the existence of laws against unfair competition passed in 1909 (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb or UWB) it was widely believed that the predominance of large cartels of German industry had made it easier for the Nazis to assume total economic control, simply by bribing or blackmailing the heads of a small number of industrial magnates. Similarly in Japan, where business was organised along family and nepotistic ties, the zaibatsu were easy for the despotic government to manipulate into the war effort. Following, unconditional surrender tighter controls, replicating American policy were introduced.

Further developments however were considerably overshadowed by the move towards nationalisation and industry wide planning in many countries. Making the economy and industry democratically accountable through direct government action became a priority. Coal industry, railroads, steel, electricity, water, health care and many other sectors were targeted for their special qualities of being natural monopolies. Commonwealth countries were reluctant in enacting statutory competition law provisions. The United Kingdom introduced the (considerably less stringent) Restrictive Practices Act in 1956. Australia introduced its current Trade Practices Act in 1974. Recently however there has been a wave of updates, especially in Europe to harmonise legislation with contemporary competition law thinking.

[edit] European Union law

    Main article: European Community competition law

In 1957 six Western European countries signed the Treaty of the European Community (EC Treaty or Treaty of Rome), which over the last fifty years has grown into a European Union of nearly half a billion citizens. The European Community is the name for the economic and social pillar of EU law, under which competition law falls. Healthy competition is seen as an essential element in the creation of a common market free from restraints on trade.[36] The first provision is Article 81 EC, which deals with cartels and restrictive vertical agreements. Prohibited are:

    &quot;(1) ...all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market...&quot;

Article 81(1) EC then gives examples of &quot;hard core&quot; restrictive practices such as price fixing or market sharing and 81(2) EC confirms that any agreements are automatically void. However, just like the Statute of Monopolies 1623, Article 81(3) EC creates exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a &quot;fair share&quot; of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints (or disproportionate, in ECJ terminology) that risk eliminating competition anywhere. Article 82 EC deals with monopolies, or more precisely firms who have a dominant market share and abuse that position. Unlike U.S. Antitrust, EC law has never been used to punish the existence of dominant firms, but merely imposes a special responsibility to conduct oneself appropriately.[37] Specific categories of abuse listed in Article 82 EC include price discrimination and exclusive dealing, much the same as sections 2 and 3 of the U.S. Clayton Act. Also under Article 82 EC, the European Council was empowered to enact a regulation to control mergers between firms, currently the latest known by the abbreviation of Regulation 139/2004/EC. The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. Again, the similarity to the Clayton Act&#039;s substantial lessening of competition. Finally, Articles 86 and 87 EC regulate the state&#039;s role in the market. Article 86(2) EC states clearly that nothing in the rules can be used to obstruct a member state&#039;s right to deliver public services, but that otherwise public enterprises must play by the same rules on collusion and abuse of dominance as everyone else. Article 87 EC, similar to Article 81 EC, lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition, but then grants exceptions for things like charities, natural disasters or regional development.

[edit] International enforcement

    See also: World Trade Organization and International Competition Network

There is considerable controversy among WTO members, in green, whether competition law should form part of the agreements
There is considerable controversy among WTO members, in green, whether competition law should form part of the agreements

Competition law has already been substantially internationalised along the lines of the US model by nation states themselves, however the involvement of international organisations has been growing. Increasingly active at all international conferences are the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which is prone to making neo-liberal recommendations about the total application of competition law for public and private industries.[38] Chapter 5 of the post war Havana Charter contained an Antitrust code[39] but this was never incorporated into the WTO&#039;s forerunner, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. Office of Fair Trading Director and Professor Richard Whish wrote sceptically that it &quot;seems unlikely at the current stage of its development that the WTO will metamorphose into a global competition authority.&quot;[40] Despite that, at the ongoing Doha round of trade talks for the World Trade Organisation, discussion includes the prospect of competition law enforcement moving up to a global level. While it is incapable of enforcement itself, the newly established International Competition Network[41] (ICN) is a way for national authorities to coordinate their own enforcement activities.

It is unclear whether competition policy is a sensible role for government in developing, particularly low-income countries. In these countries the markets are usually very small and fragmented so that developing scale sufficient to raise competitiveness and engage in international markets is a major challenge. The bigger problem is however poor governance - in societies with widespread corruption, inadequate public finances,[42] and weak judiciary and oversight institutions, competition policy may become another tool for capture by vested interests - becoming in itself a barrier to entry.

[edit] Theory

    Main article: Competition law theory

[edit] Classical perspective

    See also: Classical economics

John Stuart Mill believed the restraint of trade doctrine was justified to preserve liberty and competition
John Stuart Mill believed the restraint of trade doctrine was justified to preserve liberty and competition

The classical perspective on competition was that certain agreements and business practice could be an unreasonable restraint on the individual liberty of tradespeople to carry on their livelihoods. Restraints were judged as permissible or not by courts as new cases appeared and in the light of changing business circumstances. Hence the courts found specific categories of agreement, specific clauses, to fall foul of their doctrine on economic fairness, and they did not contrive an overarching conception of market power. Earlier theorists like Adam Smith rejected any monopoly power on this basis.

    &quot;A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company has the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate.&quot;[43]

In The Wealth of Nations (1776) Adam Smith also pointed out the cartel problem, but did not advocate legal measures to combat them.

    &quot;People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.&quot;[44]

Smith also rejected the very existence of, not just dominant and abusive corporations, but corporations at all.[45] By the latter half of the nineteenth century it had become clear that large firms had become a fact of the market economy. John Stuart Mill&#039;s approach was laid down in his treatise On Liberty (1859).

    &quot;Again, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society... both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil...&quot;[46]

[edit] Neo-classical synthesis

    See also: Neoclassical synthesis

Paul Samuelson, author of the 20th century&#039;s most successful economics text, combined mathematical models and Keynesian macroeconomic intervention. He advocated the general success of the market but backed the American government&#039;s antitrust policies.
Paul Samuelson, author of the 20th century&#039;s most successful economics text, combined mathematical models and Keynesian macroeconomic intervention. He advocated the general success of the market but backed the American government&#039;s antitrust policies.

After Mill, there was a shift in economic theory, which emphasised a more precise and theoretical model of competition. A simple neo-classical model of free markets holds that production and distribution of goods and services in competitive free markets maximizes social welfare. This model assumes that new firms can freely enter markets and compete with existing firms, or to use legal language, there are no barriers to entry. By this term economists mean something very specific, that competitive free markets deliver allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. Allocative efficiency is also known as Pareto efficiency after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto and means that resources in an economy over the long run will go precisely to those who are willing and able to pay for them. Because rational producers will keep producing and selling, and buyers will keep buying up to the last marginal unit of possible output - or alternatively rational producers will be reduce their output to the margin at which buyers will buy the same amount as produced - there is no waste, the greatest number wants of the greatest number of people become satisfied and utility is perfected because resources can no longer be reallocated to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off; society has achieved allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency simply means that society is making as much as it can. Free markets are meant to reward those who work hard, and therefore those who will put society&#039;s resources towards the frontier of its possible production.[47] Dynamic efficiency refers to the idea that business which constantly competes must research, create and innovate to keep its share of consumers. This traces to Austrian-American political scientist Joseph Schumpeter&#039;s notion that a &quot;perennial gale of creative destruction&quot; is ever sweeping through capitalist economies, driving enterprise at the market&#039;s mercy.[48] This led Schumpeter to argue that monopolies did not need to be broken up (as with Standard Oil) because the next gale of economic innovation would do the same.

Contrasting with the allocatively, productively and dynamically efficient market model are monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels. When only one or a few firms exist in the market, and there is no credible threat of the entry of competing firms, prices raise above the competitive level, to either a monopolistic or oligopolistic equilibrium price. Production is also decreased, further decreasing social welfare by creating a deadweight loss. Sources of this market power are said to include the existence of externalities, barriers to entry of the market, and the free rider problem. Markets may fail to be efficient for a variety of reasons, so the exception of competition law&#039;s intervention to the rule of laissez faire is justified if government failure can be avoided. Orthodox economists fully acknowledge that perfect competition is seldom observed in the real world, and so aim for what is called &quot;workable competition&quot;.[49][50] This follows the theory that if one cannot achieve the ideal, then go for the second best option[51] by using the law to tame market operation where it can.

[edit] Chicago School
Robert Bork argues that competition law is fundamentally flawed
Robert Bork argues that competition law is fundamentally flawed

    See also: Chicago School (economics) and Neoclassical economics

A group of economists and lawyers, who are largely associated with the University of Chicago, advocate an approach to competition law guided by the proposition that some actions that were originally considered to be anticompetitive could actually promote competition.[52] The U.S. Supreme Court has used the Chicago School approach in several recent cases.[53] One view of the Chicago School approach to antitrust is found in United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner&#039;s books&#039; Antitrust Law[54] and Economic Analysis of Law[55]

Robert Bork was highly critical of court decisions on United States antitrust law in a series of law review articles and his book The Antitrust Paradox.[56] Bork argued that both the original intention of antitrust laws and economic efficiency was the pursuit only of consumer welfare, the protection of competition rather than competitors.[57] Furthermore, only a few acts should be prohibited, namely cartels that fix prices and divide markets, mergers that create monopolies, and dominant firms pricing predatorily, while allowing such practices as vertical agreements and price discrimination on the grounds that it did not harm consumers.[58] Running through the different critiques of US antitrust policy is the common theme that government interference in the operation of free markets does more harm than good.[59] &quot;The only cure for bad theory&quot;, writes Bork, &quot;is better theory&quot;.[57] The late Harvard Law School Professor Philip Areeda, who favours more aggressive antitrust policy, in at least one Supreme Court case challenged Robert Bork&#039;s preference for non-intervention.[60]

[edit] Policy developments

Anti-cartel enforcement is a key focus of competition law enforcement policy. In the US the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act 2004 raised the maximum imprisonment term for price fixing from three to ten years, and the maximum fine from $10 to $100 million.[61] In 2007 British Airways and Korean Air pleaded guilty to fixing cargo and passenger flight prices.[62]

These actions complement the private enforcement which has always been an important feature of United States antitrust law. The United States Supreme Court summarised why Congress allows punitive damages in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.:[63]
“ 	Every violation of the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-enterprise system envisaged by Congress. This system depends on strong competition for its health and vigor, and strong competition depends, in turn, on compliance with antitrust legislation. In enacting these laws, Congress had many means at its disposal to penalize violators. It could have, for example, required violators to compensate federal, state, and local governments for the estimated damage to their respective economies caused by the violations. But, this remedy was not selected. Instead, Congress chose to permit all persons to sue to recover three times their actual damages every time they were injured in their business or property by an antitrust violation. 	”

In the EU, the Modernisation Regulation 1/2003 means that the European Commission is no longer the only body capable of public enforcement of European Community competition law. This was done in order to facilitate quicker resolution of competition-related inquiries. In 2005 the Commission issued a Green Paper on Damages actions for the breach of the EC antitrust rules,[64] which suggested ways of making private damages claims against cartels easier.[65]

[edit] Practice
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[edit] Collusion and cartels

    Main articles: Collusion and Cartel

Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith was an early enemy of cartels
Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith was an early enemy of cartels

The core of competition policy has, since the 1980s, been the anti-price fixing cartel agenda, despite criticism by libertarians.[66] In The Wealth of Nations (1776) Adam Smith pointed out the cartel problem, but did not advocate legal measures to combat them.[67] Nowadays a far stricter approach is taken. Under EC law cartels are banned by Article 81 EC, whereas under US law the Sherman Act prohibitions of section 1. To compare, the target of competition law under the Sherman Act 1890 is every &quot;contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy&quot;, which essentially targets anybody who has some dealing or contact with someone else. In the mean time, Art. 81 EC makes clear who the targets of competition law are in two stages with the term agreement &quot;undertaking&quot;. This is used to describe almost anyone &quot;engaged in an economic activity&quot;,[68] but excludes both employees, who are by their &quot;very nature the opposite of the independent exercise of an economic or commercial activity&quot;,[69] and public services based on &quot;solidarity&quot; for a &quot;social purpose&quot;.[70] Undertakings must then have formed an agreement, developed a &quot;concerted practice&quot;, or, within an association, taken a decision. Like US antitrust, this just means all the same thing;[71] any kind of dealing or contact, or a &quot;meeting of the minds&quot; between parties. Covered therefore is a whole range from a strong handshaken written or verbal agreement to a supplier sending invoices with directions not to export to its retailer who gives &quot;tacit acquiescence&quot; to the conduct.[72]

Less of a consensus exists in the field of vertical agreements. These are agreements not between firms at the same level of production, but firms at different levels in the supply chain, for instance a supermarket and a bread producer. Recently, the United States Supreme Court has become more skeptical of antitrust cases predicated on agreements between companies that are not directly in competition with one another, such as a clothing manufacturer and a clothing retailer, while maintaining the strict prohibition against agreements that limit competition between companies at the same level of the supply chain, such as agreements between two retailers or between two distributors. Vertical agreements may still be illegal, but the burden of proving them illegal was raised by a number of recent cases from the per se illegal standard to a more demanding rule of reason standard.[73]

[edit] Dominance and monopoly

    Main article: Monopoly law

The economist&#039;s depiction of deadweight loss to efficiency that monopolies cause
The economist&#039;s depiction of deadweight loss to efficiency that monopolies cause

When firms hold large market shares, consumers risk paying higher prices and getting lower quality products than compared to competitive markets. However, the existence of a very high market share does not always mean consumers are paying excessive prices since the threat of new entrants to the market can restrain a high-market-share firm&#039;s price increases. Competition law does not make merely having a monopoly illegal, but rather abusing the power that a monopoly may confer, for instance through exclusionary practices.

First it is necessary to determine whether a firm is dominant, or whether it behaves &quot;to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumer.&quot;[74] Under EU law, very large market shares raise a presumption that a firm is dominant,[75] which may be rebuttable.[76] If a firm has a dominant position, then there is &quot;a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair competition on the common market&quot;.[77] Similarly as with collusive conduct, market shares are determined with reference to the particular market in which the firm and product in question is sold. Then although the lists are seldom closed,[78] certain categories of abusive conduct are usually prohibited under the country&#039;s legislation. For instance, limiting production at a shipping port by refusing to raise expenditure and update technology could be abusive.[79] Tying one product into the sale of another can be considered abuse too, being restrictive of consumer choice and depriving competitors of outlets. This was the alleged case in Microsoft v. Commission[80] leading to an eventual fine of €497 million for including its Windows Media Player with the Microsoft Windows platform. A refusal to supply a facility which is essential for all businesses attempting to compete to use can constitute an abuse. One example was in a case involving a medical company named Commercial Solvents.[81] When it set up its own rival in the tuberculosis drugs market, Commercial Solvents were forced to continue supplying a company named Zoja with the raw materials for the drug. Zoja was the only market competitor, so without the court forcing supply, all competition would have been eliminated.

Forms of abuse relating directly to pricing include price exploitation. It is difficult to prove at what point a dominant firm&#039;s prices become &quot;exploitative&quot; and this category of abuse is rarely found. In one case however, a French funeral service was found to have demanded exploitative prices, and this was justified on the basis that prices of funeral services outside the region could be compared.[82] A more tricky issue is predatory pricing. This is the practice of dropping prices of a product so much that in order one&#039;s smaller competitors cannot cover their costs and fall out of business. The Chicago School (economics) considers predatory pricing to be unlikely.[83] However in France Telecom SA v. Commission[84] a broadband internet company was forced to pay €10.35 million for dropping its prices below its own production costs. It had &quot;no interest in applying such prices except that of eliminating competitors&quot;[85] and was being crossed subsidised to capture the lion&#039;s share of a booming market. One last category of pricing abuse is price discrimination.[86] An example of this could be offering rebates to industrial customers who export your company&#039;s sugar, but not to Irish customers who are selling their goods in the same market as you are in.[87]

    See also: Dominance (economics) and Monopoly

[edit] Mergers and acquisitions

    Main article: Mergers and acquisitions

A merger or acquisition involves, from a competition law perspective, the concentration of economic power in the hands of fewer than before.[88] This usually means that one firm buys out the shares of another. The reasons for oversight of economic concentrations by the state are the same as the reasons to restrict firms who abuse a position of dominance, only that regulation of mergers and acquisitions attempts to deal with the problem before it arises, ex ante prevention of creating dominant firms.[89] In the United States merger regulation began under the Clayton Act, and in the European Union, under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 (known as the &quot;ECMR&quot;[90]). Competition law requires that firms proposing to merge gain authorisation from the relevant government authority, or simply go ahead but face the prospect of demerger should the concentration later be found to lessen competition. The theory behind mergers is that transaction costs can be reduced compared to operating on an open market through bilateral contracts.[91] Concentrations can increase economies of scale and scope. However often firms take advantage of their increase in market power, their increased market share and decreased number of competitors, which can have a knock on effect on the deal that consumers get. Merger control is about predicting what the market might be like, not knowing and making a judgment. Hence the central provision under EU law asks whether a concentration would if it went ahead &quot;significantly impede effective competition... in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening off a dominant position...&quot;[92] and the corresponding provision under US antitrust states similarly,

    &quot;No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital... of the assets of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where... the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.[93]

What amounts to a substantial lessening of, or significant impediment to competition is usually answered through empirical study. The market shares of the merging companies can be assessed and added, although this kind of analysis only gives rise to presumptions, not conclusions.[94] Something called the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used to calculate the &quot;density&quot; of the market, or what concentration exists. Aside from the maths, it is important to consider the product in question and the rate of technical innovation in the market.[95] A further problem of collective dominance, or oligopoly through &quot;economic links&quot;[96] can arise, whereby the new market becomes more conducive to collusion. It is relevant how transparent a market is, because a more concentrated structure could mean firms can coordinate their behaviour more easily, whether firms can deploy deterrants and whether firms are safe from a reaction by their competitors and consumers.[97] The entry of new firms to the market, and any barriers that they might encounter should be considered.[98] If firms are shown to be creating an uncompetitive concentration, in the US they can still argue that they create efficiencies enough to outweigh any detriment, and similar reference to &quot;technical and economic progress&quot; is mentioned in Art. 2 of the ECMR.[99] Another defence might be that a firm which is being taken over is about to fail or go insolvent, and taking it over leaves a no less competitive state than what would happen anyway.[100] Mergers vertically in the market are rarely of concern, although in AOL/Time Warner[101] the European Commission required that a joint venture with a competitor Bertelsmann be ceased beforehand. The EU authorities have also focussed lately on the effect of conglomerate mergers, where companies acquire a large portfolio of related products, though without necessarily dominant shares in any individual market.[102]

[edit] Public sector regulation

    Main articles: Public services, Regulated market, and EC regulation
    See also: American Telephone &amp; Telegraph, Kingsbury Commitment, Hush-a-Phone v. FCC, and Bell System divestiture

Public sector industries, or industries which are by their nature providing a public service, are involved in competition law in many ways similar to private companies. Under EC law, Articles 86 and 87 create exceptions for the assured achievement of public sector service provision. Many industries, such as railways, telecommunications, electricity, gas, water and media have their own independent sector regulators. These government agencies are charged with ensuring that private providers carry out certain public service duties in line of social welfare goals. For instance, an electricity company may not be allowed to disconnect someone&#039;s supply merely because they have not paid their bills up to date, because that could leave a person in the dark and cold just because they are poor. Instead the electricity company would have to give the person a number of warnings and offer assistance until government welfare support kicks in.[103]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So why does this website waste it&#8217;s time posting trivel like this ? first of all everybody knows that the US congress and the US goverment is corrupt to the bone and they take kickbacks and bribes from the entertainment cartels.</p>
<p>It is NEVER going to change.</p>
<p>.The US goverment supports all kinds of obsolete business models such as silly(civil sevice) tax supported military exchange retail outlets that are badly managed and don&#8217;t make a profit and private business contractors that generally rip of the federal goverment.</p>
<p> The US congress supports billions of dollars worth of useless pork barrel spending.</p>
<p>The federal goverment  has always propped up failing businesses for bad business practices or other wise providing corporate welfare (PROTECTIONISM)for other failing american businesses other than the entertainment cartels.</p>
<p>If i think about the business practices of the movie and recording industry i think of ANTITRUST SUIT&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;<br />
GET OVER IT&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;THINGS ARE NEVER GOING TO CHANGE.</p>
<p>DON&#8217;T BUYT THIER PRODUCTS AND WHY DON&#8217;T YOU QUIT YOUR CRYING &#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;</p>
<p>Competition law<br />
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia<br />
  (Redirected from Antitrust)<br />
Jump to: navigation, search<br />
&#8220;Antitrust&#8221; redirects here. For the 2001 film, see Antitrust (film). For laws specific to the U.S., see United States antitrust law.</p>
<p>Competition law, known in the United States as antitrust law, has three main elements:</p>
<p>    * prohibiting agreements or practices that restrict free trading and competition between business entities. This includes in particular the repression of cartels.<br />
    * banning abusive behaviour by a firm dominating a market, or anti-competitive practices that tend to lead to such a dominant position. Practices controlled in this way may include predatory pricing, tying, price gouging, refusal to deal, and many others.<br />
    * supervising the mergers and acquisitions of large corporations, including some joint ventures. Transactions that are considered to threaten the competitive process can be prohibited altogether, or approved subject to &#8220;remedies&#8221; such as an obligation to divest part of the merged business or to offer licences or access to facilities to enable other businesses to continue competing.</p>
<p>The substance and produce of competition Act vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Protecting the interests of consumers (consumer welfare) and ensuring that entrepreneurs have an opportunity to compete in the market economy are often treated as important objectives. Competition law is closely connected with law on deregulation of access to markets, state aids and subsidies, the privatisation of state owned assets and the establishment of independent sector regulators. In recent decades, competition law has been viewed as a way to provide better public services.[1] Robert Bork has found that competition laws can produce adverse effects when they reduce competition by protecting inefficient competitors and when costs of legal intervention are greater then benefits for the consumers.[2] The history of competition law reaches back to the Roman Empire. The business practices of market traders, guilds and governments have always been subject to scrutiny, and sometimes severe sanctions. Since the twentieth century, competition law has become global. The two largest and most influential systems of competition regulation are United States antitrust law and European Community competition law. National and regional competition authorities across the world have formed international support and enforcement networks.<br />
Contents<br />
[hide]</p>
<p>    * 1 History<br />
          o 1.1 Roman legislation<br />
          o 1.2 Middle ages<br />
          o 1.3 Renaissance developments<br />
          o 1.4 Restraint of trade<br />
    * 2 Today<br />
          o 2.1 United States antitrust<br />
          o 2.2 Development in other countries<br />
          o 2.3 European Union law<br />
          o 2.4 International enforcement<br />
    * 3 Theory<br />
          o 3.1 Classical perspective<br />
          o 3.2 Neo-classical synthesis<br />
          o 3.3 Chicago School<br />
          o 3.4 Policy developments<br />
    * 4 Practice<br />
          o 4.1 Collusion and cartels<br />
          o 4.2 Dominance and monopoly<br />
          o 4.3 Mergers and acquisitions<br />
          o 4.4 Public sector regulation<br />
    * 5 See also<br />
    * 6 Notes<br />
    * 7 References<br />
    * 8 Further reading<br />
    * 9 External links</p>
<p>[edit] History<br />
Competition law<br />
Basic concepts</p>
<p>    * History of competition law<br />
    * Monopolization<br />
          o Coercive monopoly<br />
          o Natural monopoly<br />
    * Barriers to entry<br />
    * Market power<br />
    * SSNIP test<br />
    * Relevant market<br />
    * Merger control</p>
<p>Anti-competitive practices</p>
<p>    * Collusion<br />
          o Formation of cartels<br />
          o Price fixing<br />
          o Bid rigging<br />
    * Product bundling and tying<br />
    * Refusal to deal<br />
          o Group boycott<br />
    * Exclusive dealing<br />
    * Dividing territories<br />
    * Conscious parallelism<br />
    * Predatory pricing<br />
    * Misuse of patents and copyrights</p>
<p>Laws and doctrines</p>
<p>United States</p>
<p>    * Sherman Antitrust Act<br />
    * Clayton Antitrust Act<br />
    * Robinson-Patman Act<br />
    * FTC Act<br />
    * Hart-Scott-Rodino Act<br />
    * Merger guidelines<br />
    * Essential facilities doctrine<br />
    * Noerr-Pennington doctrine<br />
    * Rule of reason</p>
<p>Europe</p>
<p>    * European Community<br />
      competition law<br />
    * Irish Competition Law<br />
    * Competition Act 1998 (UK)</p>
<p>Australia</p>
<p>    * Trade Practices Act 1974</p>
<p>Enforcement authorities and organizations</p>
<p>    * International Competition Network<br />
    * List of competition regulators</p>
<p>edit box</p>
<p>    Main article: History of competition law</p>
<p>Laws governing competition law are found in over two millennia of history. Roman Emperors and Medieval monarchs alike used tariffs to stabilize prices or support local production. The formal study of &#8220;competition&#8221;, began in earnest during the 18th century with such works as Adam Smith&#8217;s The Wealth of Nations. Different terms were used to describe this area of the law, including &#8220;restrictive practices&#8221;, &#8220;the law of monopolies&#8221;, &#8220;combination acts&#8221; and the &#8220;restraint of trade&#8221;.</p>
<p>[edit] Roman legislation</p>
<p>    See also: Roman law</p>
<p>An early example of competition law is the Lex Julia de Annona, enacted during the Roman Republic around 50 BC.[3] To protect the grain trade, heavy fines were imposed on anyone directly, deliberately and insidiously stopping supply ships.[4] Under Diocletian in 301 AD an edict imposed the death penalty for anyone violating a tariff system, for example by buying up, concealing or contriving the scarcity of everyday goods.[5]</p>
<p>More legislation came under the Constitution of Zeno of 483 AD, which can be traced into Florentine Municipal laws of 1322 and 1325.[6] This provided for confiscation of property and banishment for any trade combinations or joint action of monopolies private or granted by the Emperor. Zeno rescinded all previously granted exclusive rights.[7] Justinian I subsequently introduced legislation to pay officials to manage state monopolies.[8] As Europe slipped into the dark ages, so did the records of law making until the Middle Ages brought greater expansion of trade in the time of lex mercatoria.</p>
<p>[edit] Middle ages</p>
<p>    See also: Lex Mercatoria and Guilds</p>
<p>Edward III during the Black Death enacted the Statute of Labourers to cap wages, and provide double damages against infringers<br />
Edward III during the Black Death enacted the Statute of Labourers to cap wages, and provide double damages against infringers</p>
<p>Legislation in England to control monopolies and restrictive practices were in force well before the Norman Conquest.[9] The Domesday Book recorded that &#8220;foresteel&#8221; (i.e. forestalling, the practice of buying up goods before they reach market and then inflating the prices) was one of three forfeitures that King Edward the Confessor could carry out through England.[10] But concern for fair prices also led to attempts to directly regulate the market. Under Henry III an act was passed in 1266[11] to fix bread and ale prices in correspondence with corn prices laid down by the assizes. Penalties for breach included amercements, pillory and tumbrel.[12] A fourteenth century statute labelled forestallers as &#8220;oppressors of the poor and the community at large and enemies of the whole country.&#8221;[13] Under King Edward III the Statute of Labourers of 1349[14] fixed wages of artificers and workmen and decreed that foodstuffs should be sold at reasonable prices. On top of existing penalties, the statute stated that overcharging merchants must pay the injured party double the sum he received, an idea that has been replicated in punitive treble damages under US antitrust law. Also under Edward III, the following statutory provision outlawed trade combinations.[15]</p>
<p>    &#8220;&#8230;we have ordained and established, that no merchant or other shall make Confederacy, Conspiracy, Coin, Imagination, or Murmur, or Evil Device in any point that may turn to the Impeachment, Disturbance, Defeating or Decay of the said Staples, or of anything that to them pertaineth, or may pertain.&#8221;</p>
<p>Examples of legislation in mainland Europe include the constitutiones juris metallici by Wenceslas II of Bohemia between 1283 and 1305, condemning combinations of ore traders increasing prices; the Municipal Statutes of Florence in 1322 and 1325 followed Zeno&#8217;s legislation against state monopolies; and under Emperor Charles V in the Holy Roman Empire a law was passed &#8220;to prevent losses resulting from monopolies and improper contracts which many merchants and artisans made in the Netherlands.&#8221; In 1553 King Henry VIII reintroduced tariffs for foodstuffs, designed to stabilise prices, in the face of fluctuations in supply from overseas. So the legislation read here that whereas,</p>
<p>    &#8220;it is very hard and difficult to put certain prices to any such things&#8230; [it is necessary because] prices of such victuals be many times enhanced and raised by the Greedy Covetousness and Appetites of the Owners of such Victuals, by occasion of ingrossing and regrating the same, more than upon any reasonable or just ground or cause, to the great damage and impoverishing of the King&#8217;s subjects.&#8221;[16]</p>
<p>Around this time organisations representing various tradesmen and handicraftspeople, known as guilds had been developing, and enjoyed many concessions and exemptions from the laws against monopolies. The privileges conferred were not abolished until the Municipal Corporations Act 1835.</p>
<p>[edit] Renaissance developments</p>
<p>    See also: Renaissance</p>
<p>Elizabeth I assured monopolies would not be abused in the early era of globalisation<br />
Elizabeth I assured monopolies would not be abused in the early era of globalisation</p>
<p>Europe around the 15th century was changing quickly. The new world had just been opened up, overseas trade and plunder was pouring wealth through the international economy and attitudes among businessmen were shifting. In 1561 a system of Industrial Monopoly Licences, similar to modern patents had been introduced into England. But by the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, the system was reputedly much abused and used merely to preserve privileges, encouraging nothing new in the way of innovation or manufacture.[17] When a protest was made in the House of Commons and a Bill was introduced, the Queen convinced the protesters to challenge the case in the courts. This was the catalyst for the Case of Monopolies or Darcy v. Allin.[18] The plaintiff, an officer of the Queen&#8217;s household, had been granted the sole right of making playing cards and claimed damages for the defendant&#8217;s infringement of this right. The court found the grant void and that three characteristics of monopoly were (1) price increases (2) quality decrease (3) the tendency to reduce artificers to idleness and beggary. This put a temporary end to complaints about monopoly, until King James I began to grant them again. In 1623 Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies, which for the most part excluded patent rights from its prohibitions, as well as guilds. From King Charles I, through the civil war and to King Charles II, monopolies continued, especially useful for raising revenue.[19] Then in 1684, in East India Company v. Sandys[20] it was decided that exclusive rights to trade only outside the realm were legitimate, on the grounds that only large and powerful concerns could trade in the conditions prevailing overseas. In 1710 to deal with high coal prices caused by a Newcastle Coal Monopoly the New Law was passed.[21] Its provisions stated that &#8220;all and every contract or contracts, Covenants and Agreements, whether the same be in writing or not in writing&#8230; are hereby declared to be illegal.&#8221; When Adam Smith wrote the Wealth of Nations in 1776[22] he was somewhat cynical of the possibility for change.</p>
<p>    &#8220;To expect indeed that freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain is as absurd as to expect that Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but what is more unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals irresistibly oppose it. The Member of Parliament who supports any proposal for strengthening this Monopoly is seen to acquire not only the reputation for understanding trade, but great popularity and influence with an order of men whose members and wealth render them of great importance.&#8221;</p>
<p>[edit] Restraint of trade</p>
<p>    Main article: Restraint of trade</p>
<p>Judge Coke in the 17th century thought that general restraints on trade were unreasonable<br />
Judge Coke in the 17th century thought that general restraints on trade were unreasonable</p>
<p>The English law of restraint of trade is the direct predecessor to modern competition law.[23] Its current use is small, given modern and economically oriented statutes in most common law countries. Its approach was based on the two concepts of prohibiting agreements that ran counter to public policy, unless the reasonableness of an agreement could be shown. A restraint of trade is simply some kind of agreed provision that is designed to restrain another&#8217;s trade. For example, in Nordenfelt v. Maxim, Nordenfelt Gun Co.[24] a Swedish arm inventor promised on sale of his business to an American gun maker that he &#8220;would not make guns or ammunition anywhere in the world, and would not compete with Maxim in any way.&#8221;</p>
<p>To be consider whether or not there is a restraint of trade in the first place, both parties must have provided valuable consideration for their agreement. In Dyer&#8217;s case[25] a dyer had given a bond not to exercise his trade in the same town as the plaintiff for six months but the plaintiff had promised nothing in return. On hearing the plaintiff&#8217;s attempt to enforce this restraint, Hull J exclaimed,</p>
<p>    &#8220;per Dieu, if the plaintiff were here, he should go to prison until he had paid a fine to the King.&#8221;</p>
<p>The common law has evolved to reflect changing business conditions. So in the 1613 case of Rogers v. Parry[26] a court held that a joiner who promised not to trade from his house for 21 years could have this bond enforced against him since the time and place was certain. It was also held that a man cannot bind himself to not use his trade generally by Chief Justice Coke. This was followed in Broad v. Jolyffe[27] and Mitchell v. Reynolds[28] where Lord Macclesfield asked, &#8220;What does it signify to a tradesman in London what another does in Newcastle?&#8221; In times of such slow communications, commerce around the country it seemed axiomatic that a general restraint served no legitimate purpose for one&#8217;s business and ought to be void. But already in 1880 in Roussillon v. Roussillon[29] Lord Justice Fry stated that a restraint unlimited in space need not be void, since the real question was whether it went further than necessary for the promisee&#8217;s protection. So in the Nordenfelt[30] case Lord McNaughton ruled that while one could validly promise to &#8220;not make guns or ammunition anywhere in the world&#8221; it was an unreasonable restraint to &#8220;not compete with Maxim in any way.&#8221; This approach in England was confirmed by the House of Lords in Mason v. The Provident Supply and Clothing Co.[31]</p>
<p>[edit] Today</p>
<p>Modern competition law begins with the United States legislation of the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914. While other, particularly European, countries also had some form of regulation on monopolies and cartels, the US codification of the common law position on restraint of trade had a widespread effect on subsequent competition law development. Both after World War II and after the fall of the Berlin wall competition law has gone through phases of renewed attention and legislative updates around the world.</p>
<p>[edit] United States antitrust</p>
<p>    Main article: United States antitrust law</p>
<p>Modern competition law is modeled on the United States&#8217; Sherman Act, which aimed to &#8220;bust the trusts&#8221;.<br />
Modern competition law is modeled on the United States&#8217; Sherman Act, which aimed to &#8220;bust the trusts&#8221;.</p>
<p>The American term anti-trust arose not because the US statutes had anything to do with ordinary trust law, but because the large American corporations used trusts to conceal the nature of their business arrangements. Big trusts became synonymous with big monopolies, the perceived threat to democracy and the free market these trusts represented led to the Sherman and Clayton Acts. These laws, in part, codified past American and English common law of restraints of trade. Senator Hoar, an author of the Sherman Act said in a debate, &#8220;We have affirmed the old doctrine of the common law in regard to all inter-state and international commercial transactions and have clothed the United States courts with authority to enforce that doctrine by injunction.&#8221; Evidence of the common law basis of the Sherman and Clayton acts is found in the Standard Oil case,[32] where Chief Justice White explicitly linked the Sherman Act with the common law and sixteenth century English statutes on engrossing.[33] The Act&#8217;s wording also reflects common law. The first two sections read as follows,</p>
<p>    &#8220;Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine&#8230;.</p>
<p>    Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine&#8230;.&#8221;</p>
<p>The Sherman Act did not have the immediate effects its authors intended, though Republican President Theodore Roosevelt&#8217;s federal government sued 45 companies, and William Taft used it against 75. The Clayton Act of 1914 was passed to supplement the Sherman Act. Specific categories of abusive conduct were listed, including price discrimination(section 2), exclusive dealings (section 3) and mergers which substantially lessen competition (section 7). Section 6 exempted trade unions from the law&#8217;s operation. Both the Sherman and Clayton acts are now codified under Title 15 of the United States Code.</p>
<p>Since the mid-1970s, courts and enforcement officials generally have supported view that antitrust law policy should not follow social and political aims that undermine economic efficiency.[34] The antitrust laws were minimalized in the mid-1980s under influence of Chicago school of economics and blamed for the loss of economic supremacy in the world.[35]</p>
<p>[edit] Development in other countries<br />
	This article or section is missing citations or needs footnotes.<br />
Using inline citations helps guard against copyright violations and factual inaccuracies. (July 2008)</p>
<p>    See also: Competition regulator</p>
<p>The European Commission, established following World War II, was the first Europe wide competition authority<br />
The European Commission, established following World War II, was the first Europe wide competition authority</p>
<p>It was after the First World War that countries began to follow the United States&#8217; lead in competition policy. In 1923 Canada introduced the Combines Investigation Act and in 1926 France reinforced its basic competition provisions from the 1810 Code Napoleon. After the Second World War, the Allies, led by the United States, introduced tight regulation of cartels and monopolies in occupied Germany and Japan. In Germany, despite the existence of laws against unfair competition passed in 1909 (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb or UWB) it was widely believed that the predominance of large cartels of German industry had made it easier for the Nazis to assume total economic control, simply by bribing or blackmailing the heads of a small number of industrial magnates. Similarly in Japan, where business was organised along family and nepotistic ties, the zaibatsu were easy for the despotic government to manipulate into the war effort. Following, unconditional surrender tighter controls, replicating American policy were introduced.</p>
<p>Further developments however were considerably overshadowed by the move towards nationalisation and industry wide planning in many countries. Making the economy and industry democratically accountable through direct government action became a priority. Coal industry, railroads, steel, electricity, water, health care and many other sectors were targeted for their special qualities of being natural monopolies. Commonwealth countries were reluctant in enacting statutory competition law provisions. The United Kingdom introduced the (considerably less stringent) Restrictive Practices Act in 1956. Australia introduced its current Trade Practices Act in 1974. Recently however there has been a wave of updates, especially in Europe to harmonise legislation with contemporary competition law thinking.</p>
<p>[edit] European Union law</p>
<p>    Main article: European Community competition law</p>
<p>In 1957 six Western European countries signed the Treaty of the European Community (EC Treaty or Treaty of Rome), which over the last fifty years has grown into a European Union of nearly half a billion citizens. The European Community is the name for the economic and social pillar of EU law, under which competition law falls. Healthy competition is seen as an essential element in the creation of a common market free from restraints on trade.[36] The first provision is Article 81 EC, which deals with cartels and restrictive vertical agreements. Prohibited are:</p>
<p>    &#8220;(1) &#8230;all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market&#8230;&#8221;</p>
<p>Article 81(1) EC then gives examples of &#8220;hard core&#8221; restrictive practices such as price fixing or market sharing and 81(2) EC confirms that any agreements are automatically void. However, just like the Statute of Monopolies 1623, Article 81(3) EC creates exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a &#8220;fair share&#8221; of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints (or disproportionate, in ECJ terminology) that risk eliminating competition anywhere. Article 82 EC deals with monopolies, or more precisely firms who have a dominant market share and abuse that position. Unlike U.S. Antitrust, EC law has never been used to punish the existence of dominant firms, but merely imposes a special responsibility to conduct oneself appropriately.[37] Specific categories of abuse listed in Article 82 EC include price discrimination and exclusive dealing, much the same as sections 2 and 3 of the U.S. Clayton Act. Also under Article 82 EC, the European Council was empowered to enact a regulation to control mergers between firms, currently the latest known by the abbreviation of Regulation 139/2004/EC. The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. Again, the similarity to the Clayton Act&#8217;s substantial lessening of competition. Finally, Articles 86 and 87 EC regulate the state&#8217;s role in the market. Article 86(2) EC states clearly that nothing in the rules can be used to obstruct a member state&#8217;s right to deliver public services, but that otherwise public enterprises must play by the same rules on collusion and abuse of dominance as everyone else. Article 87 EC, similar to Article 81 EC, lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition, but then grants exceptions for things like charities, natural disasters or regional development.</p>
<p>[edit] International enforcement</p>
<p>    See also: World Trade Organization and International Competition Network</p>
<p>There is considerable controversy among WTO members, in green, whether competition law should form part of the agreements<br />
There is considerable controversy among WTO members, in green, whether competition law should form part of the agreements</p>
<p>Competition law has already been substantially internationalised along the lines of the US model by nation states themselves, however the involvement of international organisations has been growing. Increasingly active at all international conferences are the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which is prone to making neo-liberal recommendations about the total application of competition law for public and private industries.[38] Chapter 5 of the post war Havana Charter contained an Antitrust code[39] but this was never incorporated into the WTO&#8217;s forerunner, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. Office of Fair Trading Director and Professor Richard Whish wrote sceptically that it &#8220;seems unlikely at the current stage of its development that the WTO will metamorphose into a global competition authority.&#8221;[40] Despite that, at the ongoing Doha round of trade talks for the World Trade Organisation, discussion includes the prospect of competition law enforcement moving up to a global level. While it is incapable of enforcement itself, the newly established International Competition Network[41] (ICN) is a way for national authorities to coordinate their own enforcement activities.</p>
<p>It is unclear whether competition policy is a sensible role for government in developing, particularly low-income countries. In these countries the markets are usually very small and fragmented so that developing scale sufficient to raise competitiveness and engage in international markets is a major challenge. The bigger problem is however poor governance &#8211; in societies with widespread corruption, inadequate public finances,[42] and weak judiciary and oversight institutions, competition policy may become another tool for capture by vested interests &#8211; becoming in itself a barrier to entry.</p>
<p>[edit] Theory</p>
<p>    Main article: Competition law theory</p>
<p>[edit] Classical perspective</p>
<p>    See also: Classical economics</p>
<p>John Stuart Mill believed the restraint of trade doctrine was justified to preserve liberty and competition<br />
John Stuart Mill believed the restraint of trade doctrine was justified to preserve liberty and competition</p>
<p>The classical perspective on competition was that certain agreements and business practice could be an unreasonable restraint on the individual liberty of tradespeople to carry on their livelihoods. Restraints were judged as permissible or not by courts as new cases appeared and in the light of changing business circumstances. Hence the courts found specific categories of agreement, specific clauses, to fall foul of their doctrine on economic fairness, and they did not contrive an overarching conception of market power. Earlier theorists like Adam Smith rejected any monopoly power on this basis.</p>
<p>    &#8220;A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company has the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate.&#8221;[43]</p>
<p>In The Wealth of Nations (1776) Adam Smith also pointed out the cartel problem, but did not advocate legal measures to combat them.</p>
<p>    &#8220;People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.&#8221;[44]</p>
<p>Smith also rejected the very existence of, not just dominant and abusive corporations, but corporations at all.[45] By the latter half of the nineteenth century it had become clear that large firms had become a fact of the market economy. John Stuart Mill&#8217;s approach was laid down in his treatise On Liberty (1859).</p>
<p>    &#8220;Again, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society&#8230; both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil&#8230;&#8221;[46]</p>
<p>[edit] Neo-classical synthesis</p>
<p>    See also: Neoclassical synthesis</p>
<p>Paul Samuelson, author of the 20th century&#8217;s most successful economics text, combined mathematical models and Keynesian macroeconomic intervention. He advocated the general success of the market but backed the American government&#8217;s antitrust policies.<br />
Paul Samuelson, author of the 20th century&#8217;s most successful economics text, combined mathematical models and Keynesian macroeconomic intervention. He advocated the general success of the market but backed the American government&#8217;s antitrust policies.</p>
<p>After Mill, there was a shift in economic theory, which emphasised a more precise and theoretical model of competition. A simple neo-classical model of free markets holds that production and distribution of goods and services in competitive free markets maximizes social welfare. This model assumes that new firms can freely enter markets and compete with existing firms, or to use legal language, there are no barriers to entry. By this term economists mean something very specific, that competitive free markets deliver allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. Allocative efficiency is also known as Pareto efficiency after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto and means that resources in an economy over the long run will go precisely to those who are willing and able to pay for them. Because rational producers will keep producing and selling, and buyers will keep buying up to the last marginal unit of possible output &#8211; or alternatively rational producers will be reduce their output to the margin at which buyers will buy the same amount as produced &#8211; there is no waste, the greatest number wants of the greatest number of people become satisfied and utility is perfected because resources can no longer be reallocated to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off; society has achieved allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency simply means that society is making as much as it can. Free markets are meant to reward those who work hard, and therefore those who will put society&#8217;s resources towards the frontier of its possible production.[47] Dynamic efficiency refers to the idea that business which constantly competes must research, create and innovate to keep its share of consumers. This traces to Austrian-American political scientist Joseph Schumpeter&#8217;s notion that a &#8220;perennial gale of creative destruction&#8221; is ever sweeping through capitalist economies, driving enterprise at the market&#8217;s mercy.[48] This led Schumpeter to argue that monopolies did not need to be broken up (as with Standard Oil) because the next gale of economic innovation would do the same.</p>
<p>Contrasting with the allocatively, productively and dynamically efficient market model are monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels. When only one or a few firms exist in the market, and there is no credible threat of the entry of competing firms, prices raise above the competitive level, to either a monopolistic or oligopolistic equilibrium price. Production is also decreased, further decreasing social welfare by creating a deadweight loss. Sources of this market power are said to include the existence of externalities, barriers to entry of the market, and the free rider problem. Markets may fail to be efficient for a variety of reasons, so the exception of competition law&#8217;s intervention to the rule of laissez faire is justified if government failure can be avoided. Orthodox economists fully acknowledge that perfect competition is seldom observed in the real world, and so aim for what is called &#8220;workable competition&#8221;.[49][50] This follows the theory that if one cannot achieve the ideal, then go for the second best option[51] by using the law to tame market operation where it can.</p>
<p>[edit] Chicago School<br />
Robert Bork argues that competition law is fundamentally flawed<br />
Robert Bork argues that competition law is fundamentally flawed</p>
<p>    See also: Chicago School (economics) and Neoclassical economics</p>
<p>A group of economists and lawyers, who are largely associated with the University of Chicago, advocate an approach to competition law guided by the proposition that some actions that were originally considered to be anticompetitive could actually promote competition.[52] The U.S. Supreme Court has used the Chicago School approach in several recent cases.[53] One view of the Chicago School approach to antitrust is found in United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner&#8217;s books&#8217; Antitrust Law[54] and Economic Analysis of Law[55]</p>
<p>Robert Bork was highly critical of court decisions on United States antitrust law in a series of law review articles and his book The Antitrust Paradox.[56] Bork argued that both the original intention of antitrust laws and economic efficiency was the pursuit only of consumer welfare, the protection of competition rather than competitors.[57] Furthermore, only a few acts should be prohibited, namely cartels that fix prices and divide markets, mergers that create monopolies, and dominant firms pricing predatorily, while allowing such practices as vertical agreements and price discrimination on the grounds that it did not harm consumers.[58] Running through the different critiques of US antitrust policy is the common theme that government interference in the operation of free markets does more harm than good.[59] &#8220;The only cure for bad theory&#8221;, writes Bork, &#8220;is better theory&#8221;.[57] The late Harvard Law School Professor Philip Areeda, who favours more aggressive antitrust policy, in at least one Supreme Court case challenged Robert Bork&#8217;s preference for non-intervention.[60]</p>
<p>[edit] Policy developments</p>
<p>Anti-cartel enforcement is a key focus of competition law enforcement policy. In the US the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act 2004 raised the maximum imprisonment term for price fixing from three to ten years, and the maximum fine from $10 to $100 million.[61] In 2007 British Airways and Korean Air pleaded guilty to fixing cargo and passenger flight prices.[62]</p>
<p>These actions complement the private enforcement which has always been an important feature of United States antitrust law. The United States Supreme Court summarised why Congress allows punitive damages in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.:[63]<br />
“ 	Every violation of the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-enterprise system envisaged by Congress. This system depends on strong competition for its health and vigor, and strong competition depends, in turn, on compliance with antitrust legislation. In enacting these laws, Congress had many means at its disposal to penalize violators. It could have, for example, required violators to compensate federal, state, and local governments for the estimated damage to their respective economies caused by the violations. But, this remedy was not selected. Instead, Congress chose to permit all persons to sue to recover three times their actual damages every time they were injured in their business or property by an antitrust violation. 	”</p>
<p>In the EU, the Modernisation Regulation 1/2003 means that the European Commission is no longer the only body capable of public enforcement of European Community competition law. This was done in order to facilitate quicker resolution of competition-related inquiries. In 2005 the Commission issued a Green Paper on Damages actions for the breach of the EC antitrust rules,[64] which suggested ways of making private damages claims against cartels easier.[65]</p>
<p>[edit] Practice<br />
Globe icon<br />
	The examples and perspective in this article or section may not represent a worldwide view of the subject.<br />
Please improve this article or discuss the issue on the talk page.</p>
<p>[edit] Collusion and cartels</p>
<p>    Main articles: Collusion and Cartel</p>
<p>Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith was an early enemy of cartels<br />
Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith was an early enemy of cartels</p>
<p>The core of competition policy has, since the 1980s, been the anti-price fixing cartel agenda, despite criticism by libertarians.[66] In The Wealth of Nations (1776) Adam Smith pointed out the cartel problem, but did not advocate legal measures to combat them.[67] Nowadays a far stricter approach is taken. Under EC law cartels are banned by Article 81 EC, whereas under US law the Sherman Act prohibitions of section 1. To compare, the target of competition law under the Sherman Act 1890 is every &#8220;contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy&#8221;, which essentially targets anybody who has some dealing or contact with someone else. In the mean time, Art. 81 EC makes clear who the targets of competition law are in two stages with the term agreement &#8220;undertaking&#8221;. This is used to describe almost anyone &#8220;engaged in an economic activity&#8221;,[68] but excludes both employees, who are by their &#8220;very nature the opposite of the independent exercise of an economic or commercial activity&#8221;,[69] and public services based on &#8220;solidarity&#8221; for a &#8220;social purpose&#8221;.[70] Undertakings must then have formed an agreement, developed a &#8220;concerted practice&#8221;, or, within an association, taken a decision. Like US antitrust, this just means all the same thing;[71] any kind of dealing or contact, or a &#8220;meeting of the minds&#8221; between parties. Covered therefore is a whole range from a strong handshaken written or verbal agreement to a supplier sending invoices with directions not to export to its retailer who gives &#8220;tacit acquiescence&#8221; to the conduct.[72]</p>
<p>Less of a consensus exists in the field of vertical agreements. These are agreements not between firms at the same level of production, but firms at different levels in the supply chain, for instance a supermarket and a bread producer. Recently, the United States Supreme Court has become more skeptical of antitrust cases predicated on agreements between companies that are not directly in competition with one another, such as a clothing manufacturer and a clothing retailer, while maintaining the strict prohibition against agreements that limit competition between companies at the same level of the supply chain, such as agreements between two retailers or between two distributors. Vertical agreements may still be illegal, but the burden of proving them illegal was raised by a number of recent cases from the per se illegal standard to a more demanding rule of reason standard.[73]</p>
<p>[edit] Dominance and monopoly</p>
<p>    Main article: Monopoly law</p>
<p>The economist&#8217;s depiction of deadweight loss to efficiency that monopolies cause<br />
The economist&#8217;s depiction of deadweight loss to efficiency that monopolies cause</p>
<p>When firms hold large market shares, consumers risk paying higher prices and getting lower quality products than compared to competitive markets. However, the existence of a very high market share does not always mean consumers are paying excessive prices since the threat of new entrants to the market can restrain a high-market-share firm&#8217;s price increases. Competition law does not make merely having a monopoly illegal, but rather abusing the power that a monopoly may confer, for instance through exclusionary practices.</p>
<p>First it is necessary to determine whether a firm is dominant, or whether it behaves &#8220;to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumer.&#8221;[74] Under EU law, very large market shares raise a presumption that a firm is dominant,[75] which may be rebuttable.[76] If a firm has a dominant position, then there is &#8220;a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair competition on the common market&#8221;.[77] Similarly as with collusive conduct, market shares are determined with reference to the particular market in which the firm and product in question is sold. Then although the lists are seldom closed,[78] certain categories of abusive conduct are usually prohibited under the country&#8217;s legislation. For instance, limiting production at a shipping port by refusing to raise expenditure and update technology could be abusive.[79] Tying one product into the sale of another can be considered abuse too, being restrictive of consumer choice and depriving competitors of outlets. This was the alleged case in Microsoft v. Commission[80] leading to an eventual fine of €497 million for including its Windows Media Player with the Microsoft Windows platform. A refusal to supply a facility which is essential for all businesses attempting to compete to use can constitute an abuse. One example was in a case involving a medical company named Commercial Solvents.[81] When it set up its own rival in the tuberculosis drugs market, Commercial Solvents were forced to continue supplying a company named Zoja with the raw materials for the drug. Zoja was the only market competitor, so without the court forcing supply, all competition would have been eliminated.</p>
<p>Forms of abuse relating directly to pricing include price exploitation. It is difficult to prove at what point a dominant firm&#8217;s prices become &#8220;exploitative&#8221; and this category of abuse is rarely found. In one case however, a French funeral service was found to have demanded exploitative prices, and this was justified on the basis that prices of funeral services outside the region could be compared.[82] A more tricky issue is predatory pricing. This is the practice of dropping prices of a product so much that in order one&#8217;s smaller competitors cannot cover their costs and fall out of business. The Chicago School (economics) considers predatory pricing to be unlikely.[83] However in France Telecom SA v. Commission[84] a broadband internet company was forced to pay €10.35 million for dropping its prices below its own production costs. It had &#8220;no interest in applying such prices except that of eliminating competitors&#8221;[85] and was being crossed subsidised to capture the lion&#8217;s share of a booming market. One last category of pricing abuse is price discrimination.[86] An example of this could be offering rebates to industrial customers who export your company&#8217;s sugar, but not to Irish customers who are selling their goods in the same market as you are in.[87]</p>
<p>    See also: Dominance (economics) and Monopoly</p>
<p>[edit] Mergers and acquisitions</p>
<p>    Main article: Mergers and acquisitions</p>
<p>A merger or acquisition involves, from a competition law perspective, the concentration of economic power in the hands of fewer than before.[88] This usually means that one firm buys out the shares of another. The reasons for oversight of economic concentrations by the state are the same as the reasons to restrict firms who abuse a position of dominance, only that regulation of mergers and acquisitions attempts to deal with the problem before it arises, ex ante prevention of creating dominant firms.[89] In the United States merger regulation began under the Clayton Act, and in the European Union, under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 (known as the &#8220;ECMR&#8221;[90]). Competition law requires that firms proposing to merge gain authorisation from the relevant government authority, or simply go ahead but face the prospect of demerger should the concentration later be found to lessen competition. The theory behind mergers is that transaction costs can be reduced compared to operating on an open market through bilateral contracts.[91] Concentrations can increase economies of scale and scope. However often firms take advantage of their increase in market power, their increased market share and decreased number of competitors, which can have a knock on effect on the deal that consumers get. Merger control is about predicting what the market might be like, not knowing and making a judgment. Hence the central provision under EU law asks whether a concentration would if it went ahead &#8220;significantly impede effective competition&#8230; in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening off a dominant position&#8230;&#8221;[92] and the corresponding provision under US antitrust states similarly,</p>
<p>    &#8220;No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital&#8230; of the assets of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where&#8230; the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.[93]</p>
<p>What amounts to a substantial lessening of, or significant impediment to competition is usually answered through empirical study. The market shares of the merging companies can be assessed and added, although this kind of analysis only gives rise to presumptions, not conclusions.[94] Something called the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used to calculate the &#8220;density&#8221; of the market, or what concentration exists. Aside from the maths, it is important to consider the product in question and the rate of technical innovation in the market.[95] A further problem of collective dominance, or oligopoly through &#8220;economic links&#8221;[96] can arise, whereby the new market becomes more conducive to collusion. It is relevant how transparent a market is, because a more concentrated structure could mean firms can coordinate their behaviour more easily, whether firms can deploy deterrants and whether firms are safe from a reaction by their competitors and consumers.[97] The entry of new firms to the market, and any barriers that they might encounter should be considered.[98] If firms are shown to be creating an uncompetitive concentration, in the US they can still argue that they create efficiencies enough to outweigh any detriment, and similar reference to &#8220;technical and economic progress&#8221; is mentioned in Art. 2 of the ECMR.[99] Another defence might be that a firm which is being taken over is about to fail or go insolvent, and taking it over leaves a no less competitive state than what would happen anyway.[100] Mergers vertically in the market are rarely of concern, although in AOL/Time Warner[101] the European Commission required that a joint venture with a competitor Bertelsmann be ceased beforehand. The EU authorities have also focussed lately on the effect of conglomerate mergers, where companies acquire a large portfolio of related products, though without necessarily dominant shares in any individual market.[102]</p>
<p>[edit] Public sector regulation</p>
<p>    Main articles: Public services, Regulated market, and EC regulation<br />
    See also: American Telephone &amp; Telegraph, Kingsbury Commitment, Hush-a-Phone v. FCC, and Bell System divestiture</p>
<p>Public sector industries, or industries which are by their nature providing a public service, are involved in competition law in many ways similar to private companies. Under EC law, Articles 86 and 87 create exceptions for the assured achievement of public sector service provision. Many industries, such as railways, telecommunications, electricity, gas, water and media have their own independent sector regulators. These government agencies are charged with ensuring that private providers carry out certain public service duties in line of social welfare goals. For instance, an electricity company may not be allowed to disconnect someone&#8217;s supply merely because they have not paid their bills up to date, because that could leave a person in the dark and cold just because they are poor. Instead the electricity company would have to give the person a number of warnings and offer assistance until government welfare support kicks in.[103]</p>
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		<title>By: Rekrul</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-781842</link>
		<dc:creator>Rekrul</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 21:53:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-781842</guid>
		<description>&quot; Thanks. I was getting tired of reiterating the same points over and over in the vain hope that it would achieve something.
You very eloquently put the final “nail” into that particular “coffin” in a manner that, frankly, I couldn’t manage to do.&quot;

My pleasure. :)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8221; Thanks. I was getting tired of reiterating the same points over and over in the vain hope that it would achieve something.<br />
You very eloquently put the final “nail” into that particular “coffin” in a manner that, frankly, I couldn’t manage to do.&#8221;</p>
<p>My pleasure. <img src='http://www.p2pnet.net/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
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		<title>By: cyberscan</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-781706</link>
		<dc:creator>cyberscan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 20:12:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-781706</guid>
		<description>Who says that file sharers are not creating?  I have released software into the public domain several times.  I like to make a living programming, and I do, but I don&#039;t like the B.S.A., M.P.A.A., R.I.A.A., or any of the other bully organizations which seek to protect the greedy and hold back society&#039;s advancement.  These bully organization seem to only protect the large &quot;creators&quot; and not the small.  Anyway, I don&#039;t think there would be so much sharing if there wasn&#039;t so much copyright abuse and overpricing.  As far as the net coming under control of the copyright monopolies and governments, alternative are already are being set up, so the cat and mouse games will continue.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Who says that file sharers are not creating?  I have released software into the public domain several times.  I like to make a living programming, and I do, but I don&#8217;t like the B.S.A., M.P.A.A., R.I.A.A., or any of the other bully organizations which seek to protect the greedy and hold back society&#8217;s advancement.  These bully organization seem to only protect the large &#8220;creators&#8221; and not the small.  Anyway, I don&#8217;t think there would be so much sharing if there wasn&#8217;t so much copyright abuse and overpricing.  As far as the net coming under control of the copyright monopolies and governments, alternative are already are being set up, so the cat and mouse games will continue.</p>
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		<title>By: Henry Ermich</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-780395</link>
		<dc:creator>Henry Ermich</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 02:26:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-780395</guid>
		<description>Rekrul:
   Thanks.  I was getting tired of reiterating the same points over and over in the vain hope that it would achieve something.
    You very eloquently put the final &quot;nail&quot; into that particular &quot;coffin&quot; in a manner that, frankly, I couldn&#039;t manage to do.

     Now, we&#039;re hopefully done with that particular horror-show.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rekrul:<br />
   Thanks.  I was getting tired of reiterating the same points over and over in the vain hope that it would achieve something.<br />
    You very eloquently put the final &#8220;nail&#8221; into that particular &#8220;coffin&#8221; in a manner that, frankly, I couldn&#8217;t manage to do.</p>
<p>     Now, we&#8217;re hopefully done with that particular horror-show.</p>
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		<title>By: Rekrul</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-780308</link>
		<dc:creator>Rekrul</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 01:11:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-780308</guid>
		<description>Sam, 

&quot;Stay in the reality of the present, Henry. You are referring to things as they &quot;should have been&quot; missing the slightly larger, inconvenient fact that the rules are not as you would write them.&quot;

The correct statement would be that the rules are not as they should be.

&quot;Your cheap little remark &quot;No research, no thinking&quot; on this subject made me laugh. My lawyer and I have been deep in copyright legislation since about the time you were born.&quot;

You may have been involved in copyright legislation for decades, but it&#039;s the twisted, corrupted copyright legislation bought by the media corporations, not the copyright legislation that was originally intended.

&quot;My IP will not be orphaned, Henry, it’s set up for re-register and eventually becomes an ongoing trust to be leveraged as my daughter sees fit until expiration takes it away from her.&quot;

You and all the other content producers have been brainwashed by the media propaganda into believing that copyrights were created for exactly the opposite purpose as they were originally intended for. The original creators of copyright law saw copyrights as a necessary evil to prvide encouragement to authors before their work *INEVITABLY* passed into the public domain for the good of all. You and all the other content producers seem to view things like the public domain and fair use as being vile, evil things that seek to take away your &quot;right&quot; to perpetual ownership of everything you&#039;ve ever created.

Read up on the origins of copyright law sometime. The creators of it saw the danger in copyrights, which is why they put limits on them. Every single un-biased study done on the issue has found that society would be better off if copyrights and the length of IP protection were REDUCED, not extended. Copyrights were never intended to provide welfare for your grandchildren.

&quot;I’ve been registering copyright for decades and it’s increasingly clear you have a big mouth and not the first clue.&quot;

And you remind me of kids today who think that video games started with the original Playstation.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sam, </p>
<p>&#8220;Stay in the reality of the present, Henry. You are referring to things as they &#8220;should have been&#8221; missing the slightly larger, inconvenient fact that the rules are not as you would write them.&#8221;</p>
<p>The correct statement would be that the rules are not as they should be.</p>
<p>&#8220;Your cheap little remark &#8220;No research, no thinking&#8221; on this subject made me laugh. My lawyer and I have been deep in copyright legislation since about the time you were born.&#8221;</p>
<p>You may have been involved in copyright legislation for decades, but it&#8217;s the twisted, corrupted copyright legislation bought by the media corporations, not the copyright legislation that was originally intended.</p>
<p>&#8220;My IP will not be orphaned, Henry, it’s set up for re-register and eventually becomes an ongoing trust to be leveraged as my daughter sees fit until expiration takes it away from her.&#8221;</p>
<p>You and all the other content producers have been brainwashed by the media propaganda into believing that copyrights were created for exactly the opposite purpose as they were originally intended for. The original creators of copyright law saw copyrights as a necessary evil to prvide encouragement to authors before their work *INEVITABLY* passed into the public domain for the good of all. You and all the other content producers seem to view things like the public domain and fair use as being vile, evil things that seek to take away your &#8220;right&#8221; to perpetual ownership of everything you&#8217;ve ever created.</p>
<p>Read up on the origins of copyright law sometime. The creators of it saw the danger in copyrights, which is why they put limits on them. Every single un-biased study done on the issue has found that society would be better off if copyrights and the length of IP protection were REDUCED, not extended. Copyrights were never intended to provide welfare for your grandchildren.</p>
<p>&#8220;I’ve been registering copyright for decades and it’s increasingly clear you have a big mouth and not the first clue.&#8221;</p>
<p>And you remind me of kids today who think that video games started with the original Playstation.</p>
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		<title>By: Henry Ermich</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-779956</link>
		<dc:creator>Henry Ermich</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 20:28:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-779956</guid>
		<description>Sam,
  Seriously now -- your complete (willful?) inability to actually formulate a coherent or meaningful response to any of the points I&#039;ve raised?  I find it encouraging, myself.  I mean, here you are, big-time IP mogul or whatever it is that you do - skilled, college-educated, supposedly clawed your way up from the same basic lower-middle-class backwater as I&#039;m in now, and yet you can&#039;t even be bothered to actually answer any of the points I raised.  Oh wait -- that&#039;s right, you DID actually answer them all, by conceding that my basic claim in regard to the extention of copyright terms was &quot;quite true&quot;. 

   Rifle, &quot;Sam?&quot;
   Nah.  To be honest, you&#039;re probably &quot;just some guy&quot;, same as me -- a little more &quot;investment&quot; in the status quo, a little more &quot;advantage&quot; in supporting the RIAA (and, not coincidentally, the complete destruction of any form of &quot;public domain&quot; whatsoever), but -- ultimately, just like me -- you&#039;re small-time.  
   Willfully ignorant on this issue, obviously very convinced of your own self-importance simply because you know the intricacies of the Red-tape swamps better than some of us, but ultimately just another really small fish in a rapidly-draining creek.

   Do I &quot;condone&quot; civil disobedience/&quot;illegal&quot; downloading?
   It&#039;s not my business to condone OR condemn.  I mentioned &quot;the statute of anne&quot; because it&#039;s true.  I mentioned the &quot;limited&quot; scope of IP &quot;protection&quot; because THAT&#039;S true, too.  I mentioed the RIAA&#039;s egregious expansion of copyright terms because THAT&#039;S true, too.

   Whether you, me, or ANYBODY thinks it&#039;s &quot;right&quot; or &quot;wrong&quot;, the fact remains that a steadily-increasing number of folks are starting to question how IP law is being used (and, sometimes, even if it SHOULD be used, at all).  A large number of them are beginning to flout such &quot;laws&quot; at every available opportunity.  Quite simply, it&#039;s a matter of principle.
   You understand &quot;principles&quot;, don&#039;t you &quot;Sam?&quot;  
   No rifle and clocktower for YOU, Ole buddy, sorry to dissapoint you.  First, like I said, you&#039;re essentially nobody, and secondly, that&#039;s not my deal.  I&#039;m not a street-fighter.  Despite whatever idiocy you try to throw at me, I&#039;m not just some yahoo with &quot;zero understanding&quot; of these issues -- in fact, as I&#039;ve pretty conclusively demonstrated over the last what, 20 messages, now, I evidently know a HELL of a lot more about the history, justification, and (more importantly) LIMITS of IP &quot;protection.&quot;

   So Sam?  Do us all a favor here: just take a big ol&#039; deep breath, swallow hard, and repeat this phrase:

   &quot;Quite right, Henry.&quot;
    
   &#039;Nuff said. :)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sam,<br />
  Seriously now &#8212; your complete (willful?) inability to actually formulate a coherent or meaningful response to any of the points I&#8217;ve raised?  I find it encouraging, myself.  I mean, here you are, big-time IP mogul or whatever it is that you do &#8211; skilled, college-educated, supposedly clawed your way up from the same basic lower-middle-class backwater as I&#8217;m in now, and yet you can&#8217;t even be bothered to actually answer any of the points I raised.  Oh wait &#8212; that&#8217;s right, you DID actually answer them all, by conceding that my basic claim in regard to the extention of copyright terms was &#8220;quite true&#8221;. </p>
<p>   Rifle, &#8220;Sam?&#8221;<br />
   Nah.  To be honest, you&#8217;re probably &#8220;just some guy&#8221;, same as me &#8212; a little more &#8220;investment&#8221; in the status quo, a little more &#8220;advantage&#8221; in supporting the RIAA (and, not coincidentally, the complete destruction of any form of &#8220;public domain&#8221; whatsoever), but &#8212; ultimately, just like me &#8212; you&#8217;re small-time.<br />
   Willfully ignorant on this issue, obviously very convinced of your own self-importance simply because you know the intricacies of the Red-tape swamps better than some of us, but ultimately just another really small fish in a rapidly-draining creek.</p>
<p>   Do I &#8220;condone&#8221; civil disobedience/&#8221;illegal&#8221; downloading?<br />
   It&#8217;s not my business to condone OR condemn.  I mentioned &#8220;the statute of anne&#8221; because it&#8217;s true.  I mentioned the &#8220;limited&#8221; scope of IP &#8220;protection&#8221; because THAT&#8217;S true, too.  I mentioed the RIAA&#8217;s egregious expansion of copyright terms because THAT&#8217;S true, too.</p>
<p>   Whether you, me, or ANYBODY thinks it&#8217;s &#8220;right&#8221; or &#8220;wrong&#8221;, the fact remains that a steadily-increasing number of folks are starting to question how IP law is being used (and, sometimes, even if it SHOULD be used, at all).  A large number of them are beginning to flout such &#8220;laws&#8221; at every available opportunity.  Quite simply, it&#8217;s a matter of principle.<br />
   You understand &#8220;principles&#8221;, don&#8217;t you &#8220;Sam?&#8221;<br />
   No rifle and clocktower for YOU, Ole buddy, sorry to dissapoint you.  First, like I said, you&#8217;re essentially nobody, and secondly, that&#8217;s not my deal.  I&#8217;m not a street-fighter.  Despite whatever idiocy you try to throw at me, I&#8217;m not just some yahoo with &#8220;zero understanding&#8221; of these issues &#8212; in fact, as I&#8217;ve pretty conclusively demonstrated over the last what, 20 messages, now, I evidently know a HELL of a lot more about the history, justification, and (more importantly) LIMITS of IP &#8220;protection.&#8221;</p>
<p>   So Sam?  Do us all a favor here: just take a big ol&#8217; deep breath, swallow hard, and repeat this phrase:</p>
<p>   &#8220;Quite right, Henry.&#8221;</p>
<p>   &#8216;Nuff said. <img src='http://www.p2pnet.net/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
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		<title>By: Henry Ermich</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-779753</link>
		<dc:creator>Henry Ermich</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 18:16:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-779753</guid>
		<description>Sam:
   &quot;Naive, unknowing things possible?&quot;
   Now, that&#039;s fascinating, &quot;Sam&quot;: 
   A vulture like yourself -- completely unconcerned about what things like copyright/patents were originally supposed to do, and you accuse me of being&quot;unknowing&quot; and &quot;naive&quot;.
    But see, that&#039;s where what you deride as &quot;useless history&quot; comes in:  the more people learn, the less they&#039;re apt to allow themselves to be continue to allow themselves to be screwed over.  Glad to hear about Bryant park, &quot;Sam&quot; (although I fail to see how that&#039;s actually relevant to anything we&#039;ve discussed here.)

    Now, be a good little RIAA shill and answer the question: 
    1. what was the original intent of IP law?
    2. What is &quot;civil disobedience&quot;?
    3. What is your stance on the &quot;public domain?&quot;
    4. Is Privacy a &quot;privilege&quot; to be revoked if it conflicts with the whims of corporate lobbyists?

   The &quot;waters&quot; in which you swim are -- to you -- completely beyond any question (or possible reproach).  We undestand that, &quot;sam&quot;.
   We also understand that you&#039;re reluctant to actually answer any questions, which is fine.

    So go right ahead, li&#039;l buddy -- try to &quot;discredit&quot; me (as if that&#039;ll actually do one single bit of good).
    Of course it&#039;s &quot;locked up&quot;, &quot;Sam&quot; -- you and your buddies at the RIAA have made amply sure of that.

   And as per your request to &quot;suck on that&quot;?  If I may be so bold (try and stop me you mindless corporate shill), we&#039;ve been &quot;sucking on it&quot; in regard to IP monopolies for DECADES, and a growing number of us are good and sick of it.

    &quot;Sam&quot;, as per usual you&#039;ve raised no actual points and answered none of the questions which were put to you.  
    Of course, you CAN&#039;T actually answer any of the points raised because to your line of &#039;thinking&#039; none of it makes any sense:  You&#039;ve been so thoroughly propagandized into believing in this mythical &quot;fundamental human right&quot; to perpetual monopoly power enforced by the State that even QUESTIONING such an axiomatic idea is impossible for you.

    We all understand that, &quot;Sam&quot;.  It&#039;s also not surprising that -- when confronted with the evidence which contradicts your deeply cherished assumptions, that your first instinct would be to completely ignore such evidence and/or attempt to discredit the messenger(s).

   Thus we get your snippy little asides about the fact that I&#039;m just a regular person -- as opposed to, let&#039;s say, an RIAA lobbyist or an apologist for such.)  Go for it -- ignore the warning signs.  Feel free to completely disregard the fact that -- whatever you may think about it -- there IS a growing movement on many different fronts which has begun to call your type out in regard to the colossal &quot;screwjob&quot; your buddies in &quot;Big Media&quot; and &quot;big pharma&quot; have been able to give us.

    &quot;Massive outdoor installations&quot; won&#039;t disguise that fact, &quot;sam&quot;.
     Kathy Lee Gifford feigned surprise when confronted with irrefutable evidence that her clothing-line used third-world child labor.
     So it&#039;s certainly no shock that a &quot;person&quot; such as yourself would react this way.

    Enjoy the popcorn, &quot;Sam&quot; -- it&#039;s shaping up to be something of a &quot;slasher&quot; flick :)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sam:<br />
   &#8220;Naive, unknowing things possible?&#8221;<br />
   Now, that&#8217;s fascinating, &#8220;Sam&#8221;:<br />
   A vulture like yourself &#8212; completely unconcerned about what things like copyright/patents were originally supposed to do, and you accuse me of being&#8221;unknowing&#8221; and &#8220;naive&#8221;.<br />
    But see, that&#8217;s where what you deride as &#8220;useless history&#8221; comes in:  the more people learn, the less they&#8217;re apt to allow themselves to be continue to allow themselves to be screwed over.  Glad to hear about Bryant park, &#8220;Sam&#8221; (although I fail to see how that&#8217;s actually relevant to anything we&#8217;ve discussed here.)</p>
<p>    Now, be a good little RIAA shill and answer the question:<br />
    1. what was the original intent of IP law?<br />
    2. What is &#8220;civil disobedience&#8221;?<br />
    3. What is your stance on the &#8220;public domain?&#8221;<br />
    4. Is Privacy a &#8220;privilege&#8221; to be revoked if it conflicts with the whims of corporate lobbyists?</p>
<p>   The &#8220;waters&#8221; in which you swim are &#8212; to you &#8212; completely beyond any question (or possible reproach).  We undestand that, &#8220;sam&#8221;.<br />
   We also understand that you&#8217;re reluctant to actually answer any questions, which is fine.</p>
<p>    So go right ahead, li&#8217;l buddy &#8212; try to &#8220;discredit&#8221; me (as if that&#8217;ll actually do one single bit of good).<br />
    Of course it&#8217;s &#8220;locked up&#8221;, &#8220;Sam&#8221; &#8212; you and your buddies at the RIAA have made amply sure of that.</p>
<p>   And as per your request to &#8220;suck on that&#8221;?  If I may be so bold (try and stop me you mindless corporate shill), we&#8217;ve been &#8220;sucking on it&#8221; in regard to IP monopolies for DECADES, and a growing number of us are good and sick of it.</p>
<p>    &#8220;Sam&#8221;, as per usual you&#8217;ve raised no actual points and answered none of the questions which were put to you.<br />
    Of course, you CAN&#8217;T actually answer any of the points raised because to your line of &#8216;thinking&#8217; none of it makes any sense:  You&#8217;ve been so thoroughly propagandized into believing in this mythical &#8220;fundamental human right&#8221; to perpetual monopoly power enforced by the State that even QUESTIONING such an axiomatic idea is impossible for you.</p>
<p>    We all understand that, &#8220;Sam&#8221;.  It&#8217;s also not surprising that &#8212; when confronted with the evidence which contradicts your deeply cherished assumptions, that your first instinct would be to completely ignore such evidence and/or attempt to discredit the messenger(s).</p>
<p>   Thus we get your snippy little asides about the fact that I&#8217;m just a regular person &#8212; as opposed to, let&#8217;s say, an RIAA lobbyist or an apologist for such.)  Go for it &#8212; ignore the warning signs.  Feel free to completely disregard the fact that &#8212; whatever you may think about it &#8212; there IS a growing movement on many different fronts which has begun to call your type out in regard to the colossal &#8220;screwjob&#8221; your buddies in &#8220;Big Media&#8221; and &#8220;big pharma&#8221; have been able to give us.</p>
<p>    &#8220;Massive outdoor installations&#8221; won&#8217;t disguise that fact, &#8220;sam&#8221;.<br />
     Kathy Lee Gifford feigned surprise when confronted with irrefutable evidence that her clothing-line used third-world child labor.<br />
     So it&#8217;s certainly no shock that a &#8220;person&#8221; such as yourself would react this way.</p>
<p>    Enjoy the popcorn, &#8220;Sam&#8221; &#8212; it&#8217;s shaping up to be something of a &#8220;slasher&#8221; flick <img src='http://www.p2pnet.net/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
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		<title>By: Sam I Am</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-779584</link>
		<dc:creator>Sam I Am</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 15:41:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-779584</guid>
		<description>“Grabs the popcorn and waits for samiam to spout more crap.
Man this is better than anything hollywood could come up with”

LOL.

Climb the clocktower with a rifle, Henry. You know you want to. LOL 

And you misunderstood. In no way did I compare online piracy to rape. You stated that if the legislature had not extended copyright, then the downloading wouldn’t be illegal and I didn’t disagree with you. All I said was..... had (even) sexual assault (or any other crime) not been rendered illegal by legislation, then that too would be legally permissible. Your logic is empty. That’s all. Like your career. What do you do for a living, Henry?

We just finished staging Fashion Week here in Bryant Park. Huge tents, hundreds of fashion designers from all over the world, thousands of participants, a massive temporary infrastructure we help to design and they set up and take down twice a year. Every dress design, every set and lighting design, every photo taken by every press photographer, every video, every TV interview, every webcast.....100% locked up intellectual property. 100%.  Suck on that for awhile.

Anyone reading Jon’s page understands that you genuinely believe you know something/anything about all this from your computer in Pennsylvania, like a man who’s never actually been in the water but once read a book on swimming.

Believe/download/carp/civil disobey as you wish, my friend. We are all in this together and it’s all fair, right?  I support your ability to do whatever you’ll do, just as I support an organized society’s right to lock your dumbass up when that time comes. It’s pretty ironic that you find me ungenerous for not wanting to release our creations to public domain when you are not making any in the first place. LOL. 

And just when I think you’ve said the most naive, unknowing things possible, you keep talking.

Keep talking, Henry. :-) 
But put the rifle down. LOL</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“Grabs the popcorn and waits for samiam to spout more crap.<br />
Man this is better than anything hollywood could come up with”</p>
<p>LOL.</p>
<p>Climb the clocktower with a rifle, Henry. You know you want to. LOL </p>
<p>And you misunderstood. In no way did I compare online piracy to rape. You stated that if the legislature had not extended copyright, then the downloading wouldn’t be illegal and I didn’t disagree with you. All I said was&#8230;.. had (even) sexual assault (or any other crime) not been rendered illegal by legislation, then that too would be legally permissible. Your logic is empty. That’s all. Like your career. What do you do for a living, Henry?</p>
<p>We just finished staging Fashion Week here in Bryant Park. Huge tents, hundreds of fashion designers from all over the world, thousands of participants, a massive temporary infrastructure we help to design and they set up and take down twice a year. Every dress design, every set and lighting design, every photo taken by every press photographer, every video, every TV interview, every webcast&#8230;..100% locked up intellectual property. 100%.  Suck on that for awhile.</p>
<p>Anyone reading Jon’s page understands that you genuinely believe you know something/anything about all this from your computer in Pennsylvania, like a man who’s never actually been in the water but once read a book on swimming.</p>
<p>Believe/download/carp/civil disobey as you wish, my friend. We are all in this together and it’s all fair, right?  I support your ability to do whatever you’ll do, just as I support an organized society’s right to lock your dumbass up when that time comes. It’s pretty ironic that you find me ungenerous for not wanting to release our creations to public domain when you are not making any in the first place. LOL. </p>
<p>And just when I think you’ve said the most naive, unknowing things possible, you keep talking.</p>
<p>Keep talking, Henry. <img src='http://www.p2pnet.net/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':-)' class='wp-smiley' /><br />
But put the rifle down. LOL</p>
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		<title>By: Henry Emrich</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-779538</link>
		<dc:creator>Henry Emrich</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 15:11:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-779538</guid>
		<description>What&#039;s really interesting to me here is, I&#039;m at least vaguely sympathetic to &quot;Sam&quot;&#039;s position:

   See, knowing WHY a particular law exists simply &quot;never comes up&quot; for most people.  
   Most folks just blithely assume that how things ARE is how they &quot;always were&quot;.  That&#039;s why history strikes so many people --- such as Sam -- to be &quot;useless&quot;: who needs to understand the original INTENT of a given class of &quot;law&quot;: it&#039;s enough that one be able to use the law to attain maximum social and economic leverage over others.

   &quot;Sam&quot; puts on a big show about how &quot;industry is people&quot;, and tries -- unsuccessfully, of course -- to put a &quot;human face&quot; on the Corporate Megaliths which are rapdily ushering in what amounts to &quot;digital feudalism&quot;.  It won&#039;t work.
    IP &quot;law&quot; was essentially a type of &quot;bribe&quot; -- a &quot;perk&quot; extended to the &quot;content industry&quot; for a LIMITED TIME, as an added incentive to produce.  It&#039;s wasn&#039;t -- and ISN&#039;T -- a &quot;fundamental right&quot;, and -- despite most of us never having slogged through the endless blizzard of bureaucratic nonsense your pals at the RIAA/MPAA have managed to create, we&#039;re still smart enough to know when we&#039;re being screwed.
   
     Corporations ARE &quot;people&quot; --- or at least, governments grant them the status of &quot;legal personhood&quot; that is from a legal standpoint seperate from the &quot;personhood&quot; of their employees or even their Executive board.   So yeah, we understand the &quot;industry is people&quot; -- in the case of the RIAA/MPAA, a few vastly wealthy, politically-savvy, morally bankrupt &quot;people&quot; who have lobbied for decades to successfully retain posession of what -- by the ORIGINAL INTENT of IP legislation itself -- SHOULD have been opened to us all, long ago.  

    But, &quot;Sam&quot; --- and the suit-and-tie vermin he applauds -- figure that all-but-perpetual monopoly backed up by threats and harrassment is their &quot;fundamental human right&quot; -- whereas privacy, for instance, is merely the &quot;privilege of a well-ordered society&quot;, to be sacrificed at legislative whim should such action become neccesary for the preservation of &quot;Order and Commerce&quot;.

     Oh, but wait -- this isn&#039;t merely a greasy, grasping, willfully-ignorant RIAA shill we&#039;re talking about -- he&#039;s REALLY continuing to support current IP laws for his DAUGHTER -- lobbying the State to preserve that monopoly for as long as possible.
    For you see, from &quot;Sam&#039;s&quot; point of view, the mere existence of the &quot;Public Domain&quot; is the vilest sort of atrocity, and the threat of the coercive monopoly&#039;s expiration &quot;taking away&quot; from his daughter simply cannot be tolerated.

   Historical roots of IP law?  Who needs history?  What&#039;s important, according to &quot;Sam&quot;, is that we &quot;Stay in the reality of the present&quot; -- and presumably, continue to sit idly by while the &quot;Cartels&quot; lobby the public domain which is &quot;robbing&quot; them -- and the privacy rights behind whch we supposedly &quot;hide&quot; in order to commit the greivous sin of failing to &quot;rent&quot; the broken, DRM-laden wreckage of our cultural heritage from them  until the end of time.

    See, we&#039;re all stupid.  Anyone who can&#039;t -- for whatever reason -- manage to successfully wrangle the rats-nest of Red tape Sam&#039;s pals over at &quot;Big Media&quot; and &quot;big pharma&quot; and those other wondeful multinational &quot;persons&quot; have created, should just swallow it.  They&#039;ve been able to get the State to agree that ten thousand years would still constitute a &quot;limited time?&quot;  Well, too goddamn bad.  That&#039;s just the &quot;cold, hard realities of business&quot; and we should all &quot;grow a pair and learn to compete.&quot;

    Libraries?  Fuck &#039;em.
    Documentary film-making?  Artsy crap that nobody really watches.
    &quot;Unauthorized public performances&quot; of a copyrighted song at a child&#039;s birthday party?  &quot;Think of the chiiildren.&quot;

    But hey, we have &quot;zero understanding&quot;, so the sheer weight of history itself can safely be ignored, right???   

    I&#039;m not going to play anymore, folks: &quot;Sam&#039;s&quot; inane, spittle-spraying, hamfisted attempts to defend Digital feudalism, and his truly sad and desperate need to take &quot;pot shots&quot; at me/my wife/our pets/anyone and anything which he cannot manage to intimidate or BUY OFF -- nah.  I&#039;ll just keep posting my &quot;useless history lessons&quot; and &quot;Sam&quot; will continue ignoring them, secure in the knowledge that Corporate feudalism is inevitable.

   Ain&#039;t life grand?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What&#8217;s really interesting to me here is, I&#8217;m at least vaguely sympathetic to &#8220;Sam&#8221;&#8217;s position:</p>
<p>   See, knowing WHY a particular law exists simply &#8220;never comes up&#8221; for most people.<br />
   Most folks just blithely assume that how things ARE is how they &#8220;always were&#8221;.  That&#8217;s why history strikes so many people &#8212; such as Sam &#8212; to be &#8220;useless&#8221;: who needs to understand the original INTENT of a given class of &#8220;law&#8221;: it&#8217;s enough that one be able to use the law to attain maximum social and economic leverage over others.</p>
<p>   &#8220;Sam&#8221; puts on a big show about how &#8220;industry is people&#8221;, and tries &#8212; unsuccessfully, of course &#8212; to put a &#8220;human face&#8221; on the Corporate Megaliths which are rapdily ushering in what amounts to &#8220;digital feudalism&#8221;.  It won&#8217;t work.<br />
    IP &#8220;law&#8221; was essentially a type of &#8220;bribe&#8221; &#8212; a &#8220;perk&#8221; extended to the &#8220;content industry&#8221; for a LIMITED TIME, as an added incentive to produce.  It&#8217;s wasn&#8217;t &#8212; and ISN&#8217;T &#8212; a &#8220;fundamental right&#8221;, and &#8212; despite most of us never having slogged through the endless blizzard of bureaucratic nonsense your pals at the RIAA/MPAA have managed to create, we&#8217;re still smart enough to know when we&#8217;re being screwed.</p>
<p>     Corporations ARE &#8220;people&#8221; &#8212; or at least, governments grant them the status of &#8220;legal personhood&#8221; that is from a legal standpoint seperate from the &#8220;personhood&#8221; of their employees or even their Executive board.   So yeah, we understand the &#8220;industry is people&#8221; &#8212; in the case of the RIAA/MPAA, a few vastly wealthy, politically-savvy, morally bankrupt &#8220;people&#8221; who have lobbied for decades to successfully retain posession of what &#8212; by the ORIGINAL INTENT of IP legislation itself &#8212; SHOULD have been opened to us all, long ago.  </p>
<p>    But, &#8220;Sam&#8221; &#8212; and the suit-and-tie vermin he applauds &#8212; figure that all-but-perpetual monopoly backed up by threats and harrassment is their &#8220;fundamental human right&#8221; &#8212; whereas privacy, for instance, is merely the &#8220;privilege of a well-ordered society&#8221;, to be sacrificed at legislative whim should such action become neccesary for the preservation of &#8220;Order and Commerce&#8221;.</p>
<p>     Oh, but wait &#8212; this isn&#8217;t merely a greasy, grasping, willfully-ignorant RIAA shill we&#8217;re talking about &#8212; he&#8217;s REALLY continuing to support current IP laws for his DAUGHTER &#8212; lobbying the State to preserve that monopoly for as long as possible.<br />
    For you see, from &#8220;Sam&#8217;s&#8221; point of view, the mere existence of the &#8220;Public Domain&#8221; is the vilest sort of atrocity, and the threat of the coercive monopoly&#8217;s expiration &#8220;taking away&#8221; from his daughter simply cannot be tolerated.</p>
<p>   Historical roots of IP law?  Who needs history?  What&#8217;s important, according to &#8220;Sam&#8221;, is that we &#8220;Stay in the reality of the present&#8221; &#8212; and presumably, continue to sit idly by while the &#8220;Cartels&#8221; lobby the public domain which is &#8220;robbing&#8221; them &#8212; and the privacy rights behind whch we supposedly &#8220;hide&#8221; in order to commit the greivous sin of failing to &#8220;rent&#8221; the broken, DRM-laden wreckage of our cultural heritage from them  until the end of time.</p>
<p>    See, we&#8217;re all stupid.  Anyone who can&#8217;t &#8212; for whatever reason &#8212; manage to successfully wrangle the rats-nest of Red tape Sam&#8217;s pals over at &#8220;Big Media&#8221; and &#8220;big pharma&#8221; and those other wondeful multinational &#8220;persons&#8221; have created, should just swallow it.  They&#8217;ve been able to get the State to agree that ten thousand years would still constitute a &#8220;limited time?&#8221;  Well, too goddamn bad.  That&#8217;s just the &#8220;cold, hard realities of business&#8221; and we should all &#8220;grow a pair and learn to compete.&#8221;</p>
<p>    Libraries?  Fuck &#8216;em.<br />
    Documentary film-making?  Artsy crap that nobody really watches.<br />
    &#8220;Unauthorized public performances&#8221; of a copyrighted song at a child&#8217;s birthday party?  &#8220;Think of the chiiildren.&#8221;</p>
<p>    But hey, we have &#8220;zero understanding&#8221;, so the sheer weight of history itself can safely be ignored, right???   </p>
<p>    I&#8217;m not going to play anymore, folks: &#8220;Sam&#8217;s&#8221; inane, spittle-spraying, hamfisted attempts to defend Digital feudalism, and his truly sad and desperate need to take &#8220;pot shots&#8221; at me/my wife/our pets/anyone and anything which he cannot manage to intimidate or BUY OFF &#8212; nah.  I&#8217;ll just keep posting my &#8220;useless history lessons&#8221; and &#8220;Sam&#8221; will continue ignoring them, secure in the knowledge that Corporate feudalism is inevitable.</p>
<p>   Ain&#8217;t life grand?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: justme</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-779442</link>
		<dc:creator>justme</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 13:43:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-779442</guid>
		<description>Grabs the popcorn and waits for samiam to spout more crap.
Man this is better than anything hollywood could come up with.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Grabs the popcorn and waits for samiam to spout more crap.<br />
Man this is better than anything hollywood could come up with.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: educ8</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-779324</link>
		<dc:creator>educ8</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 11:46:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-779324</guid>
		<description>And I will add: you must also repair what you have caused to my satisfaction!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>And I will add: you must also repair what you have caused to my satisfaction!</p>
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		<title>By: educ8</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-779320</link>
		<dc:creator>educ8</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 11:42:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-779320</guid>
		<description>As a free person I have the rights to do as I please without anyone&#039;s permission as long as I don&#039;t hurt anyone. Filthy rich persons and companies are definitely not hurting.
If someone tells secret to another it&#039;s not a secret any more. If one of these people tell someone else it&#039;s public domain.

How much is your freedom and privacy worth? Here is mine take on it.

Notice to anyone trying to restrict my fundamental rights:
My prices;
If you breach my privacy and or freedoms you and your associates will pay $1 billion dollars in gold and or 90% of your total worth payable in gold.
If you come and hassle me against my constitutional rights it&#039;s $1 million in gold.
If you arrest me it&#039;s $5 million in gold.
For every day spent in anyone&#039;s jail $10 million in gold.
If you bring me to court unlawfully [I recognize common law only] it&#039;s $50 million in gold.
For whatever price you put on your wrongful losses my price is to add a zero to your price, payable in gold.
Prices are subject to change as I see fit.

You have just been served Notice of Understanding and Intent, plus Remedy.

Hint: this is the only way to fight the greedy and control freaks. Anything else is just lip service.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As a free person I have the rights to do as I please without anyone&#8217;s permission as long as I don&#8217;t hurt anyone. Filthy rich persons and companies are definitely not hurting.<br />
If someone tells secret to another it&#8217;s not a secret any more. If one of these people tell someone else it&#8217;s public domain.</p>
<p>How much is your freedom and privacy worth? Here is mine take on it.</p>
<p>Notice to anyone trying to restrict my fundamental rights:<br />
My prices;<br />
If you breach my privacy and or freedoms you and your associates will pay $1 billion dollars in gold and or 90% of your total worth payable in gold.<br />
If you come and hassle me against my constitutional rights it&#8217;s $1 million in gold.<br />
If you arrest me it&#8217;s $5 million in gold.<br />
For every day spent in anyone&#8217;s jail $10 million in gold.<br />
If you bring me to court unlawfully [I recognize common law only] it&#8217;s $50 million in gold.<br />
For whatever price you put on your wrongful losses my price is to add a zero to your price, payable in gold.<br />
Prices are subject to change as I see fit.</p>
<p>You have just been served Notice of Understanding and Intent, plus Remedy.</p>
<p>Hint: this is the only way to fight the greedy and control freaks. Anything else is just lip service.</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Jon</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-779160</link>
		<dc:creator>Jon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 09:56:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-779160</guid>
		<description>@ Ryan Scott Scheel:

“Where do you get the page visits number?”

At the bottom of every page, immmediately under HOME (861 as a I write this).

Cheers!
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@ Ryan Scott Scheel:</p>
<p>“Where do you get the page visits number?”</p>
<p>At the bottom of every page, immmediately under HOME (861 as a I write this).</p>
<p>Cheers!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Henry Ermich</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-779045</link>
		<dc:creator>Henry Ermich</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 05:25:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-779045</guid>
		<description>Oh, and as for your accusation of me being a &quot;shop-lifting potty mouth&quot;:
&quot;People do shitty things all the time&quot; -- or dare I not quote back your own words to you (yet again!)

   Y&#039;know, this really interested me at first.
    &quot;Debating&quot; with a pseudo-intellectual who claims I have &quot;zero understanding&quot; of the issue, (despite my having provided copious links to supporting documentation), who completely refuses to actually answer any of the points raised, and whose best &quot;responses&quot; consist of nothing more than petty personalistic gibes is, to put it bluntly, boring as hell.

   No, I&#039;ve never wrangled the bureaucratic beast in the ways you describe, &quot;Sam&quot;.
   I&#039;ve never bribed lawmakers, either.
   Nor have I ever owned slaves.
   Nor have I ever traveled to Bangkok to engage in sex tourism.

   Nonetheless, lacking intimate knowledge of the minutae related to every aspect of the above activities in no way means that I have &quot;zero understanding&quot; of them.  As I said -- you feel it is in your vested interest to support a legal climate which aims to freeze the &quot;public domain&quot; at 1923.  We all understand that.
   But at least have the common courtesy to actually post meaningful responses.

   If this is the best you can do, then -- as I said originally -- why am I even bothering?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Oh, and as for your accusation of me being a &#8220;shop-lifting potty mouth&#8221;:<br />
&#8220;People do shitty things all the time&#8221; &#8212; or dare I not quote back your own words to you (yet again!)</p>
<p>   Y&#8217;know, this really interested me at first.<br />
    &#8220;Debating&#8221; with a pseudo-intellectual who claims I have &#8220;zero understanding&#8221; of the issue, (despite my having provided copious links to supporting documentation), who completely refuses to actually answer any of the points raised, and whose best &#8220;responses&#8221; consist of nothing more than petty personalistic gibes is, to put it bluntly, boring as hell.</p>
<p>   No, I&#8217;ve never wrangled the bureaucratic beast in the ways you describe, &#8220;Sam&#8221;.<br />
   I&#8217;ve never bribed lawmakers, either.<br />
   Nor have I ever owned slaves.<br />
   Nor have I ever traveled to Bangkok to engage in sex tourism.</p>
<p>   Nonetheless, lacking intimate knowledge of the minutae related to every aspect of the above activities in no way means that I have &#8220;zero understanding&#8221; of them.  As I said &#8212; you feel it is in your vested interest to support a legal climate which aims to freeze the &#8220;public domain&#8221; at 1923.  We all understand that.<br />
   But at least have the common courtesy to actually post meaningful responses.</p>
<p>   If this is the best you can do, then &#8212; as I said originally &#8212; why am I even bothering?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Henry Emrich</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-779037</link>
		<dc:creator>Henry Emrich</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 05:11:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-779037</guid>
		<description>Truth be told, I almost respect &quot;Sam&quot;.
   After all, he doesn&#039;t even begin to make a pretense of actually understanding the roots of IP law -- characterizes such an inquiry as a &quot;useless history lesson&quot;.

  First he claims that the copyright monopoly is a &quot;fundamental human right&quot;.  Then when confronted with the irrefutable fact that copyright is a relatively recent invention, all he can come up with is bombastic gibberish about how he believes owners should have &quot;exclusive control&quot; of their content &quot;for a significant time&quot;.

   It&#039;s obvious that he believes the original 11-year term isn&#039;t &quot;significant&quot;, given the fact that he  sees the expiration of copyright as &quot;taking away&quot; from his daughter.  It&#039;s obvious he doesn&#039;t give two liquidy shits about the &quot;public domain&quot;, either.

   When confronted with the numerous exceptions and caveats which ALREADY riddle copyright law -- such as &quot;fair use&quot; and the &quot;first sale doctrine&quot;, &quot;Sam&quot;&#039;s approach is to either ignore the issues raised entirely or engage in some kind of half-witted attempt at character assasination and personal insults.  

    THEN when finally cornered into admitting that lobbyists have basically hijacked copyright and turned it into what amounts to a perpetual monopoly, the best he can come up with is &quot;Quite True, Henry&quot;, and more pissy little jibes at me/my competence/my commie-anarchist leanings/etc.

    Oh, and let&#039;s not forget the claim that I have &quot;zero understanding&quot; of the issues at hand.  Despite having provided copious links to other sources -- STARTING with the statute which is at the root of virtually EVERY copyright law now extant in the English-speaking world.
     
    To be quite honest, I&#039;m not that suprised.
     &quot;Sam&quot; is merely a symptom of just how successful a job the RIAA has been able to do, and how far there is left to go.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Truth be told, I almost respect &#8220;Sam&#8221;.<br />
   After all, he doesn&#8217;t even begin to make a pretense of actually understanding the roots of IP law &#8212; characterizes such an inquiry as a &#8220;useless history lesson&#8221;.</p>
<p>  First he claims that the copyright monopoly is a &#8220;fundamental human right&#8221;.  Then when confronted with the irrefutable fact that copyright is a relatively recent invention, all he can come up with is bombastic gibberish about how he believes owners should have &#8220;exclusive control&#8221; of their content &#8220;for a significant time&#8221;.</p>
<p>   It&#8217;s obvious that he believes the original 11-year term isn&#8217;t &#8220;significant&#8221;, given the fact that he  sees the expiration of copyright as &#8220;taking away&#8221; from his daughter.  It&#8217;s obvious he doesn&#8217;t give two liquidy shits about the &#8220;public domain&#8221;, either.</p>
<p>   When confronted with the numerous exceptions and caveats which ALREADY riddle copyright law &#8212; such as &#8220;fair use&#8221; and the &#8220;first sale doctrine&#8221;, &#8220;Sam&#8221;&#8217;s approach is to either ignore the issues raised entirely or engage in some kind of half-witted attempt at character assasination and personal insults.  </p>
<p>    THEN when finally cornered into admitting that lobbyists have basically hijacked copyright and turned it into what amounts to a perpetual monopoly, the best he can come up with is &#8220;Quite True, Henry&#8221;, and more pissy little jibes at me/my competence/my commie-anarchist leanings/etc.</p>
<p>    Oh, and let&#8217;s not forget the claim that I have &#8220;zero understanding&#8221; of the issues at hand.  Despite having provided copious links to other sources &#8212; STARTING with the statute which is at the root of virtually EVERY copyright law now extant in the English-speaking world.</p>
<p>    To be quite honest, I&#8217;m not that suprised.<br />
     &#8220;Sam&#8221; is merely a symptom of just how successful a job the RIAA has been able to do, and how far there is left to go.</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Togenshi</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-778991</link>
		<dc:creator>Togenshi</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 03:56:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-778991</guid>
		<description>*sigh* on how we could let this happen. Im just wondering if there were any links between 9/11 and this chain of events. We already know the government is corrupted so its quite plausible. This is very effective on tagging everyones movements and all.

Anyhow, back to issue on hand. IP should be open till it is used for profit. Of course this is not a &quot;one size fits all&quot; issue.

Musicians should release their music for free and perform at concerts for income. They still can grab sponsors and investors and still make a pretty penny. Plus the audience is now greater. Consumer has free music and musicians have good income, win win.

Movies on the other hand should focus on quality where the consumer would feel obliged to purchase a ticket or buy the dvd. Quality of movies improves. Consumer wins.

Games are flexible in having in-game advertising and should be offered on a content provider like steam where it also acts as a service. I actually dont mind paying stuff on steam cause i had to reinstall xp numerous times and downloading steam makes it that much easier. Consumer and Developer win win.

Software - Companies that use the software are obliged to pay the license fees. For the individual, it opens the market for users that will have a ripple-effect where one person will tell another about the software. Developers have bigger base, more profit, win win.

Books - Publishers can offer users who bought the book additional online content for free as an incentive to purchase the copy. Well, as a student of Uni myself, i prefer books &gt; digital books and i dont think im the only one in this category. It will survive.

What else is there? 

Its just a matter of adapting. Seriously its not hard to change the system to your benefit. All that the &quot;Entertainment Cartels&quot; are doing is denying the inevitable by holding on like dinosaurs.

If i get caught, i&#039;ll just do a case of &quot;civil disobedience&quot; and hopefully people will follow. Im still going to download no matter what. The **AA can shove its laws up its ass for all i care. I&#039;ll just cause such a fuss that i hopefully can get the local current affairs tv show in. They will bite at anything to get ratings. 

The one thing that i am royally pissed off about is that fileshares are charged worse than if you actually stole the physical content in the first place. Its like wtf.  Besides, police should worried more about drugs, alcohol abuse, vandalism and ACTUAL theft over file-sharing. 

Now, we talked so much about the **AA, but who on earth knows the identity of the CEO? We need to give that bastard hell.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>*sigh* on how we could let this happen. Im just wondering if there were any links between 9/11 and this chain of events. We already know the government is corrupted so its quite plausible. This is very effective on tagging everyones movements and all.</p>
<p>Anyhow, back to issue on hand. IP should be open till it is used for profit. Of course this is not a &#8220;one size fits all&#8221; issue.</p>
<p>Musicians should release their music for free and perform at concerts for income. They still can grab sponsors and investors and still make a pretty penny. Plus the audience is now greater. Consumer has free music and musicians have good income, win win.</p>
<p>Movies on the other hand should focus on quality where the consumer would feel obliged to purchase a ticket or buy the dvd. Quality of movies improves. Consumer wins.</p>
<p>Games are flexible in having in-game advertising and should be offered on a content provider like steam where it also acts as a service. I actually dont mind paying stuff on steam cause i had to reinstall xp numerous times and downloading steam makes it that much easier. Consumer and Developer win win.</p>
<p>Software &#8211; Companies that use the software are obliged to pay the license fees. For the individual, it opens the market for users that will have a ripple-effect where one person will tell another about the software. Developers have bigger base, more profit, win win.</p>
<p>Books &#8211; Publishers can offer users who bought the book additional online content for free as an incentive to purchase the copy. Well, as a student of Uni myself, i prefer books &gt; digital books and i dont think im the only one in this category. It will survive.</p>
<p>What else is there? </p>
<p>Its just a matter of adapting. Seriously its not hard to change the system to your benefit. All that the &#8220;Entertainment Cartels&#8221; are doing is denying the inevitable by holding on like dinosaurs.</p>
<p>If i get caught, i&#8217;ll just do a case of &#8220;civil disobedience&#8221; and hopefully people will follow. Im still going to download no matter what. The **AA can shove its laws up its ass for all i care. I&#8217;ll just cause such a fuss that i hopefully can get the local current affairs tv show in. They will bite at anything to get ratings. </p>
<p>The one thing that i am royally pissed off about is that fileshares are charged worse than if you actually stole the physical content in the first place. Its like wtf.  Besides, police should worried more about drugs, alcohol abuse, vandalism and ACTUAL theft over file-sharing. </p>
<p>Now, we talked so much about the **AA, but who on earth knows the identity of the CEO? We need to give that bastard hell.</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: chronoss</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-778948</link>
		<dc:creator>chronoss</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 02:33:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-778948</guid>
		<description>fuck copyright
look at all the BIG winded BS above.

WHOLLY CRAP BATMAN
its a right we give
and its one we should now take away and then have them cry a little, all they are doing now is shoving up all YOUR ASSHOLES.
YOU want change
Leave mixed cds everywhere you can 
put a movie on , two tv eps
leave a dvdr
leave tons a music

Start taking it to the streets
put your money where your mouths are and share properly.

Next phase is to also start picking movie theatres (</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>fuck copyright<br />
look at all the BIG winded BS above.</p>
<p>WHOLLY CRAP BATMAN<br />
its a right we give<br />
and its one we should now take away and then have them cry a little, all they are doing now is shoving up all YOUR ASSHOLES.<br />
YOU want change<br />
Leave mixed cds everywhere you can<br />
put a movie on , two tv eps<br />
leave a dvdr<br />
leave tons a music</p>
<p>Start taking it to the streets<br />
put your money where your mouths are and share properly.</p>
<p>Next phase is to also start picking movie theatres (</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Henry Ermich</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-778919</link>
		<dc:creator>Henry Ermich</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 01:43:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-778919</guid>
		<description>&quot;Zero understanding&quot; of the law?
   Heh.
   Let&#039;s take a different approach, here:
   How about laws relating to &quot;miscegenation&quot;, &quot;Sam&quot;.
   How about &quot;separate but equal&quot;, &quot;Sam?&quot;
   How about women&#039;s suffrage, or voting rights for 18 year olds, &quot;Sam?&quot;
   How about &quot;Prohibition&quot;, &#039;Sam&#039;?
   
   Laws can be (and very often ARE) changed, but all such changes in the law are preceded by corresponding changes in people&#039;s opinions and views on a given issue.  The fact is, &quot;Sam&quot;, that IP in all forms is a State-granted monopoly power (regardless of whatever fill-in-the-blamks bureaucratic nonsense you want to blather in this regard, THAT much is clear even to someone like myself who has &quot;zero&quot; understanding -- as opposed to a pseudo-intellectual mastermind such as yourself.) :)

   You haven&#039;t once even attempted to challenge that (other than your idiotic claim that IP represents a &quot;fundamental human right&quot;, which I demonstrated to be patently false via my &quot;Statute of Anne&quot; link.)  No, all you&#039;ve done is repreated bleating of some variation of &quot;it&#039;s the laaaaw!  It&#039;s the Laaaaw!&quot; in order to -- you hope -- sidestep having to actually ADDRESS any of the points we raise.

   You flatly discount even the IDEA of civil disobedience, regard privacy as a &quot;privilege&quot;, and -- despite your spittle-dripping whingings to the contrary -- have absolutely NO interest in &quot;the wonderful free network we all share&quot;.  

   Now actually answer the points raised, or go back to masturbating over printouts of the DMCA.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;Zero understanding&#8221; of the law?<br />
   Heh.<br />
   Let&#8217;s take a different approach, here:<br />
   How about laws relating to &#8220;miscegenation&#8221;, &#8220;Sam&#8221;.<br />
   How about &#8220;separate but equal&#8221;, &#8220;Sam?&#8221;<br />
   How about women&#8217;s suffrage, or voting rights for 18 year olds, &#8220;Sam?&#8221;<br />
   How about &#8220;Prohibition&#8221;, &#8216;Sam&#8217;?</p>
<p>   Laws can be (and very often ARE) changed, but all such changes in the law are preceded by corresponding changes in people&#8217;s opinions and views on a given issue.  The fact is, &#8220;Sam&#8221;, that IP in all forms is a State-granted monopoly power (regardless of whatever fill-in-the-blamks bureaucratic nonsense you want to blather in this regard, THAT much is clear even to someone like myself who has &#8220;zero&#8221; understanding &#8212; as opposed to a pseudo-intellectual mastermind such as yourself.) <img src='http://www.p2pnet.net/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
<p>   You haven&#8217;t once even attempted to challenge that (other than your idiotic claim that IP represents a &#8220;fundamental human right&#8221;, which I demonstrated to be patently false via my &#8220;Statute of Anne&#8221; link.)  No, all you&#8217;ve done is repreated bleating of some variation of &#8220;it&#8217;s the laaaaw!  It&#8217;s the Laaaaw!&#8221; in order to &#8212; you hope &#8212; sidestep having to actually ADDRESS any of the points we raise.</p>
<p>   You flatly discount even the IDEA of civil disobedience, regard privacy as a &#8220;privilege&#8221;, and &#8212; despite your spittle-dripping whingings to the contrary &#8212; have absolutely NO interest in &#8220;the wonderful free network we all share&#8221;.  </p>
<p>   Now actually answer the points raised, or go back to masturbating over printouts of the DMCA.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Free Thinker</title>
		<link>http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007/comment-page-1#comment-778918</link>
		<dc:creator>Free Thinker</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 01:43:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17007#comment-778918</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;Freethinker: Me and Sam I am, the same person?&lt;br /&gt;
Nah — I can actually manage to read, and think coherently.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ok, sorry. No offense meant. :)&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Freethinker: Me and Sam I am, the same person?<br />
Nah — I can actually manage to read, and think coherently.</p>
<p>Ok, sorry. No offense meant. <img src='http://www.p2pnet.net/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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