p2pnet.net News:- p2pnet is being sued for libel in a case which epitomizes the terrible danger Canada’s entire blogging community is in.

And with US laws in mind, we ran an item saying the California Supreme Court was, "leaning toward dismissing a lawsuit against a woman who posted an allegedly libelous email".

We went on, "Or as Law.com summed it up, California lawyer Christopher Grell’s belief that, ‘certain Internet speech shouldn’t be immune from liability was bombing Tuesday during oral arguments in the state Supreme Court. But the coup de grace came when Justice Ming Chin (right) followed up Grell’s presentation by immediately telling one of the opposing lawyers how surprised he was by Grell’s ’startling lack of legal authority’.

"That statement apparently summed all seven justices’ thoughts about Grell’s argument, and effectively signaled that the court doesn’t intend to make untold numbers of Internet users liable for every allegedly defamatory posting on the Web."

The principal opponents are Ilena Rosenthal in the US and Terry Polevoy in Canada, the first a women’s health advocate, and the second a doctor runnng an acne clinic.

Back to Canada, Nikki Hemming, ceo of Sharman Networks’ Australia-based Kazaa p2p application, claims p2pnet and editor/publisher Jon Newton "defamed" her in a story quoting an Associated Press item on widely reported court proceedings in which she was questioned about the sale of her "multimillion dollar Sydney mansion," and which also included a reader’s comment.

"For you, this may simply be yet another lawsuit, and a minor one at that," I wrote in an open letter to Hemming, "but to me and to a lot of other Canadians, it represents the thin end of a very sharp wedge." I said that because the roots of Canada’s libel law hark back centuries before the country’s Charter of Rights was adopted and are dangerously out of kilter with what’s happening in online publishing in the digital 21st century.

"The Supreme Court of Canada has set a high threshold to determine when a party ‘authorises’ infringement." says Canadian IP and Net expert Dr Michael Geist. "Merely hosting content, even after being made aware of an unproven infringement allegation, is unlikely to meet that standard."

Other countries, "most notably the United States, have implemented ‘notice and takedown’ systems that provide intermediaries with a legal safe harbour provided that they promptly remove take down content upon notification," he says, going on, "the United States enacted a law 10 years ago that provides broad immunity for intermediaries that host third-party content. That provision has since been used dozens of times to immunize ISPs, large companies such as Amazon.com, and small websites who could ill-afford to fight legal challenges.

"A similar provision in the Commonwealth countries would protect sites such as P2Pnet, as well as the thousands of ISPs, websites, and bloggers, who are contributing to a robust online dialogue, but today find themselves vulnerable to lawsuits whose primary purpose may be to suppress legitimate speech."

Meanwhile, the California Supreme Court story has led to a series of acrimonious comment posts from various people involved, among whom is Grell

Read his entire book-length post below and under it, if you’re still awake, another Reader’s Write in novelette form which addresses Grell’s ideas.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Your comments about the ‘lack of authority" cited is the reason why this case was before the California Supreme Court. in otherwords, if there was a great deal of authority, why would the Supreme Court of California bother to hear the case?

Equally misleading is your comment about how Grell’s arguments were "bombing". Apparently, you failed to read the Appellate Court’s ruling. Not only does this Appellate Court’s decision support Grell’s position, it found that Grell’s argument’s were meritorious based on the rules that are suppose to be followed by Courts when interpreting a statute, like Section 230 of The Communication Deccency Act, especially when the statute involves competing constitutional rights such as free speech and the right to petition for redress when ones reputation is falsely attacked by statements that are false. Indeed, know one supporting immunity bothered to mentioned that the statements that were reposted and republished by Ms Rosenthal, were already found by the trial court to be libelous per se.

The trail court found that not only were the statements accusing Dr. Polevoy of "stalking" false, the trial court found that the statements Ms Rosenthal reposted over and over, were made with mailice by the original publisher. The fact that Ms Rosenthal continues to claim that her republication of this libelous article was justified is additional proof of the lengths that this woman will go to distort the truth for her own benfit.

As for the issue of immunity, your comments neglect to mention the findings of the Appellate Court’s 50 page decision holding that Congress did not intend to bestow absolute immunity to Internet providers and users who knowing repost libelous statements and/or knowing allow libelous publication to remain online after the provider or user has been told that the publication is false.

Your article also fails to mention that Internet libel is not the only issue that immunity can effect. For example, there are several cases where Internet users are trying to use Section 230 to protect themselves against liability for discriminatory housing ads that are being posted online. If these discriminatory ads were published anywhere else, they would violate the Fair housing Act.

No doubt that the same issue will arise when discriminatory employment want ads are publsihed. Did Congress intend to grant immunity to users and providers, who under any other situation, would be liable for their discriminatory conduct?

Online discrimination and libel are only two of the absurd results that will occur if immunity is granted to users and providers who knowing post or republish such material. Think about it. What will happen if someone hacks into confidential medical records and posts them online and get reposted by another person. If immunity is granted, no one who reposts these records and no provider who allows these records to remain online, will have any liability for not removing the records no matter how much evidence is presented that the records invade a persons privacy.

As noted in the Appellate decision, which, was the only published case to actually analyse section 230 consistent with the rules applicable to statutory interpretation, the legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood.

As noted by the Court ‘We would not lightly require the State to abandon this purpose, for, as Mr. Justice Stewart has reminded us, the individual’s right to the protection of his own good name ‘reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being–a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional system.’ (Rosenblatt v. Baer (1966) 383 U.S. 75, 92 (conc. opn.).’ " (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 341 (Gertz).)

The Appellate case also concluded that the Court’s analysis in the Zeran case, flies in the face of this admonition.

Zeran also flies in the face of well established rules of statutory interpretation especially statutory interpretation involving competing intersecting Constitutional rights.

For example, the Zeran Court’s interpretation of §230 fails to balance a person’s free speech rights, if any, against another person’s’ rights of petition for libel, two equally protected provisions under both the United States and California constitution. (See Rosenblatt v. Baer (1965) 383 US 75, 86 S.Ct 669, 675 “…Society has a persuasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation”).

As noted by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion,

"The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional system.

Where is the decency in allowing unbridled Internet republications of defamatory statements?

In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 749 105 S.Ct. 2939, 2943, the Court held that the State’s interest in compensating private individuals against defamatory statements was “strong and legitimate” and that “a state should not be lightly required to abandon it”.

Is there any evidence to suggest that in enacting §230, Congress intended to eliminate that aspect of state law holding a republisher of a defamatory statement immune from liability or to eliminate individual rights not to be defamed?

As noted in McCoy v. Hearst Corporation (1986) Cal. 3d 835, 856:

"Libel laws recognize that each person has a right not to be disparaged by false statements. (citation omitted) Society’s interest in redressing the harm done to one’s reputation is strong. (citation omitted) Moreover, this court is not unmindful that “[t]he harm done to one’s reputation by erroneous charges of corruption or dishonesty can never be fully undone, … For even an erased question mark still suffices to raise the question, where perhaps none existed before.” (Bird, The Role of the press in the First Amendment Society (1980) 20 Santa Clara L.Rev. 1, 8.

Good Character, or reputation, consists of the general opinion of people respecting one. It is built up by a lifetime of conduct. It is probably the dearest possession that a man has, and once lost is almost impossible to regain. The possession of a good reputation is conducive to happiness in life and contentment. The loss of it, … brings shame, misery and heartache. (citation omitted."

Another rule of statutory interpretation requires that the Court “‘select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating thegeneral purpose of the statute, and to avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.’ . .” Guillemin v. Stein

As noted in Welton v. Los Angeles (1976) 18 Cal.3d 497, "a statute should be construed so as to avoid conflict with the Constitution. The court should construe the enactment so as to limit its effect and operation to matters that may be constitutionally regulated or prohibited.” (Supra at 505.)

Second, “that judicial construction must not create uncertainty inhibiting exercise of a constitutional right.”

In McCoy v. Heart Corporation (1986) 42 Cal.3d 835, 856 the Court stated that:

"Society’s interest in redressing the harm done to one’s reputation is strong. (citation omitted) Moreover, this court is not unmindful that "[t]he harm done to one’s reputation by erroneous charges of corruption or dishonesty can never be fully undone, … For even an erased question mark still suffices to raise the question, where perhaps none existed before." (Bird,

"Good Character, or reputation, consists of the general opinion of people respecting one. It is built up by a lifetime of conduct. It is probably the dearest possession that a man has, and once lost is almost impossible to regain. The possession of a good reputation is conducive to happiness in life and contentment. The loss of it, … brings shame, misery and heartache. "

Another rule of statutory interpretation that the Zeran Court never considered is set out in DeYoung v. San Diego (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 17. In this case, the Court pointed out that one fundamental rule of statutory construction is togive significance, if possible, to every word or part, and harmonize the parts considering a particular clause or section in the context of the whole.

How does absolute immunity harmonize the competing Constitutional rights of defamation and the right to petition?

How does absolute immunity harmonize the competing federal laws that can be violated if absolute immunity is found.

Another factor to consider is legislation on the same subject,

Here we have 47 USC Section 223 which reads like this: "Whoever…utilizes any device or software that can be used to originate telecommunications or other types of communications that are transmitted, in whole or in part, by the Internet… without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person…who receives the communications…shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than two years, or bothpublic policy, violation of federal and State laws against discrimination.

Absolute immunity would contradict what Congress intended to do when it passed Section 223.

Under the rules of statutory interpretation, if the terms of a statute are by fair and reasonable interpretation capable of a meaning consistent with the requirements of the Constitution, the statute will be given that meaning, rather than another in conflict with the Constitution. Consequently, if feasible within bounds set by their words and purposes, statutes should be construed to preserve their constitutionality. This follows from the presumption that the legislative body intended to enact a valid statute. The rule in favor of a construction which upholds a statute’s validity plainly must mean that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, the court’s duty is to adopt the latter.

If immunity is granted, a “clever libeler” could easily escape liability by having some other Internet user who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, or who is anonymous, or who is judgment proof, publish libelous statements which another “Internet user” is free to republish.

In addition to destroying a person’s right to seek petition for redress against a person or entity that knowing allows another person to post, publish or report defamatory remarks, a finding that section 230 bestows absolute immunity on an ISP or user of an interactive computer service, will allow the ISP and/or user to escape liability for publications that invade a person’s privacy, false advertising and similar laws that would in any other situation be violated.

How can a finding of absolute immunity be harmonized with these other laws?

In the Appellate decision, the Court concluded that absolute immunity can not be harmonized. As noted by the Court, ‘Because section 230 does not "’speak directly’ to the question addressed by the common law" and is capable of more than one construction, we conclude that the statute should not be interpreted as having abrogated the common law principle of distributor or knowledge-based liability."

The fact that so many other cases have found immunity does not make them right. See Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 620 [A decision "is not authority for everything said in the . . . opinion but only 'for the points actually involved and actually decided' "].) The absence of any analysis renders this dictum unpersuasive. (See People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 915 [" 'we must view with caution seemingly categorical directives not essential to earlier decisions and be guided by this dictum only to the extent it remains analytically persuasive'

Moreover, the Appellate Court concluded that the speculative conclusion of the Zeran court that exposing Internet intermediaries to knowledge-based liability would significantly chill online speech is disputed by the speculations of other authorities. fn. 14 We set forth the views of some of the commentators who disagree with Zeran on this point solely to illustrate the nature of the ongoing debate

And at least one commentator who agrees that intermediary liability may chill online speech does not believe an absolute immunity is the appropriate response, because such a complete protection not only "ignores the power that the Internet gives irresponsible speakers to damage the reputations of their targets," but also "underestimates the benefits that defamation law may bring to Internet discourse." (Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace (2000) 49 Duke L.J. 855, 865.) Emphasizing that defamation law exerts a "civilizing influence" that makes meaningful public a "civilizing influence" that makes meaningful public discourse possible (id. at p. 886, citing Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution (1986) 74 Cal. L.Rev. 691, 713 and Post, Constitutional Domains (1995)), Professor Lidsky maintains that completely protecting Internet intermediaries who disseminate injurious speech deters citizens fearful of injury from engaging in Internet discourse and exacerbates "the largest single threat to meaningful discourse in cyberspace: incoherence."

A review of the Communication Decency Act history suggests that the reason for §230 stems from the fact that the electronic transmission of information created a substantial opportunity to distribute false information.

Prior to the enactment of §230, courts considering defamation claims involving Internet information service providers tended to look to the service provided and then analogize it to traditional legal categories. For example, under the common law, one who only delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person, i.e., “a distributor” was subject to liability only if he knows, or has reason to know, of its defamatory character. (Restatement of the Law (Second) Torts § 581(1), p. 231, (1977)). In contrast, one who republished a libel was subject to liability as if he had originally published the statement. Thus, a republisher of defamatory material is treated as a “publisher” of the material under the common law.

Congress’ decision to enact §230 and establish a distinction between parties who distributed defamatory statements and those that published them was further influenced by two cases: Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., (776 F.Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., (1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. (1995)). The plaintiffs in Cubby sued CompuServe, a computer information service that users could access from a computer. The plaintiffs accused CompuServe of posting defamatory statements about them on its computer service in a publication that CompuServe had posted for a third party. CompuServe moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was a distributor, and not a publisher, of the defamatory statements at issue. Accordingly, CompuServe argued, it could not be held liable because it did not know or have reason to know of the defamatory statements.

In short, the unambiguous language of §230 reveals that the legislative intent behind civil liability immunity was to protect Internet services providers and other similar types of Internet users, from liability on “account of” “any action taken in good faith to restrict access to material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, harassing or otherwise objectionable whether or not such material is constitutionally protected,” not a user who engages in the willful act of republishing libelous statements.

Consequently, granting immunity to any individual Internet user who intentionally republishes defamatory material, like Rosenthal, is contrary to 1) the legislative intent and 2) the constitutional protection afforded to individuals and to states charged with protecting its citizens against injury to their reputation.

The very title of the law, i.e., “The Communication Decency Act” is also inconsistent with absolute immunity. In other words, where is the “Decency” in granting Internet users immunity for libelous republications?

Finally, to uphold such an interpretation would also lead to absurd results since such a user could even profit from the defamatory message being spread, as the reputation of the hapless subject of the defamatory message is further harmed by the message’s continued propagation. Indeed, even if such a defamed plaintiff were to recover from the original author of a defamatory message, there would still be no incentive whatsoever for a malicious republisher to stop spreading the false, defamatory message.

As noted by the Appellate Court, Legislative use of the legally uncertain word "publisher" is simply too flimsy a basis upon which to grant providers and users of interactive computer services what amounts to an "absolute protection" requiring the "total sacrifice of the competing value served by the law of defamation" and”” the _subordination of "a concept at_ the root of any decent system of ordered liberty." (Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at p.

Because section 230 does not "'speak directly' to the question addressed by the common law" (United States v. Texas, supra, 507 U.S. 529, 534), and is capable of more than one construction, we conclude that the statute should not be interpreted as having abrogated the common law principle of distributor or knowledge-based liability

Indeed, one could argue from the enumeration of publisher and speaker in § 230(c)(1) that distributor was deliberately omitted." (Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230, supra, 61 Alb. L.Rev. 147, 162.) [FN 10

Contrary to your claim the Grell's arguments were bombing, in the Appellate decision, the Court noted that "the view of most scholars who have addressed the issue is that Zeran 's analysis of section 230 is flawed, in that the court ascribed to Congress an intent to create a far broader immunity than that body actually had in mind or is necessary to achieve its purposes. [FN 8] We share that view. Cognizant that, "while federal circuit court precedence on issues of federal law is certainly entitled to substantial deference, it is not binding" (Yee v. City of Escondido (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1349, 1351, affd. (1992) 503 U.S. 519; accord, 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 942, p. 983), we decline to accept Zeran ’s construction of the statute. [FN 9]

Indeed, a strict reading of section 230 shows that the only thing unambiguously communicated by the entire text of section 230 is a prohibition on the imposition of primary publisher liability on providers and users who act to restrict access to offensive or injurious materials. fn. 11 Because the statute does not clearly indicate an intention to [114 Cal.App.4th 1400] abrogate the common law principle of distributor liability, it is appropriate to inquire whether the legislative history demonstrates such an intention. (People v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1075; American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 480, 487-488; Lewis v. Ryan (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 330, 333.)

In the Legislative history of Section 230 Congress overruled Stratton Oakmont because it wanted "to remove the disincentives to self regulation" created by the decision. (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d. at p. 331

As Zeran acknowledges (129 F.3d at p. 331), the committee report pertaining to section 230 indicates only that the statute was designed to overrule Stratton Oakmont,

in short, in the Legislative History of Section 230, the legislative purpose and intent was to over rule the Stratton Oakmont case where liability was based on original publisher liability. The legislature, familiar with Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. (S.D.N.Y.1991) 776 F.Supp. 135 does not mention of this case in the legialative history. Cubby liability was based on distributor liability.

In short, Congress intended to encourage ISPs to monitor the content on the Internet, but if ISPs are granted absolute immunity for disseminating third-party defamatory material, then ISPs will not bother to screen their content at all because they will never be subject to liability.

If, on the other hand, ISPs could be held liable as a distributor for neglecting to monitor information or failing to remove objectionable content that is brought to their knowledge, then ISPs would have a greater incentive to screen content.

Common sense dictates that an ISP will not waste its time and money monitoring content over the Internet when it will suffer no repercussions from failing to do so. Thus, immunizing ISPs from distributor liability would frustrate Congress’s objectives under the CDA much more than would subjecting ISPs to distributor liability." (Patel, Immunizing Internet Service Providers From Third-

The stated policy objectives in the plain language and the legislative history of the CDA actually compel the conclusion that Congress intended for ISPs to remain subject to distributor liability in certain contexts. Section 230(b) states that ‘[i]t is the policy of the United States’ to: (1) ‘encourage the development of technologies that maximize user control over what information is received’ over the Internet, and (2) ‘remove disincentives [for ISPs to] develop[ ] and utiliz[e] … blocking and filtering technologies’ in order to facilitate the screening of ‘objectionable’ material displayed over the Internet. In other words, in enacting the CDA, Congress intended to create incentives for ISPs to screen and edit the content of information displayed over the Internet. If ISPs were immune from both publisher and distributor liability in third-party defamation claims, they would essentially be given blanket immunity from liability. This interpretation of the ‘Good Samaritan’ immunity, which is advocated in Zeran, would frustrate, rather than promote the purpose of the CDA. subject to liability.

Resting on the use of the ambiguous word "publisher" in section 230(c)(1), the Zeran court felt it unnecessary to examine anything else in the text of the statute to determine whether it "speaks directly" to the question addressed by the common law principle of distributor liability.

This omission is important because the text that the Zeran court failed to examine examination, sheds light on the breadth of the immunity Congress intended to create.

For example, in the findings and declarations set forth in section 230, Congress discuss’ the "opportunities for cultural development," and the "myriad avenues for intellectual activity" provided by "the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services" (§ 230(a) & (b)).

On the otherhand, nowhere in the findings and declarations is there any indication that Congress considered online speech in need of protection.

Further, there is no expression of general concern for the promotion of speech in section 230(c). As stated in the title of section 230 what Congress did express concern for was the "Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material,"

As clearly stated in Section 230(c)(2), the statute immunizes providers and users against liability on account of action "to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be . . . objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected," or to provide others "the technical means to restrict access to [such] material . . . ." (§ 230(c)(2)(A) & (B), italics added.)

The statute makes no reference to immunizing the provider or user of an interactive computer service from liability for publications that would otherwise violate federal law like the Fair housing Act or from injurious publications that the provider and/or user knows is a defamatory, discriminatory, or wrongful publication like false advertisements, and similar kinds of law.

The fact that there is no mention of immunity for such conduct is both negates the claim that Section 230 bestows absolute immunity on providers and users since such a conclusion would violate virtually every rule of statutory construction especially those rules that are to be applied when competing constitutional rights are at odds.

As noted in the Appellate decision, Congress does not write upon a clean slate. [Citation.] In order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must ’speak directly’ to the question addressed by the common law. [Citations.]" (United States v. Texas (1993) 507 U.S. 529, 534, italics added; accord, Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 92 ["it should not 'be presumed that the Legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by necessary implication'"].)

In sum, a distributor liability rule that encouraged some response by intermediaries would be socially efficient: the benefits from reduced defamation injury would likely greatly exceed the cost of response by intermediaries. Such liability seems particularly critical in online defamation cases, given those factors of cyberspace communication that both encourage production of serious defamation and limit a victim’s ability to bring original authors to account. Not surprisingly, many commentators have agreed that an intermediate form of liability for intermediaries would make the most sense. In fact, almost all of those who commented on Cubby viewed its imposition of distributor liability as the correct legal rule choice." (Id. at p. 620, fns. omitted; see also Butler, Plotting the Return of an Ancient Tort to Cyberspace, supra, 6 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L.Rev. 247, 272 [explaining why exposure to distributor liability "would do the least harm to the forum for free speech over the Internet"]; Bovenzi, Liability of Systems Operators on the Internet, supra, 11 Berk. Tech. L.J. 93, 139 [knowledge-based liability "would preserve freedom of expression on computer networks"].)

If my arguments bombed, so did the Appellate Courts. Hopefully, the California Supreme Court will see it differently and not be intimidated by all the major Interent providers who joined forces in support of absolute immunity, for one reason, it would cost them a little more money to make sure that Communication on the Internet retains some amount of Decency.

Christopher E. Grell

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Mr. Grell,

As you conveniently fail to mention, most if not all, of the arguments you are still making to justify allowing Polevoy to sue Rosenthal have been almost universally REJECTED by federal courts across the land.

The Court of Appeal’s decision on which you depend so heavily stands alone. I read in the papers that the California Supreme Court rebuked you during your presentation of the case that there was a shocking LACK of legal authority supporting Polevoy’s position (made by you) and abundant legal authority supporting Rosenthal.

Polevoy is still suing Bolen for money because Bolen is the original author of the article which you claim is not true and is libelous. You and Polevoy have yet to prove those claims are true in a court of law. All you have done so far is to just SAY what Bolen wrote is false and defamatory.

As a lawyer, you should know it is very easy to say something is true; it is an entirely different matter to prove it in a court of law. I know, life would be so much simpler if juries would just hand a plaintiff a bag of cash based simply on unproven allegations.

It seems to me that the result of the likelihood that the Supreme Court will reject your arguments and will overrule the Court of Appeal is that it means Polevoy will have one less deep pocket to reach his hands into. Polevoy can still go after Bolen. You may not like it, but we are a nation of laws which are designed for the good of EVERYONE, not just a chosen few. If Congress says you are wrong and Polevoy can’t sue Rosenthal for repeating an article which you CLAIM is libelous, then take it up with Congress, as the Supreme Court suggested. Stop blaming Rosenthal.

Finally I note that your posting and the many like it commenting on this case over the years have served only to publicize more the allegations about Polevoy. In a way, aren’t you contributing to publicizing the very same allegedly libelous things about Polevoy that you are complaining about?? If Polevoy had sued only Bolen in the first place, and not dragged Rosenthal into the lawsuit, most of us would probably never have heard about Polevoy’s alleged stalking, etc. If the Supreme Court concludes Rosenthal is immune then in a way I guess that helps you, too.

What irony eh?

Anonynmous

Also See:
BBC – iPod fans ’shunning iTunes store’, September 16, 2006

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